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Abstract 
This study investigated the perceptions of election stakeholders with regard to the 
management of the 2011 electoral processes in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). The involvement of civil society organizations, electoral experts and 
academia, including party agents as domestic observers and stakeholders in 
Congolese electoral processes, is crucial as they help electoral and participatory 
democracy to take root in the DRC. This study was underpinned by political trust, 
political support and neopatrimonial theories. Furthermore, a mixed methods 
research design was used in order to understand the perceptions of stakeholders 
on the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. The findings of 
the study showed that stakeholders‟ perceptions on the management of the 2011 
electoral processes in the DRC were driven by both internal and external factors 
pertaining to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) that have the 
potential to affect the electoral processes as well as the level of trust in the INEC 
and other institutions involved in the electoral processes.  
 
KEY WORDS: Electoral process, Independent National Electoral Commission, 
election management bodies, stakeholders, perceptions, integrity, impartiality, 
political trust, political support,  patrimonialism, Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT  
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with a total area of 2 345 000 square 
kilometers, is the third largest country in Africa after Sudan and Algeria. 
Geographically, it is located in the central Africa region. The DRC shares borders 
with nine states as follows: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Its population is 
approximately 77.433.744 inhabitants.1 The majority of the population is African 
and more than one hundred African languages are spoken. The most well-spoken 
are Chiluba, Kikongo, Lingala, and Swahili; and French is the only official 
language. The DRC is inhabited by around 450 ethnic groups. The country is 
subdivided into 10 provinces, namely: Bandundu, Equateur, Kasai Oriental, Kasai 
Occidental, Katanga, Bas Congo, Maniema, Province Oriental, North Kivu, and 
South Kivu. Kinshasa is the capital city of the DRC (see appendix A the map of the 
DRC). 
 
In 1879, the Belgian King Leopold II assigned Henry Morton Stanley2 to establish 
his authority in the Congo basin in order to take over trade opportunities in central 
Africa along the Congo River. 
                                            
1
 According to the United States based Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the estimated population 
in the DRC in July 2014 is 77.433.744 habitants. Source: CIA: Online. Available at:  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html#cg [Accessed: 27 
September 2014]. For many years, the DRC has not organized the census of its population. The 
last census in the DRC (Zaire) was organized in 1984.   
2
 Sir Henry Morton Stanley named Bula Matari (“Breaker of Rocks”) by the Congolese, became 
one of the most well-known British explorers. After becoming a naturalized American, he fought 
during the American civil war. He became famous when the New York Herald commissioned him 
to rescue David Livingstone in Africa. Furthermore, when Livingstone died in 1873, Stanley 
resolved to continue his exploration of the region, funded by the Herald, a British newspaper. He 
explored vast areas of central Africa, and travelled down the length of the Lualaba and Congo 
Rivers, reaching the Atlantic in August 1877, after an epic journey that he later described in 
'Through the Dark Continent' (1878). Failing to gain British support for his plans to develop the 
Congo region, Stanley found more success with King Leopold II of Belgium, who was eager to tap 
Africa's wealth. In 1879, with Leopold's support, Stanley returned to Africa where he worked to 
open the lower Congo to commerce by the construction of roads. He used brutal means that 
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Morton Stanley succeeded in the mission by dispossessing land ownership from 
chiefs3 (local or traditional authorities) who were trapped and handed over their 
land rights to the Association International du Congo (International Association of 
Congo) which was a King Leopold II trust company. Following the Berlin 
conference on Africa held from 1884-1885, The DRC, previously known as Congo 
Free State and then Zaire, was formerly allocated to King Leopold II as a private 
domain due to his pretending previous presence in the Africa Central region as a 
result of Stanley‟s exploration in the basin Congo River. Subsequently, the 
massive violation of human rights, exploitation of natural resources and enormous 
debt to the Belgian State led the King to transfer the Congo Free State to the 
Belgian government in 1908. After five decades of Belgian colonization, the DRC 
became an independent state on 30 June 1960.4 Joseph Kasa Vubu and Patrice 
Emery Lumumba became respectively the State President and the Prime Minister 
after being elected by the parliament house in 1960.     
 
Kabemba (2011:81) states that after independence, the country plunged into 
confusion and conflict. Thus in 1960, less than a fortnight after independence on 
30 June 1960, the Congolese leadership found itself unable to govern. According 
to Kabemba (2011:81), no ethnic group was prepared to tolerate others; the army 
mutinied against its officers‟ corps, Katanga seceded, and a rebellion was 
                                                                                                                                    
included the widespread use of forced labor. Competition with French interests in the region helped 
bring about the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) in which European powers sorted out their 
competing colonial claims in Africa. Stanley's efforts paved the way for the creation of the Congo 
Free State, privately owned by Leopold. Source: BBC: Online. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/stanley_sir_henry_morton.shtm. [Accessed:27 
September 2014]. 
3
 The chiefs considered Stanley as a guest and welcome him. However, Stanley took advantage 
on chiefs‟ hospitality in cheating and forcing them to sell their land. Those who tried to object were 
killed. The Belgian King hired Stanley as his personal head of a colonization project with almost 
unlimited resources. Online. Available at:  http://crawfurd.dk/africa/stanley.htm. [Accessed: 2 
February 2014].  
4
 The DRC gained its independence on 30 June 1960 from the Kingdom of Belgium following the 
violation of human rights and massive killings from 1885-1960 under the colonial authority. 
Subsequently, violence and massacre occurred in the country on 4 January 1959 which was a 
precursor of the independence.   
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launched in the east. The chaotic situation that ensued immediately after 
independence paved the way for General Joseph Désiré Mobutu to seize political 
power in a successful coup d‟état on 24 November 1965.  
 
On coming to power, General Mobutu who called himself Mobutu Sese Seko,5 
instituted a single party state system all over the country. From 1967 until 1990, 
the Mouvement Populaire pour la Révolution (Popular Movement for the 
Revolution) (MPR) was the only legal party in the country, and membership was 
compulsory and automatic for all citizens from birth (Kadima and Tshiyoyo 
2009:94). President Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the country for 32 years under a 
single party and neopatrimonial system characterized by kleptocracy and violent 
oppression of any form of opposition. On 17 May 1997, his regime was overthrown 
by the rebels of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du 
Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo) (AFDL) led 
by Laurent Désiré Kabila, with the backing of Rwanda and Uganda. In 1998, after 
having been told by some of his advisors that a Rwandan officer James Kabarebe 
was about to overthrow him, President Kabila decided on the dismissal of James 
Kabarebe as the chief of staff of the Congolese armed forces, and on his 
substitution by General Kifwa Celestin, who was Katangan, as was Kabila. 
President Kabila also sent back home all foreign armed forces. However, former 
backers of Kabila accused him of monopolization of power.  
 
It was against this backdrop that the DRC went into a second war led by former 
fellows6 of Laurent Désiré Kabila on 2 August 1998. Subsequently, President 
Kabila was assassinated on 16 January 2001 in Kinshasa. On attaining political 
power after the assassination of his father, the new President, Joseph Kabila 
Kabange, was committed to ending war in the DRC. In order to restore peace, a 
peace agreement was signed between the rebel movements, civil society, leaders 
from opposition parties and the government of the DRC in Pretoria (South Africa) 
                                            
5
 Claiming to return to African roots and identity, Joseph Désiré Mobutu later declared Congolese ( 
Zairois) should abandon western names to embrace African names as well as culture through the 
use of the concept the “retour” à l‟authenticité (return to our authenticity). For this reason, he 
changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko which means Mobutu forever and ever. 
6
 Former fellows of Laurent Désiré Kabila are Ruberwa, Nyarugabo, Bugera and James Kabarebe 
who created a second rebellion movement on 2 August 1998. 
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on 17 December 2002. This peace agreement framed the agenda for the transition 
process to a democratic as well as a peaceful state. Following the implementation 
of the peace agreement, the interim constitution came into force on 4 April 2003. 
As a result of the ending of political bargaining between Congolese parties, along 
with the establishment of political institutions, the interim constitution made 
provision for institutions supporting democracy during the transitional period: the 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the High Authority of Media, the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, the Rights National Observatory and the 
Commission on Ethics and Fight against Corruption. The IEC was a temporary 
institution responsible for preparing and organizing the constitutional referendum 
and the electoral processes during the transitional dispensation from 2003 to 
2006.  
The table below outlines the evolution of electoral practices in the DRC from 1960 
to 2011. It shows the different electoral experiences that the Congolese people 
underwent.  
Table 1.1 Historical evolutions of Congolese elections 
Periods Types of elections Observations 
1960 Multiparty Elections 
of Members of 
Parliament  
Firstly, members of parliament were elected. 
Secondly they elected respectively Mr Joseph 
Kasa Vubu as first President of the Republic 
and Mr Patrice Lumumba first Prime Minister. 
1964 Constitutional 
Referendum 
Congolese approved the constitution known as 
constitution of Luluabourg: 90.82% of voters 
approved the constitution and 9.18 % rejected 
it. 
1965 Legislative Elections Elections were organized under the multiparty 
system. 
1967 Constitutional 
Referendum 
Referendum was organized under single party 
system after the coup d‟etat of Mr Mobutu Sese 
Seko: 98.44% of voters said yes to the 
constitution and only 1.56% of voters said no to 
it. 
1970 Presidential Mr Mobutu Sese Seko, sole candidate, was 
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Elections elected as President of the Republic under the 
single party electoral system for the first term (7 
years). The Mouvement Populaire pour 
Révolution (MPR) became the governing party. 
In consequence there were no distinctions 
between the state and party. This meant the 
head of the party was automatically the head of 
the state (president of the country). 
1970 Elections of the 
National Assembly 
(Parliament) 
Elections organized under single party system. 
All members of National Assembly were 
partisans of the MPR.  
1975 Elections of 
National Legislative 
Council (which 
played the role of 
National Assembly)  
Elections organized under single party system. 
Elections took place by acclamations at mass 
rallies held throughout the country. 
1977 Presidential 
Elections 
Mr Mobutu Sese Seko was re-elected 
unopposed as President of the Republic and 
head of the party (MPR) for the second term 
under single party electoral system. 
1977 Elections of 
National Legislative 
Council 
Elections organized under single party system. 
All members of National Assembly were 
partisans of the MPR. 
1982 Elections of 
National Legislative 
Council 
Elections organized under single party system. 
All members of National Assembly were 
partisans of the MPR. 
1984 Presidential 
Elections 
Mr Mobutu Sese Seko was re-elected 
unchallenged as President of the Republic and 
head of the party (MPR) for the third term under 
single party electoral system. 
1987 Elections of 
National Legislative 
Council 
Elections organized under single party system. 
All members of National Assembly were 
partisans of the MPR. 
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2005 Constitutional 
Referendum 
Registered voters numbered 25 021 703. The 
total number of votes was 15 505 810 with a 
turnout of 62.0%. The number of voters who 
said yes to constitution was 12 461 001 
(84.31%) and the number of voters who 
rejected was 2 319 074 (15.69%). (Tshiyoyo 
2009:134) 
2006 Presidential 
Elections 
Election of Mr Joseph Kabila Kabange for first 
term (5 years) as President of the Republic at 
second round under a multiparty electoral 
system.  
2006 Elections of the 
National Parliament 
Elections of members of Parliament were 
organized under a multiparty electoral system. 
2011 Presidential 
Elections 
Mr Joseph Kabila Kabange was re-elected for 
second term as President of the Republic after 
one round of elections under a multiparty 
electoral system.  
2011 
 
 
Elections of the 
National Parliament 
Elections of members of Parliament were 
organized under a multiparty electoral system. 
The outcomes of 2011 electoral processes 
(presidential and legislative elections) in the 
DRC were widely considered as lacking 
credibility by the majority of electoral 
stakeholders (political actors, electoral experts, 
domestic and international election observers.  
Source: Adapted by the author from Tuseku 2012.   
 
1.2 BACKGROUND    
The holding of the 2006 elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo had a dual 
purpose. First, it was seen as a suitable way to bring peace after a long armed 
conflict and, second, it marked the end of the transitional government in the DRC. 
This was made possible when all parties7 to the DRC conflict (rebel movements, 
                                            
7
 Congolese Parties that participated in the political negotiations held at Sun City and later in 
Pretoria, South Africa, are generally perceived to be rebel movements such as: Liberation 
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government, political parties and social forces) agreed to sign the Global and 
Inclusive Agreement8 on 17 December 2002 in Pretoria. Following this agreement, 
the IEC was a transitional institution in charge of managing the 2006 electoral 
processes in the DRC in order to support electoral democracy. In spite of the 
instability and uncertainty that characterized the transitional period in the DRC, the 
IEC largely succeeded in managing both the electoral processes and the 
referendum for the new constitution. In doing so, the new constitution9, known as 
the constitution of 18 February 2006, established the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) as a State institution supporting democracy. In 
2010, all parties represented in Parliament agreed to the creation of the INEC as 
the institution for managing electoral and referendum processes in the DRC. The 
institutionalization of the INEC as the permanent Election Management Body10 
(EMB) meant that elections became the unique source of legitimacy for political 
power in the DRC. It was therefore expected that good performance by INEC 
would build confidence in electoral processes amongst the stakeholders and 
contribute to the consolidation of democracy. Thus INEC replaced the IEC, which 
was a provisional institution that arose from the political agreement among 
Congolese parties.  
 
In order to guarantee the integrity and credibility of the electoral processes, article 
211 of the constitution of the DRC lays out the function of the INEC. Its main 
function is to organize and manage electoral and referendum processes; in 
particular voter registration, the maintenance of the voters‟ roll, the management 
of voting operations and of vote counting, and the publishing of election results.  
                                                                                                                                    
Movement of Congo (MLC), Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), Rally for 
Congolese Democracy/Kisangani Liberation Movement (RCD/KML), Rally for Congolese 
Democracy National (RCD), including Mai Mai militia, political parties, civil society organizations 
and the government of the DRC. 
8
 Congolese political negotiations were ended by the endorsement of a global and inclusive 
agreement on transition in the DRC by all participants in order to bring peace back to the DRC 
after a long and bloody armed conflict. 
9
 The new constitution in the DRC was voted by referendum on 18 February 2006 to replace the 
transitional constitution that was adopted for the transition period from 2003 to 2006. 
10
 The article 211 of the Congolese Constitution establishes the INEC as a permanent Election 
Management Body and state institution in supporting democracy in the DRC. 
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The first test of the INEC in managing electoral activities was on the electoral 
operations of the 2011 presidential and legislative elections. 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Credible electoral processes are important pillars in the delivery of acceptable 
electoral outcomes. The lack of impartiality and independence in running elections 
affects the credibility and integrity of electoral processes, which results in declining 
stakeholders‟ confidence in electoral processes as well the legitimacy of political 
institutions. The observers of the DRC‟s 2011 electoral processes noted that the 
mismanagement of the vote tabulation process compromised the integrity of the 
election, which had been fraught with legal, technical, and logistical deficiencies 
from the outset (Dizolele and Kambale 2012:111). Given widespread allegations of 
irregularities in the running of the 2011 elections and since negative perceptions 
have the potential to destroy public trust in electoral democracy, thereby 
undermining the very core of participatory democracy as exemplified by the 
electoral processes, it is imperative to undertake research in this regard in order to 
examine stakeholders‟ views about the management of electoral processes in an 
attempt to shed more light on this crucial issue. 
 
1.3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
Against this backdrop, this research sought to investigate the following questions:  
1.3.1.1 Main question 
- What are the perceptions of stakeholders with regard to the management of the 
2011 electoral processes by the INEC in the DRC?    
1.3.1.2 Subsidiary questions 
- What factors affected the management of the 2011 electoral processes?           
- To what extent is the INEC free from partisan interference?  
- To what extent does the INEC build confidence in the 2011 electoral processes?  
-  What steps need to be taken to guarantee credible elections in future?  
 
1.3.2 OBJECTIVES AND AIM 
The overall aim of the study was to explore the perceptions of stakeholders on the 
management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. In order to achieve this 
aim, these related objectives were pursued:  
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1. To investigate electoral malpractices pertaining the management of the 2011 
elections; 
2. To assess the level of INEC‟s impartiality and independence in performing its 
tasks; 
3. To determine the level of satisfaction of stakeholders and their trust in the INEC; 
         4. To provide recommendations in order to improve the management of future 
electoral processes. 
          
1.4 RATIONALE  
This study is significant both on practical and theoretical grounds. This research 
attempts to contribute to the literature on democratization theory, which also deals 
with elections, electoral systems, governance, democracy and economic, social 
and cultural factors, but seldom focuses on the election management bodies. The 
intention of this research was to contribute to knowledge on the subject of election 
management as a central component in the continent‟s democratization process. 
In developing countries that include the DRC, the management of electoral 
processes has become the source of disputes, violence and even armed 
confrontation among election stakeholders. Therefore, it sought to address one of 
the most salient institutions in the democratization process, namely the EMB. To 
this end, Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe (2010:67) observe that many governments 
have established EMBs to support free and fair elections where all stakeholders 
can feel that their success or loss was fair. It has been recognized that tensions 
leading to confrontations that threaten state stability often arise during the 
preparation for elections, while conducting elections, and after election results 
have been declared (Hounkpe and Fall 2011). Additionally, Hounkpe and Fall 
(2011) assert that this may be upstream, where stakeholders do not agree with the 
rules that govern the electoral process or the modalities for the organization of 
elections; or downstream, where candidates who lost elections view the outcome 
of elections as not being a true reflection of the will of the electorate and choose to 
contest the results of polls (Hounkpe and Fall 2011:2). On the one hand, it was 
established that one of the fundamental prerequisites of a democratic polity is the 
extent to which elections are free and fair. This is where the role of election 
management bodies is of paramount importance (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe 
2010:66). On the other hand, after the announcement of electoral results by the 
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EMB, if some stakeholders do not have confidence in the entire electoral process, 
the question of election outcomes and legitimacy could be raised due to the lack of 
trust in the EMB. In this respect, the recent electoral experience in the 
management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC was examined in order 
to determine the perceptions of stakeholders on the management of the 2011 
electoral processes. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY     
This section provides an overview of the research framework and design that was 
used in carrying out this study. A methodology is the strategy, plan of action, 
process, or design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and 
linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes (Crotty 1998:3). 
The methodology applied to this study was a mixed methods approach. Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie (2004:17) define the mixed methods approach as the type of 
research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single 
study (see chapter Three).  
 
1.6 ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE DRC 
The constitution, electoral law and decisions, as well international covenants and 
treaties to which the DRC is party, constitute the legal framework of the 2011 
electoral process in the DRC. Elections are complex logistical, administrative, 
technical and political processes. According to Kadima (2009:11), the success of 
the electoral process depends largely on the independence, impartiality, 
professionalism, integrity and responsiveness of the EMB. The legal framework 
that governed the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC consisted of the 
Constitution the DRC, known as the Constitution of 18 February 2006, as well as 
the following laws: 
- Law No. 11/002 of 20 January 2011, revising the Constitution of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo of 18 February 2006 (instituting the simple majority 
presidential election system);  
- Law No. 10/13 of 28 July 2010, governing the establishment and function of the 
INEC and governing its internal organization; 
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- Ordinance No. 11/012 of 3 February 2011, formally installing the members of the 
INEC; 
- Law No. 11/003 of 25 June 2011, modifying Law No. 06/006 of 9 March 2006 on 
the organization of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, municipal and local 
elections;  
- Law No. 11/014 of 17 August 2011, on the allocation of legislative and provincial 
seats according to registered voters; 
- Law No. 04/002 of 15 March 2004, on political parties;  
- Law No. 04/028 of 12 November 2004, regulating the DRC citizenship; 
- Law No. 11/001 of 10 January 2011, on the composition and functioning of the 
Supreme Council of Audiovisual and Communication;  
- Decision No. 052 bis/INEC/BUR/11 of 18 August 2011 of the INEC, on the 
implementation of the Law No. 11/003 of 25 June 2011, modifying Law No. 06/006 
of 9 March 2006 on the organization of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, 
municipal elections; 
- Decision No. CSAC/AP/0002/2011 of 28 September 2011 of the High Council of 
Audio-visual and Communication, relating to campaign through the media.  
 
1.6.1 ELECTORAL SYSTEM  
According to Law No. 11/002 of 20 January 2011, modifying certain articles of the 
constitution, article 71 of the constitution made the following provision: the 
president of the state is elected by simple majority of suffrage. This means that at 
the presidential level, the electoral system is one of a simple majority, where the 
winner-takes-all principle is applied. Article 70 of the Constitution stipulates that 
the president of the DRC serves five years per term, for a maximum of two terms. 
In the DRC, at National Assembly level, the electoral law provides a mixed 
electoral system. Members of Parliament are elected through both constituencies 
based on a Proportional Representation-open party list (PR-open) electoral 
system, and single-member constituencies using the First-Past-The-Post (simple 
majority) system. Members of Parliament serve for five-year terms. 
1.7 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS  
- Elections stakeholders 
According to Wall, Ellis, Ayoub, Dundas, Rukambe and Staino (2006:201), 
stakeholders of an EMB are those individuals, groups and organizations that have 
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an interest or „stake‟ in the EMB‟s operations. They can be classified either as 
primary stakeholders, who directly affect or are directly affected by the EMB‟s 
activities, policies and practices; or as secondary stakeholders, who have a looser 
connection with the EMB‟s activities. Genuine and open dialogue with 
stakeholders can contribute to confidence in the electoral process and trust in the 
EMB‟s activities.  
- Proportional Representation-open list 
The PR-open list is an electoral system in which voters have the liberty to choose 
the candidate from the party list according to their preference without any 
predetermined order of name on the list. The open list PR system is the electoral 
system in which the voters determine which candidate will be their representative. 
The candidate is elected according to the number of votes obtained. 
- Proportional Representation closed List 
The PR-closed list is an electoral system in which candidates are elected 
according to their position of appearance on a list as fixed and predetermined by 
the party itself. This means voters do not have the power to determine or to vote 
for the candidate of their preference. This is the case in South Africa where 
electors are required to vote for the party not for the individual candidate. In most 
cases, the ballot paper is designed in the way it represents the party names and 
logo as well as the picture of the party leader rather than the names of the 
candidates. Candidates are elected as a result of a fixed and predetermined list as 
submitted to the IEC by the parties themselves.  
- The First-past-the post 
The first-past-the-post is an electoral system in which the candidate who receives 
the most votes in an election is elected. There is no need to get a majority of votes 
(50 %+). The candidate who obtains a higher number of votes than other 
candidates in a given constituency is declared the winner.  
- Election Management Bodies 
Wall et al. (2006:5) notify that the complexity and specialist skills necessary for 
electoral management require that an institution or institutions be responsible for 
electoral activities. Such bodies come in a variety of shapes and sizes, with a wide 
range of titles to match, which include „Election Commission‟, „Department of 
Elections‟, „Electoral Council‟, „Election Unit‟, or „Electoral Board‟. In addition, Wall 
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et al. (2006) maintain that the term „Election Management Body‟ (EMB) has been 
coined as a name to refer to the body or bodies responsible for election 
management, whatever wider institutional framework is in place. An EMB is an 
organization or body which has the sole purpose of, and is legally responsible for, 
managing some or all of the elements that are essential for the conduct of 
elections and of direct democracy instruments such as referendums, citizens‟ 
initiatives and recall votes, if these are part of the legal framework.  
 
Wall et al. (2006:7-8) suggest three models of election management bodies, which 
are outlined as follows: 
The Independent Model of electoral management exists in those countries where 
elections are organized and administrated by an EMB which is institutionally 
independent and autonomous11 from the executive branch of government, and 
which has and manages its own budget. Under the Independent Model, an EMB is 
not accountable to a government ministry or department. According to Wall et al 
(2006:7-8), the EMB may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the 
head of state. Furthermore, Wall et al. (2006:7-8) contend that many new and 
emerging democracies have chosen the Independent Model of electoral 
management. Examples of EMBs under the Independent Model include Armenia, 
Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Estonia, 
Georgia, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Poland, South Africa, 
Thailand and Uruguay. In some countries, two bodies are established for the 
management of elections, both of which are independent of the executive and can 
be considered as independent EMBs. One of these bodies is likely to have 
responsibility for policy decisions relating to the electoral process, and the other to 
be responsible for conducting and implementing the electoral process. Provisions 
may exist which insulate the implementation EMB from interference by the policy 
EMB in staffing and operational matters. Examples of this „double-independent‟ 
                                            
11
 In this study the autonomous of the EMBs refers to the way EMBs conducting their internal 
activities (managing the elections , recruitment and training of election officers, conducting voter 
and civic education) vis-à-vis the Government. In this view, Maphunye (2014) declares that in each 
country, the autonomy of the EMBs is relative and depends on the provision made in the electoral 
legal framework.   
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framework under the Independent Model include Jamaica, Romania, Suriname 
and Vanuatu (Wall et al. 2006:7-8).   
 
The Governmental Model of electoral management exists in those countries 
where elections are organized and managed by the executive branch through a 
ministry (such as the Ministry of the Interior) and/or through local authorities (Wall 
et al. 2006:7-8). In addition, Wall et al. (2006:7-8) declare that where EMBs under 
the Governmental Model exist at national level, they are led by a minister or civil 
servant and are answerable to a cabinet minister. With very few exceptions they 
have no „members‟. Wall et al. (2006:7-8) posit that their budget falls within a 
government ministry and/or under local authorities. Countries whose EMBs fall 
into this model include Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore ,Switzerland, Tunisia, 
the United Kingdom (for elections but not referendums) and the United States. In 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, elections are 
implemented by local authorities. In Sweden and Switzerland the central EMB 
assumes a policy coordinating role (Wall et al. 2006:7-8). 
 
According to Mozaffar (2002:93), the EMBs are non-autonomous12 (located within 
the formal Government bureaucracy) in the following African countries: Cameroon, 
Congo, Côte d‟Ivoire, Guinea, Djibouti, Mauritania, Seychelles and Rwanda. 
In the Mixed Model of electoral management, there are usually two component 
EMBs, and dual structures exist: a policy, monitoring or supervisory EMB that is 
independent of the executive branch of government (like an EMB under the 
Independent Model) and an implementation EMB located within a department of 
state and/or local government (like an EMB under the Governmental Model). Wall 
et al (2006:7-8) state that under the Mixed Model, elections are organized by the 
component governmental EMB, with some level of oversight provided by the 
component independent EMB. The Mixed Model is used in France, Japan, Spain 
                                            
12
 Mozaffar (2002:91) identifies three types of EMBs in terms of autonomous as follows: 
-Non-autonomous EMBs located within the formal Government bureaucracy (Governmental 
model);   
-Semi-autonomous EMBs located within the formal Government bureaucracy but under the 
supervision of an autonomous body established specifically for that purpose;  
- Autonomous EMBs otherwise also known as Independent Electoral Commissions. 
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and many former French colonies, especially in West Africa, for example Mali, 
Senegal and Togo (Wall et al. 2006:7-8).  
In addition, in Africa each country has a specific model of institution (EMB) in 
charge of managing the electoral processes. For instance, during the 2011 
elections in the DRC, the INEC was under the independent model.  
 
Moreover, within the SADC region the independent model of EMB seems to be the 
most established among members state. According to Balule (2008:109-110), all 
the SADC member States have established independent EMBs to manage their 
elections. Balule asserts that except the Republic of Angola, Mozambique and 
Namibia where their EMBs are established by statutes, other SADC member 
states have established their EMBs under their respective Constitution.  
 
Furthermore, Balule (2008:110) maintains that the legal instruments establishing 
these institutions save for Botswana and Lesotho expressly provide that they shall 
be independent in the exercise of their functions and shall not be subjected to the 
direction or control of any person. However, many EMBs do not comply with 
democratic political culture, standards and norms related to the management of 
elections in Africa and especially in the SADC region.  
 
- Electoral process 
According to Wall et al. (2006:330), the electoral process is a series of steps 
involved in the preparation and carrying out of a specific election or direct 
democratic instrument. The electoral process usually includes the enactment of 
the electoral law, electoral registration, the nomination of candidates and/or 
political parties or the registration of proposals, the campaign, the voting, the 
counting and tabulation of votes, the resolution of electoral disputes and the 
announcement of results. 
 
Wall et al. (2006:151-152) provide certain fundamental guiding principles of 
electoral management13 namely: independence, impartiality, integrity, 
transparency, efficiency, professionalism and service-mindedness as 
                                            
13
 A deeper understanding and more detailed discussion of guiding principles of electoral 
management  can be found in the Encyclopedia of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network at 
http://www.aceproject.org and The Management Design Handbook: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
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indispensable features of election administration in insuring integrity, legitimacy 
and credibility of electoral processes, no matter which model of EMB is used in 
managing electoral processes. These principles are discussed below. 
 
- Integrity: the ability to act in a non-partisan and independent manner by not 
acting to benefit political interests and/or corruptly, and by ensuring that the 
electoral law, rules and codes of conduct are followed; 
 
- Impartiality: the ability to be fair and to afford stakeholders equitable and honest 
treatment on a level playing field, and the ability to treat all stakeholders in an 
even handed, non-partisan manner; 
 
- Independence: meaning the ability to carry out the work without influence from 
or being under the control of an external force, such as the government or the 
ruling party; 
 
- Transparency: referring to the ability of the EMB to be open and truthful and to 
avail to stakeholders of timely information and access to EMB records; 
 
- Efficiency: meaning that optimal use of resources of all kinds and those 
electoral funds are used wisely, and all activities are designed and conducted in a 
sustainable and cost-effective manner; 
 
- Service-mindedness: ensuring that all activity is aimed towards the delivery of 
high-quality services to all stakeholders, and in particular voters;  
 
- Professionalism: meaning the meticulous and accurate implementation of 
electoral procedures as a key element for the delivery of credible elections. EMBs 
need to ensure that all election officials, whether core staff or temporary workers, 
are well trained and acquainted with the necessary skills so as to apply high 
professional standards in the implementation of their technical work. Professional 
training prompts public trust that the entire process is „in good hands‟. 
 
- Electoral integrity  
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Norris (2013:579) defines electoral integrity14 as complying with agreed 
international conventions and global norms15, which apply to all countries 
worldwide throughout the electoral cycle, including during the pre-election period, 
the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath. In addition, the recent Report of 
the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security (2012:6) defines an 
election with integrity as any election that is based on the democratic principles of 
universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and 
agreements, and is professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and 
administration throughout the electoral cycle. 
 
- Election quality  
According to Kadima (2009:5) it follows that the assessment of the quality of 
an electoral process is a complex process, for a number of reasons. These 
reasons include the logistical and financial challenge of monitoring an 
electoral process from its very early stages up to the final post-election 
stages, and the difficulty of accessing some of the hidden parts of election 
management, such as computerized results, tabulation and management.  
 
Alemika (2007:2) states that the concept of electoral quality is often used 
interchangeably with electoral integrity. Both concepts refer to the degree of the 
freeness and fairness of elections. There are several factors that impact on the 
quality and integrity of elections. Among these are (a) legal framework; (b) 
electoral system; (c) technical efficiency of electoral management authority; (d) 
relative autonomy of the electoral agency from interference by other organs of 
government and the ruling party; and (e) degree to which electoral processes, 
decisions, participation and outcomes are insulated from manipulation, corruption, 
and violence.  
                                            
14
 In the case of this study the term electoral integrity refers to the extent to which the INEC 
complied with the democratic principles and international norms related to elections, in conducting 
the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC.    
15
 Global norms and international standards in this study refer to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights; African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; SADC Principles and 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; and Principles for Election Management, Monitoring 
and Observation.  
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The quality of elections around the world is assessed according to free and fair 
criteria. Mpabanga and Rakner (2007:7) declare that elections must comply with 
international standards in order to qualify as free and fair.  
 
- Perception 
Perception is the process of recognition, appreciation and being aware of 
something by means of the senses. According to the Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary (2006:1036), perceptions refer to a way in which something is regarded, 
understood, or interpreted. In this study, perceptions refer to the way election 
stakeholders observed, understood and interpreted the management of the 2011 
electoral processes in the DRC.  
 
- Free Elections 
Tlakula (2011:3) declares that for an election to be free, citizens must have the 
right and opportunity to choose. There must be freedom of assembly, association, 
movement, and speech for candidates, parties, voters, media, observers and 
others. The political environment should be free of intimidation, and there should 
not be any impediments to standing for election by both political parties and 
independent candidates. Therefore freedom is an essential precondition to 
meaningful elections.  
 
- Fair elections 
According to Tlakula (2011:3), for an election to be fair, it must have honest voting 
and counting, and be administered without fraud or manipulation by impartial 
election authorities. Political parties and individuals must have reasonable 
opportunities to stand for election, and there must be prompt and just resolution of 
election-related disputes and grievances, before and after election day. Fairness 
also requires a „level playing field‟. Misuse of public resources for campaign 
purposes and incumbency should be avoided, and all parties and candidates must 
have an adequate chance of communicating with the voters, including reasonably 
equitable access to the media. Furthermore, for elections to be fair official 
announcements of results should be expedited and electoral complaints should be 
treated with impartiality. 
 
19 
 
In the same vein, Elklit and Svensson (1997) are questioning what makes 
elections free and fair. For them, the translation of theoretical concepts such as 
free and fair into practical factors has proved difficult (Eklit and Svenson 1999). In 
addition, Eklit and Svenson (1999) declare that the pre-election period is 
especially important: it is at this stage that observers must assess whether the 
election law and the constitution guarantee the freedom of the voters, and verify 
that relevant resources are not too unequally distributed among competing parties 
and candidates. They argue that:  
Whereas, freedom is a necessary though not sufficient condition for an 
election's acceptability, the combination of freedom and the fair application 
of electoral rules is both necessary and sufficient for such acceptability. For 
an election to be free and fair, however, the main competitors should have 
had at least some access to campaign resources and the media, even if that 
access was not fully equal. In determining the acceptability of a given 
election, observers should focus on the degree of conformance to the 
country's election law and related regulations, considering not just election-
day events but also the periods before and after the balloting 
 
Table 1.2 below summarizes the nature of the electorate, the exercise of the right 
to vote and defines the characteristics required of the voters, parties and 
candidates; and the electoral campaign itself. 
 
Table 1.2 Free and fair election patterns. 
Freeness: nature of the electorate Fairness: securing a level 
playing field 
a) All adults are qualified voters;  
b) Each voter has only one vote;  
c) Each voter has an equal opportunity to 
participate in the elections;  
d) When casting their votes the electorate 
should be free to choose among the 
alternatives (parties‟  candidates) without 
threat or coercion and without being 
compensated for choosing a particular 
a) The criteria for registering parties 
and nominating candidates; 
 b) Each party or candidate should 
have an equal opportunity to present 
to the voters their arguments, both 
arguing for their own case as well as 
to formulate a critique against the 
incumbent government;  
c) None of the contenders should 
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alternative;  
e) Each vote is counted only once and for 
the person/party chosen by the voter;  
f) Only ballots cast by the voters are 
included in counting. 
have greater access to resources 
that are supposed to be neutrally 
and evenly distributed, should be 
politically neutral.  
 
Table 1.2 adapted by the author from Mpabanga and Rakner (2007:8) 
1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study only focuses on the exploration of stakeholders‟ perceptions of the 
2011 electoral processes. The views of stakeholders on the management of 
electoral processes constitute the essential matter of this study. This study did not 
intend to attend to all stakeholders in the DRC. However, in this study 
stakeholders are a sample of domestic election observers, electoral experts and 
selected members of civil society who were involved in the 2011 elections. In 
addition, twelve key informants were interviewed and 120 self-administration 
questionnaires were distributed. The researcher conducted field work in Kinshasa 
from June to July 2013 and October to December the same year. For this reason, 
the researcher did not intend to produce statistically generalizable findings.  
 
1.9 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter one introduces the study and provides the background, research problem, 
aim, objectives and rationale of the study. It also provided the limitations, 
methodology and definition of key concepts in relation to the study.  
 
Chapter two deals with the theoretical framework and the literature review in 
relation to this study. The literature review focused on the management of 
electoral processes. In addition, political trust, political support, patrimonialism and 
neopatrimonialism theory helped to investigate factors that contribute in shaping 
stakeholders‟ perceptions in the management of elections. These concepts also 
helped to gauge the stakeholders‟ trust with respect to the management of 
elections in order to understand their perceptions of the 2011 electoral processes 
in the DRC.  
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Chapter three highlights the methodology. It intended to shed light on the data 
collection techniques used during the data gathering phases. The research 
design, data collection and analysis are also discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter four analyses and interprets the findings. Finally, Chapter five 
summarizes the findings, presents conclusions and recommendations. 
1.10 SUMMARY 
This chapter gave a succinct overview of the historical and political context in 
which the Congolese 2011 election was organized. It further provided the problem 
statement, research question, objectives and rationale of the study on 2011 
election management in the DRC. The scope of the study, an overview of the 
methodology and concepts related to election management were discussed in this 
chapter. The following chapter will discuss the literature relevant to election 
management and the theoretical framework that underpins this study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to explain what has been studied previously in 
order to determine what remains to be studied in future research. Gray (2014:98)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
notes that a comprehensive review of the literature is essential because it serves a 
number of purposes, including: providing an up-to-date understanding of the 
subject, its significance and structure; identifying significant issues and themes 
that present themselves for further research, particularly where there are gaps in 
current knowledge; guiding the development of research topics and questions; 
assisting future researchers in understanding why the research was undertaken, 
its design and direction, and helping others to replicate the research; and 
presenting the kinds of research methodologies and tools that have been used in 
other studies, which may guide the design of the proposed study. 
 
There are a range of publications dedicated to the 2011 elections in the DRC (see 
Dizolele and Kambale, 2012; Mangu, 2013). The literature review in this study 
revolves around various themes which are related to the topic. Furthermore this 
chapter lays out the theoretical framework that informs this study on the 
perceptions of stakeholders with regard to the 2011 elections in the DRC.  
 
2.2 REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE   
The literature review discusses scholarly and other publications related to the role 
of the Election Management Body (EMB) as an institution responsible for 
managing all election phases and stakeholders‟ views of electoral processes. 
 
2.2.1 LEGAL BASIS FOR CONDUCTING ELECTIONS IN AFRICA 
The African Union‟s Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Chapter 
7, Article 17) and Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in 
Africa, which was adopted in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, made provisions 
for holding regular, transparent, free and fair elections and the establishment of 
independent and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for the 
management of elections within all member states.    
 
In a recent report entitled “Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence” 
published by the African Union Panel of the Wise (Panel of Wise 2010:9) it was 
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confirmed that for elections to enhance democracy, relevant institutions need to be 
built, including impartial and independent election management bodies, and the 
roles of political parties and civil society organizations in all stages of the electoral 
cycle need to be guaranteed. This report examines the political context and legal 
framework that can help prevent election-related violence. It maintains that an 
independent and impartial national electoral body assuredly in charge of election 
management should be established and strengthened in order to ensure the 
credibility and transparency of electoral processes.    
 
Matlosa (2004) examines the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections. He highlights the fact that there are three instruments which 
deal with elections in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 
first is the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; the 
second is the SADC Parliamentary Forum (PF), a parliamentarian initiative that 
developed norms and standards for elections in the SADC region since 2001; and 
the third is an initiative of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the election 
management bodies (EMBs) known as the Principles for Election Management, 
Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO) in the SADC region.  
 
Moreover, Matlosa states that technically, the SADC Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections suffer some kind of schizophrenia: it is more of 
an election observation guideline than a document on election management 
principles; although SADC leaders tend to think that it is in fact an election 
principles document. It is more inclined towards election observation than election 
management. Matlosa declares that methodologically, the correct title for this 
document should have been SADC Principles and Guidelines for Observation of 
Elections, given that it is more elaborate on observation than it is on election 
management as such. In contrast, the SADC Parliamentary Forum (PF) guidelines 
are more comprehensive on election observation and less so on management.  
Matlosa concludes that the three instruments can be used independently of each 
other in election management and observation and there should not be concerns 
regarding duplication, since they would be administered towards the same end-
goal: democracy consolidation and political stability (Matlosa 2004:20). In order to 
determine the quality of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC, the researcher 
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made use of the PEMMO as a tool for analyzing the preparation, conducting and 
observation of the 2011 Congolese elections, since it encompasses all dimensions 
related to the holding of credible elections.  
 
According to Kambale (2012:1-2) the Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance adopted by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in 2001 states that among the principles to be declared as 
constitutional principles shared by all Member States is that every accession to 
power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections (article1[b]). The 
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance also specifies that the 
bodies responsible for organizing the elections shall be independent or neutral and 
shall have the confidence of all the political actors (article 3). Kambale‟s study 
sheds light on the evolution of electoral management and its impact on the quality 
of citizenship, and political participation in West African countries. Kambale 
(2012:9) claims that the central role that electoral management is now playing in 
the political life of an increasing number of African countries means that the 
management of elections is now also at center stage.  
 
Kambale (2012:9) concludes that the institutional framework for these bodies, and 
their endowment with adequate human and financial resources, has thus become 
an important concern in the constitutional reforms that have accompanied the 
second wave of democratization in West Africa. 
 
2.2.2 IMPORTANCE OF ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN MANAGING 
ELECTORAL PROCESSES 
In a study entitled “Matters Arising: African Elections and the Problem of Electoral 
Administration”, Jinadu (1997) draws attention to the structure that is required in 
order for elections to be organized and conducted, rather than on the election 
outcomes. He states that the centrality of elections presupposes the importance 
particularly of the impartial electoral administration. In order to shed light on 
matters surrounding elections in Africa, Jinadu (1997:1) cautions: “elections have 
to be organized and conducted; who does this and how it is done, the structure 
and processes for doing it, are all of paramount importance”.  
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In a study entitled “Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance”, 
Pintor-Lopez (2000:13) underlines the importance, role and challenges of an 
Elections Management Body (EMB) for democracy-building in developing 
countries, as opposed to old democracies. 
 
Pintor-Lopez observes that the United States established the Federal Election 
Commission only in 1975; Australia created its Electoral Commission as an 
autonomous body as late as 1984; in the United Kingdom, the desirability of 
introducing a general electoral authority into the country‟s political system is still 
being discussed. In both new and older democracies, arguments advocating the 
establishment of independent electoral bodies highlight the importance of these 
structures in promoting democratic technical efficiency. 
 
Besides, Pintor-Lopez (2000:21-24) examines EMBs as permanent public 
institutions of governance in a democratized world. He discusses technical 
aspects of their sustainability, as well as their contribution to the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions and to their enhancement of the rule of law in a democratic 
state. In addition, Pintor-Lopez also explores main structural patterns of EMBs by 
regions of the world as well as by political and cultural traditions. Furthermore, 
Pintor-Lopez also provides three-fold classifications for running elections: Around 
53% of countries have elections run exclusively by independent EMBs, a total of 
27% have elections conducted by the government under the supervision of an 
independent collective authority; finally, in only 20% of the countries are elections 
organized exclusively by the executive (Pintor-Lopez 2000:26).   
 
Table 2.1 Mode of elections management worldwide 
53% of countries 27% of countries 20% of countries 
Elections run 
exclusively by 
independent EMBs 
Elections run under the 
supervision of an 
independent collective 
authority 
Elections run 
exclusively by the 
executive 
Table 2.1 adapted by the author from Pintor-Lopez (2000:26) 
Pintor-Lopez (2000:123) concludes by averring a significant contribution of EMBs 
to democracy and the rule of law.  
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Pastor (1999:5) argues that during the transition toward democracy in developing 
countries, the administration of elections takes on the status of great importance. 
Because the stakes are so high, the failure to conduct elections efficiently and 
impartially could lead to violence. In addition to this, Pastor also provides reasons 
as to why democratic transitions derail during the electoral process. The author 
sheds light on some reasons: the character, competence and composition of 
election management bodies; the weakness of the state; and bureaucratic 
incapacity, which often affects the quality of electoral processes in developing 
countries such as the DRC.   
 
In the same vein, Harris (1998:310) argues that the primary purpose of any 
electoral administration body is to deliver credible free and fair election services to 
the candidates and voters. In doing this, it must ensure that the integrity of each 
election process is adequately safeguarded from incompetent election officials and 
fraudulent manipulators. Issues relating to impartiality and independence, 
efficiency, professionalism, and transparency are particularly important in the 
context of suspicion and mistrust that characterizes post-conflict elections (Lyons 
2004:45). 
 
2.2.3 ELECTION STAKEHOLDERS AND MANAGEMENT OF ELECTORAL   
PROCESSES 
Stakeholders in elections are individuals, groups and organizations that have an 
interest or stake in the electoral processes (Wall et al.  2006:201). According to 
Wall et al. (2006), stakeholders of an EMB affect directly or are directly affected by 
an EMB‟s activities, policies and practices. Genuine and open dialogue with 
stakeholders can contribute to confidence in the electoral process and trust in the 
EMB‟s activities.  
 
According to Wall et al. (2006:330) the electoral process is defined as a series of 
steps involved in the preparation and carrying out of a specific election or direct 
democratic instrument. The electoral process usually includes the enactment of 
the electoral law, electoral registration, the nomination of candidates and/or 
political parties or the registration of proposals, the campaign, the voting, the 
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counting and tabulation of votes, the resolution of electoral disputes and the 
announcement of results.  
 
In a study entitled “Assessment of Elections Stakeholders in Elections 
Management”, Norman (2010:320) claims that election stakeholders include all 
individuals and organizations that conduct the elections or ensure that the 
elections occur; and individuals for whom elections are performed. Furthermore he 
concludes that thorough accomplishment of election management depends on two 
aspects of the role players: the competence of the election management body, 
and the ability of election stakeholders to articulate the rules and regulations that 
govern elections (Norman 2010:326). 
 
Tötemeyer (2010) in an article titled “Namibia‟s Constitution, Democracy and the 
Electoral Process” reminds us that the most important stakeholders in an election 
in the Namibian context are the governing electoral bodies, the Electoral 
Commission, and the Directorate of Elections, along with political parties, the 
associations and organizations participating in elections, and civil society, 
particularly the electorate. Focusing on the Namibian case, Tötemeyer declares 
that the building of democracy includes not only the pursuance of political values 
and political attitudes that uphold democracy, but also the conducting of 
comprehensive voter registration, effective electoral campaigns, and proper voter 
education as an integral part of the electoral process. An electoral process can 
only be meaningful if voters understand the essence and consequence of 
democracy as it relates to elections (Tötemeyer 2010:289-290). 
 
According to Jinadu (1997:2), electoral process refers to  the rules, procedures 
and activities relating to, among others, the establishment of electoral bodies, the 
appointment of their members, the registration of voters, the nomination of 
candidates, balloting, counting of the ballots, the declaration of results, the 
selection and training of electoral officials, constituency delimitation, voter 
education and, in some cases, registration of political parties and supervision of 
party nomination congresses.  
 
Ijim-Agbor (2007) discusses the neutrality of the Nigerian EMB in delivering 
credible electoral outcomes during the 2007 elections. Ijim-Agbor (2007:81) 
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asserts that it is widely held by election observer missions and other participants 
that the 2007 Nigerian elections were heavily flawed. Nigeria‟s INEC has been 
accused of partiality and outright collusion with the police, other security 
organizations, the executive arm of the government and the People‟s Democratic 
Party (PDP) to rig the elections in favor of the PDP. This collusion manifested in 
massive stuffing of ballot boxes, deliberate delays in delivering election materials 
to areas considered non-PDP strongholds, and the issuing of fake results sheets. 
In addition, Ijim-Agbor (2007:93) suggests that the Nigerians need to evolve an 
electoral process where each vote is taken into account; and the Nigerian state 
should develop the ethics of participation, with citizens having a greater voice in 
government through their votes.   
 
In their book entitled Electoral Democracy in Uganda: Understanding the 
Institutional process and outcomes of the 2006 multiparty elections, Makara, 
Rakner and Rwengabo (2008) analyze the role of the Ugandan Electoral 
Commission (EC) in administering the 2006 multiparty elections (presidential and 
parliamentarian). They contend that in order to guarantee legitimacy, the electoral 
process should be regulated by constitutional rules and special legislation as well 
as by cultural norms developed to govern the behavior of the actors. They 
maintain that the key factors in achieving this are the quality of the electoral 
process, the capacity of the administrative unit mandated to administer the 
elections and the unit‟s autonomy from political forces (Makara et al. 2008:90).  
Debrah, Pumpuni, and Gyimah-Boadi (2010:7) conducted a study on Ghana‟s 
Electoral Commission; they stated that since failure of the election authority to 
manage credible elections has serious ramifications for democratic legitimacy, 
assessing the performance of Ghana‟s Electoral Commission (EC) seems most 
appropriate and salient because of its multiple implications for other governance 
institutions in Ghana and elsewhere. In their study, they investigated whether the 
EC as a governing institution performed in accordance with principles of 
governance. They identify factors that could contribute to failure or success of the 
EC in Ghana, and Debrah et al. (2010:26) are of the view that efficient electoral 
management is crucial.  
Efficient electoral management is capital intensive; lack of or delay in releasing 
resources for the good functioning of the EC can compromise the integrity of the 
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election and democratic process. Debrah et al. (2010:26) recommend that, in 
order to overcome recurrent insufficient financial resources for elections, 
stakeholders may agree by consensus to set up an election fund for managing 
elections.  
 
Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe (2010) in their study on the management of 
elections in Botswana, highlight the uncontested role of elections as an important 
ingredient in liberal democracy. They argue that Botswana is an election success 
story in Africa and beyond. They assert that one of the fundamental prerequisites 
of a democratic polity is the extent to which elections are free and fair. This is 
where the role of election management bodies (EMBs) is of paramount importance 
(Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe 2010:66). However, Maphunye, in a paper 
presented in 2013 during the colloquium on Electoral Democracy in Africa, 
questioned the independence of the IEC in Botswana. Maphunye claims that there 
is no clear difference between public servants and elections officials, as long as 
the IEC is still under state control in terms of election commissioners‟ appointment 
as well as logistical means (finances, buildings, cars, etc.).    
 
In his article entitled “Election Management Bodies in Africa: Cameroon‟s National 
Elections Observatory in perspective”, Fombad analyses the Cameroonian 
National Elections Observatory (NEO). He claims that a selected type of EMB is at 
stake not only for the reason that it is shaping the nature of political competition, 
but because it could affect the credibility of electoral outcomes in any electoral 
processes. Fombad concludes that elections could lose their relevance as an 
effective means of enforcing governmental responsibility and accountability and 
may give rise to the feeling that government can neglect people‟s welfare as much 
as it likes and still manage to return to power against the will of the people 
(Fombad 2003:50).  
 
In a study entitled “Election Management in Cameroon: progress, problems and 
prospects”, Menang (2006:69) asserts that the most important challenge facing 
election managers in Cameroon is the building of public confidence in the electoral 
process to the extent that election results are readily accepted and cease to be the 
subject of such controversy that they threaten the stability of the country‟s 
democratic institutions at the end of each electoral process. Further, Menang 
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(2006:70) declares that for public confidence in the electoral process to grow, 
election stakeholders must comply with the laws that govern elections. 
Furthermore, Menang recommends the reform of the EMB by adapting electoral 
laws perceived as a source of conflict: this can be accomplished by including 
several new measures in order to strengthen the EMB, harmonize procedures, 
restrain impunity, and restructure functions. 
 
Rakner and Svåsand (2005) in a working paper entitled “Maybe Free but not Fair: 
Electoral Administration in Malawi 1994-2004”, assesses the Malawi Electoral 
Commission‟s (MEC) autonomy, capacity and relationship with stakeholders 
through the electoral process in Malawi across three consecutive elections. He 
argues that the quality of the elections, in terms of voter participation (registration), 
a level playing field for campaigning, and certainty about the rules and regulations 
guiding the electoral exercise, have not improved significantly. The lack of 
improvement of the electoral process continues to undermine the legitimacy of 
elections and prevent the consolidation of democracy (Rakner and Svåsand 
2005:16).  
 
Ibrahim and Garuba (2010), in Codesria‟s commissioned study of the Independent 
National Electoral Commission of Nigeria,  examine in a holistic way (the structural 
culture of the organization, legal framework, composition, institutional autonomy, 
internal structure and capacity, functioning and performance with particular 
respect to transparency, accountability and democratic governance, as well as 
public perception and credibility) factors that contribute to shaping perceptions of 
the quality of the management of electoral processes. Ibrahim and Garuba 
(2010:4-6) set up an analytical framework of electoral processes that include 
indicators and areas of assessment such as public perception and public 
confidence in the institution, quality of the leadership of the institution, level of 
public trust in the institution, level of development of the political system and how it 
influences the electoral authority‟s (EA) performance. 
 
In an article entitled “Independent Electoral Commission in Tanzania: a false 
debate?” Makulilo declares that the importance of elections in the contemporary 
world calls for the need to establish an impartial body to manage them. The 
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establishment and operation of this body, however, must meet the principles of a 
credible election administration. He therefore examines the independence of the 
Tanzanian EMB, and its capacity to promote free and fair elections. Taking into 
account the perceptions of political parties and the public about the National 
Election Commission (NEC), Makulilo (2009:446) is of the opinion that from its 
formation to date, the NEC has not enjoyed the confidence and trust of some of 
the key stakeholders in elections; that is, the political parties (particularly the 
opposition parties) and the general public. 
 
In their study of electoral processes in post-apartheid South Africa, Struwing, 
Roberts and Vivier (2011:1127) argue that confidence in the electoral process is 
enhanced and strengthened by trust in the institution, which enhances the 
electoral process in South Africa. This point of view came about as a result of two 
nationwide surveys that were conducted in South Africa. The Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC) organized (from 1998 to 2001) the first survey called 
Evaluation of Public Opinion (EPOP), and the South African Social Attitudes 
Survey (SASAS) ran from 2003 to 2010. At the same time, these authors 
scrutinized voting behavior, perceptions of electoral processes and the 
performance of the South African Electoral Commission using both the 2010 Voter 
Participation Survey (VPS) and the 2011 Election Satisfaction Survey (ESS) in 
order to capture perceptions of voters regarding the 2011 local government 
elections in South Africa. Subsequently, this study assessed public opinion about 
the South African Electoral Commission and measured people‟s trust in the 
political system and other social and political institutions in South Africa. Struwing 
et al. (2011) discovered that the level of the general public trust had increased due 
to the performance of and various efforts by the South African Electoral 
Commission, which were aimed at being responsive, proactive and innovative.  
 
Birch (2008:306-307) states that it is worth noting that elections are a process that 
ordinary citizens are more likely to be competent to assess than most government 
procedures, given widespread participation and the attentiveness this is likely to 
breed. In this regard, Birch is of the view that any individual voter may have the 
capacity to evaluate electoral processes. While this might be true in established 
democracies, it may not be the case in new democracies or countries attempting 
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democratic transition. Such countries also countries face problems related to 
illiteracy that might undermine citizen participation.  
 
In addition, Kerr (2009:9-10) argues that citizens are, for the most part, capable of 
assessing the capacity and autonomy of the electoral commission through direct 
experience with the EMB and indirect information about the EMB. According to 
Kerr, voters who have experienced electoral processes through voter registration, 
voter education, and polling activities are most capable of assessing the 
performance (capacity and autonomy) of the EMB. Kerr‟s main argument is that 
the performance of the EMB influences citizens‟ confidence in the EMB and 
consequently shapes citizens‟ perceptions of election quality. Being involved in the 
2011 electoral processes in the DRC, stakeholders had experiences that shaped 
their perceptions of the INEC in terms of independence and impartiality. For 
instance, stakeholders who were interested in the 2011 elections would be more 
able to assess the electoral processes throughout the pre-elections phase, 
elections phase and post-elections phase than those who were not involved. 
Hence, the Congolese electoral experience could have increased or decreased 
the level of stakeholders‟ confidence and trust in the INEC. 
 
In his article entitled “The Citizens‟ View on Electoral Governance in Mexico”, 
Ugues (2010:495) asserts that it is important to understand how institutions of 
electoral governance affect the credibility of elections but also how individuals 
view these institutions, as this may also affect their credibility within society. He 
explores how public opinion of an electoral governance institution is shaped within 
a particular country and context. Using data from the Mexico 2006 Panel Study, a 
public opinion study of Mexico‟s general election and campaign spanning from 
2005 to 2006, (Ugues 2010: 503), observes that the partisanship for the winning or 
losing party correlates to the positive attitudes or pessimistic views regarding the 
Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), which is the EMB in Mexico.       
 
Hall, Monson and Patterson (2009:10) indicate that rating the job performance of a 
poll worker as excellent continues to produce high levels of confidence. Their 
analysis revealed that voters who rate the job performance of poll workers as 
excellent were more likely to express more confidence in the process. They 
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recommended that election administrators should invest more in the recruitment 
and training of poll workers due to the fact that their efficiency could have an effect 
on voters‟ confidence in voting process.  
 
In their study entitled "Are Americans Confident their Ballots are Counted? “ 
Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn (2008:756) investigate the confidence American voters 
have that ballots were recorded as intended for the 2004 presidential contest 
between George Bush and John Kerry in the United States. In this study, they find 
a relationship between voter turnout and confidence. The more confident voters 
are, the more likely they are to turn out to vote. They believe that the study of the 
relationship between voter confidence and political participation may provide a 
better understanding of voter behavior in a representative democracy. Further, 
Alvarez et al. (2008:764) indicate that a significant difference in confidence levels 
exists along racial lines, as the proportion of the African American voters who are 
confident that their vote for President in the 2004 election was counted as 
intended is significantly lower than the proportion of white voters who are similarly 
confident. Alvarez et al. (2008:756) think that white Republicans are more 
confident than white Democrats due to a winner‟s effect stemming from the 2000 
and 2004 national elections. In Addition, they conclude that both political affiliation 
and voter familiarity with the electoral process, as measured by education and 
age, exert a significant influence upon confidence.  
 
In his study, „‟Election Observation and Monitoring in Botswana‟‟, Sebudubudu 
(2006:168) argues that election observation and monitoring have promoted 
transparency and accountability as well as public confidence in the credibility of 
the Botswana electoral process, especially in the recent years. According to 
Sebudubudu (2006:168), election observers and monitors are not only central to 
but have become part and parcel of the electoral process worldwide, especially in 
emerging or young democracies, as a way of promoting transparency in the 
electoral process and encouraging free and fair elections.  
Lekorwe (2006:65) states that election management is a service that normally 
attracts attention at the time of elections but is usually ignored during the intervals 
between them, a factor which can be costly. In his study, Lekorwe examines the 
role and the status of Botswana‟s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) which 
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is a subject of the opposition‟s criticism with regard to its independence from the 
government. Lekorwe (2006:76) emphasizes that the credibility of the election 
management body is essential to the holding of free and fair elections, and 
transparency is essential to credibility. Transparency can be facilitated by all 
stakeholders playing an active part and appreciating the role and functions of the 
commission (Lekorwe 2006:75). In the same vein Lekorwe (2006) claims that the 
confidence that is bestowed by members of the public in the IEC may be 
measured by voters‟ own views of the elections, the levels of accountability of 
politicians to voters, and the manner in which the commission renders its service 
to the public. 
 
In his article entitled “Evaluating Election Management in South Africa„s 2009 
elections”, Maphunye (2009:57) argues that most of the complexities relate to the 
fact that running an election is an elaborate process that requires various skills, 
including knowledge and expertise in implementing relevant legal and regulatory 
frameworks; public sector administration and management skills; effective 
organizational and events management measures; the ability to respond to the 
needs of the electorate in various ways, such as providing them with the 
necessary information before, during and after an election; and the ability to make 
the relevant arrangements.  
 
Harris (1998:310) states that the functioning of an electoral body should not be 
subject to the direction of any other person, authority or political party; it must 
function without political favor or bias. In addition, the body in charge of 
administering or supervising an election must be able to operate free of 
interference simply because any allegation of manipulation, perception of bias, or 
alleged intervention, will have a direct impact not only on the credibility of the body 
in charge, but on the entire process. In connection to this idea, Harris (1998:310) 
stresses that the failure to fulfill even a simple election task or activity may not only 
adversely affect the quality of the services delivered, but may jeopardize public 
perception of the competence and impartiality of election administrators.  
 
According to Adebayo and Omotola (2007:203-205), the certification by an 
election monitoring group that an election is free and fair is usually sufficient for 
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the citizens of a nation and the international community to accept the elected 
government as legitimate. Besides, Adebayo and Omotola argue that the 
importance of the certification of elections by monitoring groups is that the reports 
of election monitoring groups may be, to a very large extent, a reflection of the 
perception of the wider population. Adebayo and Omotola (2007:203) maintain 
that a critical dissection of such perceptions may be useful in identifying the 
strengths and weaknesses of the elections. It may also help in designing 
appropriate reform measures to protect the competitiveness, openness, freedom 
and fairness of electoral politics in the country. Adebayo and Omotola argue that 
in the absence of longitudinal data, perceptions of the 2007 Nigerian general 
elections were centered on the view of domestic and international observers, 
political parties, interest groups and individuals. 
 
2.2.4 FEATURES OF 2011 ELECTORAL PROCESSES MANAGEMENT IN THE 
DRC  
Dizolele and Kambale (2012:111) observe that with regard to the 2011 elections in 
the DRC, the poor election management and lack of expertise and skill among 
some election commissioners led to serious irregularities, including the loss of 
results from nearly two thousand polling stations in Kinshasa, as well as incredibly 
high voter turnouts, which exceeded 100% in the Katanga province. 
 
Dizolele and Kambale (2012:112) point out that the Roman Catholic Church, 
arguably the DRC‟s most influential institution, which itself deployed thirty 
thousand election observers across the country, backed the Carter Center‟s 
statement. Speaking at a press conference, Kinshasa‟s Archbishop, Cardinal 
Laurent Monsengwo, told journalists that the Electoral Commission‟s results 
represented neither truth nor justice. He stressed that the announced results 
posed a serious credibility problem for the election. Dizolele and Kambale 
underline the question of legitimacy and its aftermath due to irregularities and 
deficiencies that characterized the 2011 electoral process in the DRC.  
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Tshiyoyo16 (2012) sheds light on the preparedness of the INEC to manage the 
2011 electoral processes in the DRC. He stresses that if in 2006, elections were 
successfully organized and celebrated as a milestone in the peace process, it was 
unfortunate to note that ahead of the 2011 elections, the constitution was reviewed 
and tailor-made to suit President Joseph Kabila. In the same vein, following the 
constitutional revision, a number of substantial prerogatives of the Government, 
Parliament and the Judiciary were curtailed to the presidential office‟s benefit.  
 
Tshiyoyo (2012) notes that the 2011 elections were obviously a dilemma: to 
respect the constitutional deadline and organize botched elections; or ignore that 
deadline and slide into a situation of unconstitutional power. In conclusion, he 
asserts that the quality and integrity of the vote tabulation process has varied 
across the country, ranging from the proper application of procedures to serious 
irregularities (loss of nearly 2 000 polling station results in Kinshasa); multiple 
locations, particularly in Kabila‟s strongholds, reported high rates of 99% to100% 
voter turnout with all, or nearly all, votes going to the incumbent President. There 
were serious allegations of fraud in the parliamentary elections: Members of the 
National Assembly resembled appointees rather than elected representatives of 
the people of the DRC.   
 
According to Githaiga (2012), the second post-conflict election in the DRC took 
place in a context of significant challenges and was marred by allegations of 
electoral fraud and mismanagement. The pre-electoral climate was characterized 
by lack of confidence among elections stakeholders, persistent insecurity in parts 
of the country, and pervasive socioeconomic adversity. He points out that other 
aspects of controversy plaguing the work of the INEC were allegations of a lack of 
transparency and insufficient readiness for the elections. Following allegations of 
discrepancies in the voter register ranging from double registration to the 
registration of minors and militia members, the opposition launched public 
demonstrations demanding transparency, resulting in the INEC agreeing to an 
audit of the electoral register (Githaiga 2012:4). Additionally, Githaiga (2012:6) 
                                            
16
 „‟The 2011 Elections in the DRC: Assessing the electoral legal framework and CENI‟s 
preparedness to organize the 2011 elections‟‟. Presentation paper by Tshiyoyo (2012) at the 
National Library of South Africa (Pretoria) under the auspice of the Africa Institute of South Africa. 
37 
 
alleges that polling day was not without incidents. Githaiga claims that voters burnt 
down several polling stations in Kananga (Kasai Occidental province) and 
destroyed electoral materials in Lubumbashi (Katanga province) due to suspicions 
of fraud; gunmen in Lubumbashi opened fire at a polling station, killing three 
people; and other gunmen raided election material that was being delivered. 
Githaiga (2012:6-7) asserts that observers also highlighted other irregularities like 
voter intimidation by security forces, ballot stuffing, undelivered ballot papers and 
voters being turned away at polling stations. At the close of the polls, the vote 
counting for the presidential race began in the wake of rising controversy over 
limited access to compilation centers. This led to mounting suspicions of electoral 
fraud.  
 
Roberts (2011) states that the situation before the holding of the 2011 election in 
the DRC had become increasingly tense in the months running up to the elections. 
Roberts contends that the amendment of the electoral system in January 2011 
resulted in the scrapping of the second round of elections, and was the biggest 
blow for opposition parties aspiring to the presidency. An added frustration for the 
political opposition was the rumor of irregularities within the INEC as it promoted 
the possibility of vote rigging by the ruling party. 
 
The survey of the existing literature on EMBs reveals that there are many studies 
on elections management, types of EMB, and public perceptions on elections as 
well as the importance of elections in a democratic dispensation. However, the 
current study focuses on perceptions of stakeholders (especially domestic election 
observers and election experts) on electoral processes management. This study 
gives consideration to domestic election observers and election experts for their 
important role in accompanying voters and EMB officials through their advice, 
advocacies and observations with regard to the integrity of the electoral cycle. In 
the DRC, domestic election observers and election experts get involved in 
electoral processes from pre-election, on election day, and throughout post-
election phases. In addition, in this study, election experts and domestic election 
observers‟ views are important because they are informed and trained as well as 
have knowledge regarding electoral processes (legal framework, procedural 
issues and their implementation). For example, Struwing et al. (2011); Ugues 
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(2010) and Kerr (2009) dedicated their studies to the public opinion of elections. 
Ougude‟s article (2012) entitled “An appraisal of elections monitoring and 
observation in Africa: the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo‟s 2011 
presidential elections”, is relevant for this dissertation because it strives to 
understand what factors lead election observers and monitors to determine to 
what extent elections are credible. However, Ougude‟s article does not clearly 
show the method used to collect primary and secondary data as well as the unit of 
analysis.  
 
This study seeks to fill in this gap and contribute to the current literature on 
elections and democracy, by going beyond the legal framework and structural or 
functional organization of the EMB in investigating how stakeholders (domestic 
election observers and election experts) in elections perceive the quality of 
election management in terms of trust in the INEC, integrity and the credibility of 
electoral outcomes that reflect the will of the voters in the DRC.  
 
2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the theoretical framework that was used 
to guide this study and provide an understanding of the political and economic 
context as well as the practical manner in which the 2011 Congolese electoral 
processes were conducted. There is no single and specific theory that can explain 
the way in which stakeholders‟ perceptions of the quality of election management 
are shaped. This study is therefore informed by the following theories: political 
support, political trust, as well as neo-patrimonialism. 
 
2.3.2 THEORY OF POLITICAL SUPPORT  
Democratic regimes are dependent on citizens‟ political support. In representative 
democracies, political parties, elections, and civil society institutions act as agents 
of this support. In addition to these institutional channels, however, citizens‟ 
support of a democratic regime and its institutions are important for democratic 
sustainability (Aydin and Cenker 2012:230).  
 
According to Easton (1957:390) support means that B supports A either when A 
acts on B‟s behalf or when he orients himself favorably toward B's goals, interests, 
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and actions. In the same vein, he describes support as an attitude by which a 
person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or 
negatively.  
 
The Eastonian perspective of support emphasizes the fact that support is primarily 
about attitude, behavior, confidence or commitment, based on a mutual action 
directed to a person, a policy or an institution. Easton (1957) makes a distinction 
between two types of political support known as specific support and diffuse 
support. According to Easton in Dalton (1999:58), diffuse support is a deep-seated 
set of attitudes towards politics and the operation of political systems that is 
relatively impervious to change. Diffuse support has also been interpreted as 
measuring the legitimacy of a political system or political institutions. In contrast, 
specific support is closely related to the actions and performance of the 
government or political elites. In addition Easton (1957:391) specifies and 
examines the political objects in relation to which support is extended.17 In a 
similar way, Norris (1999) in a book entitled Critical Citizens’ Global Support for 
Democratic Governance, claims that political support should be understood as a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon. Norris (1999a:9) asserts that in practice people 
seem to make a judgment concerning different but related institutions within a 
regime, expressing confidence in the courts, for instance, while rejecting 
parliament. They often do appreciate democratic values, and for example they are 
able to criticize the way democratic governments work in practice.  
Additionally, Norris (1999a:10-12) sets up a framework which displays five 
domains of political support. Table 2.2 clearly displays to what extent a particular 
trend of support corresponds to a specific object of political support.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
17
 Three domains of support as identified by Easton (1957) are: political community, regime, and   
government. According to Klingemann (1999:33), political community is the cultural entity that 
transcends particularities of formal governing structures and inscribes the elemental identity of the 
collectivity constituting the polity. The regime is constituted of those principles, processes, and 
formal institutions that persist and transcend particular incumbents. The political authorities are 
those officials occupying governmental posts at a particular time.  
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Table 2.2 Support and trends   
Object of Support Summary of trends 
Political community High levels of support 
Regime principles High levels of support 
Regime performance Varied satisfaction with the working of 
the regime 
Regime institutions Declining confidence in government 
institutions; low levels of support in 
many newer democracies 
Political actors Mixed trends for trust in politicians 
Source: Norris (1999a:10) 
In the view of Norris (1999a:10-12), there are five level of support that are 
elaborated as follows:  
- The first level is about a diffuse support for the political community. Political 
community is usually understood as the essential prerequisite for the foundation of 
any stable nation state. Political community may be defined narrowly in terms of a 
local or regional community, or as political cleavages based on ethnic, class, or 
religious identities, as much as by physical geography.  
- The second level refers to support for the core regime principles representing the 
values of the political system in a democratic state. Nevertheless, according to 
Beetham (1994) and Simon (1996) as quoted by Norris (1999a:11) those values 
are basic principles of democratic regimes commonly understood to include 
freedom, participation, tolerance and moderation, respect for legal institutional 
rights, and the rule of law.  
- The third level concerns evaluations of regime performance, meaning support for 
how authoritarian or democratic political systems function in practice. For a deep 
understanding of any evaluation of a regime‟s performance, both Afrobarometer 
and Eurobarometer surveys reflect a real perception of the extent to which the 
public is satisfied with the incumbent government and how democracy is 
perceived to be working. This is a realistic way to portray the perception of the 
public on how the government performs in a practical way rather an idealistic one.  
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- The fourth level focuses on support for regime institutions. This includes attitudes 
towards governments, parliaments, the executive, the legal system and police, the 
state bureaucracy, political parties, and the military. 
- The last level is interested in comparing specific support for political actors or 
authorities, including evaluations of politicians as a class and performance of 
particular leaders (Norris 1999a:12).    
 
In the present study, the researcher supports the view of Dalton (1999:58-59) who 
refines the Eastonian model of system analysis in providing two categories of 
political beliefs (affective orientation and instrumental evaluation). In addition, 
Dalton (1999:58-59) points out that affective belief involves an acceptance or 
identification with an entity. It represents adherence to a set of values (what 
Easton labels diffuse support), and evaluative beliefs involve judgments about 
performance or appropriateness of the object; they reflect judgments about 
political phenomena (specific support).  
 
Table 2.3 is a combination of affective orientations, instrumental evaluations and 
political levels of analysis. It emphasizes the importance of making a distinction 
between two types of political beliefs in understanding how public attitudes are 
oriented toward the political process (Dalton 1999:58).     
 
Table 2.3 Types of political belief 
Level of analysis Affective orientations Instrumental 
evaluations 
Community National pride 
National identity 
Best nation to live in 
Regime principles Democratic values Democracy best form of 
government 
Regime performance Participatory norms 
Political rights 
Evaluations of rights 
Regime institutions Institutional expectations 
Support for parties 
Output expectations 
Trust in institution 
Trust in party system 
Authorities Feelings towards political 
leaders  
Party identification 
Evaluations of politicians 
Source: Adapted from Dalton (1999:58)  
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The Eastonian model of political support was not applied within this study (Easton 
1957:390). However, in this study the author followed the model of systems 
analysis, in particular the regime institutions as object of political support, as 
refined by Dalton in Norris (1999a:11). This approach assisted the author in 
understanding to what extent electoral stakeholders oriented their attitudes 
regarding the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. In the 
context of this study the core of regime institutions as objects of political support is 
constituted by the Government, Parliament, INEC, political parties, the Supreme 
Court, the Police and the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication. 
Dalton‟s approach of political support theory was applied to the INEC in order to 
find out to what extent electoral stakeholders trusted the INEC with the 
management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. Further, this theory 
enabled the author to measure the level of support for the INEC among national 
elections observers. Finally, the political support theory advances our 
understanding of how the decline or increase of trust in, as well the level of 
support for, the INEC may have affected the stakeholders‟ perceptions of the 2011 
electoral processes in the DRC.  
 
2.3.3 THEORY OF POLITICAL TRUST 
According to  Arancibia (2008:6), research on political trust appeared at the end of 
the 1960s, used as a crucial element for the definition of support for the political 
system in the works of Easton (1965, 1975) and Gamson (1968), and it was 
experimentally observed and promoted with the publications of Miller (1974a, 
1974b) and Citrin (1974).  
 
Levi and Stoker (2000:476) write that although trust is a contested term, there 
appears to be some minimal consensus about its meaning. Trust is relational: it 
involves an individual making himself/herself vulnerable to another individual, 
group, or institution that has the capacity to do him/her harm or to betray him/her. 
For instance citizens may entrust their lives to their government during wartime but 
not trust the bureaucracies that expend funds during peacetime.  
According to Citrin (1974:973), political elites make policies. In exchange, they 
receive trust from citizens satisfied with these policies and cynicism from those 
who are disappointed. 
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Van de Meer (2010:519-520) argue that trust is a rational evaluation of social 
situations along four dimensions. A person who trusts (the subject) implies that 
he/she thinks that the object of trust meets certain requirements: the object would 
be competent, intrinsically committed (caring), extrinsically committed 
(accountable because of encapsulated interest) and predictable.  
 
In line with this study, the researcher suggests that the subjects of trust who are 
election stakeholders rely on the INEC as an object of trust, because they think 
that the INEC has the capacity and independence to manage the electoral 
processes with credibility, integrity and professionalism of the electoral process. 
This implies that the INEC will perform its task and reach the stakeholders‟ 
expectations (credible electoral outcomes). Further, this study suggests that 
election stakeholders may support or disparage the INEC as regards the way in 
which the 2011 electoral processes were managed by the INEC. 
 
Aydin and Cenker (2012:232) argue that the bulk of research on citizens‟ 
confidence in political institutions focuses on advanced industrial democracies. So 
far, only a limited number of scholars have attempted to explain confidence levels 
across developing democracies. Yet, we believe that studying citizens‟ confidence 
in political institutions in developing democracies is important because the stability 
and legitimacy of a fledgling democracy largely depend on citizens‟ support. 
 
Rudolph and Evans (2005:661) argue that political trust, a global affective 
orientation toward government, is the reflection of citizens‟ policy satisfaction. 
Trust is higher when policies are viewed as effective or when there is perceived 
similarity between citizens' expectations and policy outputs. In other words, when 
citizens believe that their expectations are met by the government, they are likely 
to trust the government. In 2011, tensions were high between election 
stakeholders who supported and those who did not support the INEC as an 
institution in charge of elections processes in the DRC. Thus, this study makes 
use of the evaluation instruments of regime institutions (Dalton1999) such as trust 
in the INEC and confidence in the electoral processes, in order to explain whether 
or not the INEC met the expectations of election stakeholders in the 2011 
elections in the DRC.  
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Political trust may be understood as a reflection of how positively citizens perceive 
the institutional performance with regard to their expectations. Moreover, in a 
study entitled “Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1974”, Miller 
(1974a:952) writes that political trust can be thought of as basic evaluative or 
affective orientation toward the government. According to Miller (1974a), trust may 
be expressed from high political trust to high political distrust or political 
cynicism.18 Miller (1974a) argues that the level (high or low) of trust is a matter of 
how the government functions in order to produce the outputs that meet the 
expectations of the people. As shown elsewhere in this study,19 the researcher 
argues that the level of trust in the INEC depends on how the INEC performed its 
duties (for example the management of the 2011 electoral processes and the 
levels of credibility and integrity throughout pre-election phase, election phase and 
post-election phase). 
 
According to Mishler and Rose (2001), two theoretical frameworks are in 
competition to explain the origins of trust, and these offer different perspectives on 
the prospects for developing sufficient trust for democratic institutions to survive 
and function effectively. Mishler and Rose (2001:31) argue that cultural theories 
hypothesize that trust in political institutions is exogenous. Trust in political 
institutions is hypothesized to originate outside the political sphere in long-
standing and deeply seated beliefs about people that are rooted in cultural norms 
and communicated through early-life socialization. From a cultural perspective, 
institutional trust is an extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life and, 
much later, projected onto political institutions, thereby conditioning institutional 
performance capabilities. Institutional theories, in contrast, hypothesize that 
political trust is politically endogenous. Institutional trust is the expected utility of 
institutions performing satisfactorily; it is a consequence, not a cause, of 
institutional performance. Trust in institutions is rationally based; it hinges on 
citizen evaluations of institutional performance. Institutions that perform well 
generate trust; untrustworthy institutions generate skepticism and distrust. 
                                            
18
 Cynicism refers to the degree of negative effect toward the government and is a statement of the 
belief that the government is not functioning and producing outputs in accord with individual 
expectations (Miller 1974a:952). 
19
 See Chapter two, section 2.3.2 on political support. 
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Mishler and Rose (2001:32) explain that macro-cultural theories emphasize the 
homogenizing tendencies of national traditions and make little allowance for 
variation in trust among individuals within societies. Micro-cultural theories focus 
on differences in individual socialization experiences as sources of significant 
variation in political trust within as well as between societies. To an even greater 
extent, macro-institutional and micro-institutional theories are distinct (Mishler and 
Rose 2001:32).  
 
Mishler and Rose (2001:32) stress that macro-institutional theories emphasize the 
aggregate performance of institutions in such matters as promoting growth, 
governing effectively, and avoiding corruption. The outputs of institutions are 
assumed to determine individual responses. By contrast, micro-institutional 
theories emphasize that individual evaluations of institutional performance are 
conditioned by individual tastes and experiences, for example, whether a person 
thinks that political integrity or economic growth is more important and whether 
that individual personally has experienced the effects of corruption or the benefits 
of economic growth (Mishler and Rose 2001:32). 
 
In similar vein, the expectation from stakeholders was that the INEC should 
manage the 2011 electoral processes according to electoral legal frameworks 
(electoral law; the INEC Establishment Act, elections provisions made in the 
constitution and elections procedures). Failing to do so could affect the 
stakeholders‟ degree of trust in the INEC as an institution established to run the 
election processes in the DRC.  
 
Additionally, in the DRC, with reference to the 2011 electoral processes, since its 
establishment the INEC was strongly criticized by some stakeholders such as 
political parties and civil society organization leaders, who called into question the 
capacity, ability and neutrality as well as the leadership of the INEC, as these 
pertained to its ability to implement election processes and deliver election results 
that would certainly reflect the will of the voters as expressed in ballot papers. In 
this view, trust in the INEC entailed support from stakeholders (political parties, 
civil society organizations, election experts, voters and domestic observers) and 
acceptable institutional performance of the INEC in managing the 2011 elections.   
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Moreover, based on their experiences in electoral and civic education, domestic 
election observers who were involved in the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC 
were able to assess the institutional performance of the INEC in delivering credible 
electoral outcomes. 
 
2.3.4 NEOPATRIMONIALISM THEORY  
Bach in Bach and Gazibo (2012:26) declares that in Africa, as earlier in Latin 
America or Asia, references to the notion of the patrimonial state were initially 
designed to account for institution-building processes rooted in a traditional, 
neotraditional or traditionalist turf. Historically, Bruhns in Bach and Gazibo 
(2012:12-13) asserts that Max Weber neither invented the concept of 
patrimonialism (Patrimonialismus) nor that of patrimonial domination 
(Patrimonialherrschaft). These terms were part of the political vocabulary of 
political reactionaries and conservatives in the German states of the nineteenth 
century.  
 
In an effort to describe patrimonialism, Bruhns in Bach and Gazibo (2012) 
stresses that Weber wrote several of his typologies of three pure types of 
legitimate domination. Weber distinguished three forms of domination as follows: 
rational legal, traditional and charismatic.   
 
According to Weber quoted by Bruhns in Bach and Gazibo (2012:18), 
patrimonialism, and in the extreme case, sultanism, tends to arise whenever 
traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are 
purely personal instruments of the master. For Weber, patrimonialism as a form of 
political domination occurs when the mode of obedience, domination or authority 
is based not on legal rational legitimacy but on traditional legitimacy through the 
personal relationship between the ruler, master, or the incumbent holder of 
political power, and those who are governed or ruled.     
 
Willame (1972:2) defines patrimonialism as a system of rule incorporating three 
fundamental and related elements: appropriation of public offices as the elite‟s 
prime source of status, prestige, and reward; political and territorial fragmentation 
through the development of relationships based on primordial and personal 
loyalties; and the use of private armies, militias, and mercenaries as chief 
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instruments of rule. However, Pichter, Moran, and Johnston at al. (2009:126) 
stress that for Weber, patrimonialism was not a synonym for corruption, bad 
governance, violence, tribalism, or a weak state. It was instead a specific form of 
authority and source of legitimacy.  
 
Bach in Bach and Gazibo (2012:25) asserts that neopatrimonialism was conceived 
as a particular variant of patrimonialism: a hybrid model-type intended to account 
for new power systems in the post-traditional societies of Latin America, South 
Asia and the Middle East. Neopatrimonialism20 in Africa is classically defined as 
the expression of confusion between office and officeholder within a state 
endowed, at least formally, with modern institutions and bureaucratic procedures 
(Bach 2012:28). 
 
In neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through 
personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law. As with classic 
patrimonialism, the right to rule is attributed to a person rather than to an office. In 
contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and dependency pervade 
a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic office 
less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The 
distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. The essence 
of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within 
the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, 
contracts, and projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political 
support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons (Bratton 
and Van de Walle 1994:458).    
 
According to Bourmaud (1997:62) quoted by (Bach 2012:28), neopatrimonialism is 
a dualistic situation, in which the state is characterized by patrimonialization, as 
well as by bureaucratization.  
 
Erdmann and Engel (2007:104) claim that all the attempts to define 
neopatrimonialism (or „modern patrimonialism‟) deal with, and try to tackle, one 
                                            
20
 According to Bach in Bach and Gazibo (2012:25) it was Shmuel Eisenstadt who settled the 
terminology by suggesting the addition of the „neo-‟prefix to eliminate any ambiguity over the 
distinction between modern traditional and post-traditional regimes. 
48 
 
and the same intricate problem: the relationship between patrimonial domination 
on the one hand and legal-rational bureaucratic domination on the other, i.e. a 
very hybrid phenomenon. Various authors give different weight to it, but almost all 
fail to elaborate sufficiently on the constituent elements of this form of hybrid 
structure. 
 
Further, Erdmann and Engel (2007:105) write that neopatrimonialism is a mixture 
of two co-existing, partly interwoven types of domination: namely, patrimonial and 
legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power relations 
between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal 
relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm. 
However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between the private and the 
public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made 
to this distinction. Neopatrimonial rule takes place within the framework of, and 
with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or „modern‟ statehood. Formal 
structures and rules do exist, although in practice the separation of the private and 
public sphere is not always observed. 
 
2.3.4.1 Clientelism and patronage as part of patrimonialism and 
neopatrimonialism 
Likoti (2008:81) posits that a patron-client relationship is an exchange between a 
superior patron or patron group and an inferior client or client group. In addition 
Likoti maintains that in most developing countries, and especially in Africa, the 
ruling party acts as a patron and voters become an inferior group voting in 
expectation of some reward from the patron (ruling party). 
 
For Erdmann and Engel (2007:107), clientelism means the exchange or brokerage 
of specific services and resources for political support, often in the form of votes. It 
involves a relationship between unequals, in which the major benefits accrue to 
the patron; redistributive effects are considered to be very limited. They posit that 
the difference between patrimonial and neopatrimonial clientelism is that the latter 
is more complex than the former. It is a reiterating patron-client relation, forming a 
hierarchy of dominance relations.  
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Erdmann and Engel (2007:107) contend that in neopatrimonialism there are 
brokers to mediate the exchange between the „little man‟ and the „big man‟; and 
through a network of brokers, sometimes even traditional patrons, the political 
center is linked with the countryside. In patrimonialism there is only a direct dyadic 
exchange relation between the little and the big man. Second, the object of the 
exchange is different. The transactions are less about the exchange of private or 
personal goods and services and more about the transfer of public goods and 
services by the patron.  
 
Erdmann and Engel (2007:107) argue that the difference between clientelism and 
patronage is essentially a distinction between the recipients, between „individual‟ 
(e.g. land, office, services) and „collective‟ benefits (e.g. roads, schools). Further, 
for Erdmann and Engel (2007:107), patronage is part of high-level politics and an 
important instrument in creating and maintaining political cohesion, for instance a 
coalition of ethnic elites, which is needed to form and support a government or a 
political party. In contrast, clientelism concerns individuals and, thus, is based on 
personal relations. It involves the personal network of a politician, but it also 
occurs within and around the bureaucracy at all levels. 
 
Furthermore, Erdmann and Engel (2007:107) point out that a client needs a patron 
for protection, either to avoid something or to be assisted in gaining something 
which otherwise would not be obtainable. In short, developing a clientelist network 
is a means to gain protection and to achieve goals in a situation of societal 
uncertainty created by public institutions that may behave in ways that are not 
calculable.  
 
In a neopatrimonial system, during the electoral processes, certain election 
stakeholders decide not to comply with the electoral law. On the one hand, 
intuitively, opposition candidates are virtually assured that they will get into power. 
On the other hand, the incumbents are distressed at not being re-elected for a 
second term in office. The uncertainty of election outcomes in developing 
countries may lead election challengers to use clientelism and patronage, which 
harm the integrity of electoral processes.    
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In the DRC, neopatrimonialism theory as well as its constituent elements (patron-
client network) contributes to shedding light on the political context in which the 
2011 elections were conducted. The neopatrimonialism theory helps one to 
understand how the patron-client network influences the management of the 
electoral processes. In the wake of the 2011 presidential and parliamentary 
elections in the DRC, certain contenders (patrons, bid men, godfathers) made use 
of election maladministration practices (corruption, faking of electoral reports and 
results, regionalism, ethnicism, misuse of state resources, refusal of access to 
public media for opposition parties, intimidation, threats and illegal arrest of 
opposition leaders, bribery of voters, pressure on elections commissioners) as well 
as the appointment of election commissioners who were either closer to the 
incumbent or to the opposition.  
 
In order to control all electoral processes, some of the election stakeholders 
(political parties and independent candidates or their representatives) interfered 
with the 2011 election processes as managed by the INEC at the expense of the 
electoral law. During the 2011 elections in the DRC, electoral contenders behaved 
as patrons. Some of them resorted to the usage of patron-client relationships, in 
which the patron‟s political clients (followers) had an interest in seeing see their 
patron keep power. In addition, a patron‟s political clients (followers) in the 
Congolese 2011 elections secured the political and economic position of their 
patrons by helping them to be elected regardless of the nature of the means and 
strategies that were used.       
 
Moreover, the latter situation was addressed by Githaiga (2012) who highlights the 
link between politics and economics in the DRC. Githaiga (2012:3) remarks that 
the high number of 18 500 parliamentary candidates vying for 500 legislative 
seats, and the disproportionately high candidature in the parliamentary race, may 
in part be attributed to the link between political leadership and economic gain. 
Githaiga (2012) asserts that the parliamentary position offers a competitive 
remuneration and, for the unscrupulous, the opportunity to use power to gain 
economic benefits.    
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2.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the literature review and theoretical framework related to 
election management. A survey of the literature was done in order to discover 
what has been done and what needs to be done in the field of election 
management as a modest contribution to the existing body of knowledge. 
Furthermore, political support, political trust and neopatrimonial theories that 
underpin this study were discussed as a basis for explaining and understanding 
stakeholders‟ perceptions about the management of the 2011 electoral processes 
in the DRC. The next chapter describes the research methodology. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter describes the methodology used in carrying out this study. A 
methodology is a strategy, plan of action, process, or design lying behind the 
choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to 
the desired outcomes (Crotty 1998:3). Because of the close correlation between 
the methodology and the procedures of research, Creswell (2003:4) defines 
methodology as the framework that relates to the entire process of research. To 
answer the research questions in this study, the researcher employed a mixed 
methods approach to achieve the study‟s research objectives (see Chapter one). 
According to Johnson et al. (2007:113), mixed methods research is an approach 
to knowledge (theory and practice) that attempts to consider multiple viewpoints, 
perspectives, positions, and standpoints, always including the standpoints of 
qualitative and quantitative research. Recently, debates between positivists and 
interpretivists (see sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2; Table 6) were impeded by 
researchers who do not take their positions in either the positivist or the 
interpretivist camp (Schram 2007). Some researchers (Lieberman 2005; Parry and 
Kupiec-Teahan 2010; Mathagu 2010; Muboko 2011) have previously used mixed 
methods approaches to carry out their research.  
 
3.1.1 PHILOSOPHY AND ASSUMPTIONS OF METHODOLOGY  
It is worth mentioning that any scientific research is led by a philosophical 
paradigm. Punch (2011:27) argues that a paradigm is a complex term that is used 
very frequently in research methods literature. As used in social science, it refers 
to a set of assumptions about the social world, and about what constitutes proper 
techniques and topics for inquiry. In short, it means a view of how science should 
be conducted. It is a very broad term, encompassing elements of epistemology, 
theory and philosophy, along with other methods. Paradigms have been the 
subject of vigorous debate, as in the phrase „paradigm wars‟ which has been used 
to describe the arguments between quantitative researchers and qualitative 
researchers. Sometimes the term „paradigm‟ is used to describe quantitative 
research or qualitative research, as in „the quantitative paradigm‟ or „the qualitative 
paradigm‟.  
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Huff, as quoted by Creswell (2013:18), claims that it is helpful to articulate the 
importance of philosophy in research. It shapes how we seek information in order 
to answer questions. A cause-and-effect type of question in which certain 
variables are predicted to explain an outcome is different from an exploration of a 
single phenomenon as found in qualitative research. Teddlie and Tashakkori 
(2009:4-8) state that in general, researchers in the social sciences and behavioral 
sciences can be categorized into three groups: 
- Quantitatively-oriented social and behavioral scientists(QUANs) primarily 
working within the post-positivist/positivist paradigm and principally 
interested in numerical data and analyses; 
- Qualitatively-oriented social and behavioral scientists (QUALs) primarily 
within the constructivist paradigm and principally interested in narrative data 
and analyses; and 
- Mixed methodologists working primarily within the pragmatist paradigm and 
interested in both narrative and numeric data and analyses.  
 
Over the past fifteen years, the debate over the relative virtues of quantitative and 
qualitative methodology has gained considerable impetus. While the exact 
constitution of the two methodologies varies somewhat from author to author or is 
defined with varying degrees of specificity, there is substantial agreement about 
the fundamental antinomies and their practical implications for the conduct of 
research (Bryman 1984:75). In the social sciences, in order to make sense of what 
we observe and to understand it, researchers use paradigms. The most commonly 
used philosophical paradigms in social sciences are positivism and interpretivism. 
The former is always associated with the quantitative approach while the latter 
with the qualitative approach. However, the philosophical paradigm that guides 
this study is that of pragmatism (see section 3.3.1). 
3.1.1.1 Positivism  
Amaratunga et al. (2002:18) argue that logical positivism uses quantitative and 
experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive generalizations. Among 
the major implications of this approach are the need for independence of the 
observer from the subject being observed and the need to formulate 
hypotheses for subsequent verification. Positivism searches for causal 
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explanations and fundamental laws, and generally reduces the whole to its 
simplest possible elements in order to facilitate analysis. 
3.1.1.2 Interpretivism  
Amaratunga et al. (2002:18) stress that a phenomenological (interpretive science) 
inquiry uses qualitative and naturalistic approaches to inductively and holistically 
understand human experience in context-specific settings. This approach tries to 
understand and explain a phenomenon, rather than search for external causes or 
fundamental laws.  
 
In some cases writers have chosen not to use the quantitative/qualitative 
distinction and have instead used terms which have been used as synonyms. The 
terms 'positivist' and 'empiricist' often denote the same fundamental approach as 
'quantitative', while 'naturalistic' field research, 'ethnographic', 'interpretivist', and 
'constructivist' are sometimes used instead of 'qualitative' (Bryman 1984:77).  
 
Table 3.1 Distinction between positivist and interpretivist traditions 
Theoretical 
assumptions  
Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontology Person (researcher) and reality 
are separate. 
Person (researcher) and reality 
are inseparable (life-world). 
Epistemology Objective reality object exists 
beyond the human mind. 
Knowledge of the world is 
intentionally constituted through 
a person‟s lived experience. 
Research object    
 
 
The research object has an 
inherent quality that exists 
independently of the researcher. 
Research object is interpreted 
in light of meaning and 
structure of 
person‟s (researcher‟s) lived 
experience. 
Theory 
building/testing 
Theories are postulated that can 
be tested to be confirmed or 
rejected. A theory is proven from 
observable phenomena/ 
behavior. Theories are tested in 
a controlled setting, empirically 
supporting or falsifying 
hypotheses through a process 
of experimentation. 
Theories are built/ constructed 
from multiple realities: the 
researcher has to look at 
different things in order to 
understand a phenomenon. 
Theory is shaped by social and 
cultural context. 
Method Statistics, content analysis, etc. Hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
etc. 
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Theoretical 
assumptions  
Positivism Interpretivism 
Theory of truth Correspondence theory of truth: 
one-to-one mapping between 
research statements and reality. 
Truth as intentional fulfillment: 
interpretations of research 
object match lived experience 
of object. 
Types of data Quantitative data 
 
Qualitative data 
Validity Certainty: data truly measures 
reality. 
Defensible knowledge claims. 
Reliability Replicability: research results 
can be reproduced. 
Interpretive awareness: 
researchers recognize and 
address implications of their 
subjectivity. 
 
Source: Sonubi (2010:97) 
 
3.2 MIXED METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN  
Research design refers to a particular strategy for research, such as experiments, 
case studies, ethnography, and action research. The process of research design 
refers to the practice of working through a given focus for research and the 
generation of a research plan and design for that topic (Gibson and Brown 
2009:48). Gibson and Brown declare that the research design entails specifying 
analytic interests and working out what kind of data is required to explore those 
interests, and how it is generated. Furthermore, Creswell (2013:5) asserts that the 
research design refers to the entire process of research from conceptualizing a 
problem to writing research questions, and on to data collection, analysis, 
interpretation, and report writing. In addition, Punch (2011:63) maintains that one 
requires a basic plan for a piece of research, and includes four main ideas. The 
first is strategy, the second is the conceptual framework, the third is the question 
of who or what will be studied and the fourth concerns the tools and procedures to 
be used for collecting empirical data. In this study centered on stakeholders‟ 
perceptions of the 2011 elections management, the researcher adopted the mixed 
methods approach as a research design to respond to the research questions.  
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3.2.2 MIXED METHODS APPROACH 
Mixed methods, as a research paradigm, is seen as emerging from the 1990s 
onwards, establishing itself alongside the previous paradigms so that we are 
currently in a three methodological or search paradigm world, with quantitative, 
qualitative, and mixed methods research all thriving and coexisting (Robson 
2011:164). In addition, Klassen et al. (2012:379) claim that:  
There is no rigid formula for designing a mixed methods study, but the following 
general steps should provide some guidance, especially for an investigator new to 
mixed methods. Preliminary considerations include considering philosophy and 
theory, resources (for example, time, financial resources, skills), and the research 
problem and reasons for using mixed methods. Clarification of study aims and 
research questions that call for qualitative, a quantitative and mixed method is 
important, to incorporate these into the reasons for conducting a mixed methods 
study. It is also critical to determine the methods of quantitative and qualitative data 
collection and analysis (when it will be collected, what emphasis will be given to 
each, and how they will be integrated or mixed), and select a mixed methods 
design that helps address research questions and the data collection/ 
analysis/integration procedures. After collecting and analyzing the data, meta-
inference allows the researcher to interpret how the combined quantitative and 
qualitative approaches contribute to addressing the research problem and 
questions, and to report findings while making explicit the contribution of the mixed 
methods approach.  
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:17) define the mixed methods approach as the 
type of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into 
a single study. Moreover, Greene in Johnson et al. (2007:119) stresses that the 
mixed methods inquiry is an approach to investigating the social world that ideally 
involves more than one methodological tradition and thus more than one way of 
knowing, along with more than one kind of technique for gathering, analyzing, and 
representing human phenomena, all for the purpose of better understanding.  
Johnson et al. (2007:119) maintain that: 
In sum, the 20th century started with some use of what later came to be called 
mixed research, but social and psychological research quickly became primarily 
quantitative (e.g. as influenced by logical positivism and a reinvigorated scientism). 
Partially in reaction, many qualitative currents developed throughout the century, 
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coalescing into a qualitative research paradigm in the 1980s and 1990s (for 
example, Guba, 1990). In reaction to the polarization between quantitative and 
qualitative research, another intellectual movement (focusing on synthesis) 
occurred and it has come to be called mixed methods research. We currently are in 
a three methodological or research paradigm world, with quantitative, qualitative, 
and mixed methods research all thriving and coexisting. 
In addition, Creswell (2008) argues that mixed methods research is a research 
methodology with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. 
Furthermore, Creswell states that mixed methods as a methodology involves 
philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis of 
data and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases in 
the research process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing 
both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its 
central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in 
combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either 
approach alone. 
 
3.2.3 QUALITATIVE APPROACH  
Creswell et al. (2012:4) claim that a salient strength of qualitative research is its 
focus on the context including the significance of human lives and experiences for 
the purpose of inductive or theory development-driven research. It is a systematic 
and particular form of inquiry that uses methods of data collection such as in-depth 
interviews, ethnographic observation, and review of documents. Qualitative data 
help researchers to understand processes, especially those that emerge over 
time; provide detailed information about setting or context; and emphasize the 
voices of participants through interviews. Qualitative methods facilitate the 
collection of data when measures do not exist and provide a depth of 
understanding of concepts.  
 
3.2.4 QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 
Quantitative research is described as a mode of inquiry used often for deductive 
research in order to test theories or hypotheses, collect descriptive information, or 
examine relationships among variables (Creswell et al. 2012:4). In addition, 
Creswell et al. assert that these variables are measured and produce numeric 
data that can be analyzed statistically. Furthermore, Quantitative data have the 
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ability to provide measurable evidence, to help to establish (probable) cause and 
effect, to provide efficient data collection procedures, to create the possibility of 
replication and generalization to a population, to facilitate the comparison of 
groups, and to provide insight into a breadth of experiences (Creswell et al. 
2012:4). 
 
Table 3.2 Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research approaches  
Approach Definition Consideration 
Quantitative -Uses numerical data to make sense 
of information. 
-Examples: scores on a test or survey 
answers on a five-point scale. 
-Allows collection and 
analysis of large amounts 
of data relatively quickly. 
-Analysis perceived to be 
less open to interpretation 
and typically considered 
more objective.- 
Qualitative -Uses narrative forms, such as 
thoughts or feelings, to describe what 
is being evaluated. 
-Examples: observations, interviews, 
focus groups, photographs or 
videotapes. 
-Can provide rich context 
for examining participants‟ 
experiences and how a 
program operates. 
-Allows in-depth 
investigation of questions. 
Mixed Methods -Uses a combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative data. 
-Example: a combination of surveys 
and interviews. 
-Allows quantitative data 
to be collected from a 
large number of 
participants. 
-Allows in-depth 
qualitative investigation of 
evaluation questions with 
a smaller number of 
participants. 
-Requires an evaluator 
capable of collecting data 
using a variety of methods 
and analysis. 
Source: Muboko (2011:106) 
3.3 RATIONALE FOR USING MIXED METHODS APPROACH 
For the purpose of this study, which focuses on the perceptions of the 
stakeholders in the DRC‟s 2011 electoral processes, both quantitative and 
qualitative methods are important and useful. The goal of a mixed methods 
approach is not to replace either of these approaches but rather to draw on the 
strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both in single research studies and 
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across studies (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004:14-15). The major advantage of 
the mixed methods approach is that it enables the researcher to simultaneously 
ask confirmatory and exploratory questions and therefore verify and generate 
theory in the same study (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009:33). Creswell and Plano 
(2007:18) stress that it is premised on the idea that the combination of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches provides a better understanding of research problems 
than either approach alone. This leads to a better understanding of the results 
because mixed methods offer strengths that offset the weaknesses of separately 
applied quantitative and qualitative research methods. It also encourages the 
collection of more comprehensive evidence for study problems, helps answer 
questions that quantitative or qualitative methods alone cannot answer, and 
reduces adversarial relationships among researchers and promotes collaboration 
(Creswell and Plano 2007:18). 
 
According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009:7), the philosophical assumption most 
often associated with mixed methods is pragmatism, although some researchers 
are philosophically oriented to the transformative perspective. Teddlie and 
Tashakkori (2009:7) define pragmatism as a deconstructive paradigm that 
debunks concepts such as „truth‟ and „reality‟ and focuses instead on what works 
as the truth regarding the research questions under investigation. Pragmatism 
rejects the either/or choices associated with the paradigm wars, advocates for the 
use of mixed methods in research, and acknowledges that values of the 
researcher play a large role in the interpretation of results. 
 
Creswell (2003:12) claims that pragmatism is not committed to any one system of 
philosophy and reality. This applies to mixed methods research in that inquirers 
draw liberally from both quantitative and qualitative assumptions when they 
engage in their research.  
 
3.3.1 MIXED METHODS DESIGN 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009:138) declare that a tenet of mixed methods 
research is that researchers should mindfully create designs that effectively 
answer their research questions; this stands in contrast to the common approach 
in traditional quantitative research where students are given a menu of designs 
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from which to select. It also stands in stark contrast to approaches where one 
completely follows either the qualitative paradigm or the quantitative paradigm.  
 
Creswell (2003:213-219) spells out six types of mixed methods strategies as 
follows:  
 Sequential explanatory strategy is characterized by a chronological order of 
the collection and analysis of data into two phases. The process of 
collection and analysis of quantitative data is followed by the collection and 
analysis of qualitative data. The priority is given to the quantitative data 
phase.  
 Sequential exploratory strategy is conducted in two phases; the first phase 
is characterized by the collection and analysis of qualitative data followed 
by quantitative data collection and analysis. 
 Sequential transformative strategy is the mixed methods strategy in which 
the priority is given either to quantitative or qualitative data collection and 
analysis. Unlike sequential explanatory and sequential exploratory designs, 
sequential transformative strategy has a theoretical perspective to guide the 
study.  
 Concurrent triangulation strategy is the most familiar of the six mixed 
methods designs. It is applied as research design when research uses two 
different methods in an attempt to confirm, cross-validate, or corroborate 
findings within a single study. In this case, ideally, priority is given to neither 
qualitative nor quantitative phases of data collection and analysis, but 
practically, priority may be oriented to either a qualitative method or 
quantitative method. The quantitative and qualitative data collection is 
concurrent and happens in one phase of research study. 
 Concurrent nested strategy can be identified by its use of one data 
collection phase for both quantitative and qualitative data in a simultaneous 
manner. Unlike the concurrent triangulation design, in a concurrent nested 
design, less priority is given to one method (qualitative or quantitative) 
which is nested, or embedded within the predominant method (qualitative or 
quantitative). 
 Concurrent transformative strategy is guided by the researcher‟s use of a 
specific theoretical perspective, as with the sequential transformative 
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model. This theoretical perspective may be based on ideologies, such as 
critical theory, advocacy, participatory research, or a conceptual or 
theoretical framework.  
3.3.2 MIXED METHODS DESIGN PROCESS 
Johnson and Onwuegbuze (2004:23), based on their interpretations of the extant 
literature, recommend eight steps that represent the mixed methods process. 
Researchers would apply them before, during, and/or after the conduct of their 
mixed analyses as follows: 
1. Research Question(s)  
2. Purpose of Mixed Research 
           3. Selection of Research Methodology 
           4.  Data Collection     
5. Data Analysis 
6. Data Interpretation 
  7. Legitimation 
  8. Conclusion  
 
3.4 THE DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND SAMPLING PROCESS 
In this study, the researcher applied the concurrent mixed method design in which 
both qualitative and quantitative data are collected, not following any chronological 
order, within one phase. According to Creswell (2003:217), this model generally 
uses separate quantitative and qualitative methods as the means to offset 
weaknesses inherent within one method with the strengths of another method. In 
addition, this strategy usually integrates the results of the two methods during the 
interpretation phase. The traditional mixed method model is advantageous 
because it is familiar to most researchers and can result in well-validated and 
substantiated findings (Creswell 2003:217). In addition, the concurrent data 
collection results in a shorter data collection time period as compared to one of the 
sequential approaches. During the process of data collection, the researcher 
should be aware of the accuracy of the instruments used to collect the data.  
 
Cooper and Schindler (2011:280) provide the following major criteria to evaluate a 
measurement tool: validity, reliability, and practicality. 
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 Validity refers to the extent to which the test measures what we actually 
wish to measure. 
 Reliability has to do with the accuracy and precision of a measurement 
procedure. 
 Practicality is concerned with a wide range of factors of economy, 
convenience and interpretability. 
The collection of data in the current study was done by means of interviews and 
questionnaires. Ethical considerations were taken into account by providing a 
consent form to all participants with information related to the study. 
 
3.4.1 POPULATION 
Robson (2011:530) defines a population as a universe of elements from which the 
sample elements are drawn. It can be literal population (that could a number of 
people) but it is also used more specifically (for example, it could be the population 
of all hospitals in the region). In addition, he states that population may be a list of 
those in the population from which the survey sample is drawn. Survey 
researchers refer to it as a sampling frame (Robson 2011:250). The population 
from which the sample of interviewees and respondents for this study comprised 
election experts, members of political parties, academia, INEC as well as CSOs 
such as Agir pour les élections transparantes et apaisées21 (AETA),  Réseau 
National pour Observation et la surveillance des élections au Congo22 
(RENOSEC) and representatives of International Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), The Carter Center (CC) 
and Konrad-Adenauer, who were involved in the 2011 electoral processes.  
 
3.4.2 SAMPLING  
The sampling process involves selecting units of analysis in a manner that 
maximizes the researcher‟s ability to answer research questions that are set forth 
in a study. The sampling frame refers to a formal or informal list of units or cases 
from which the sample is drawn (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009:345). The research 
                                            
21
 Agir pour les élections transparentes au Congo is French for Act for Transparent and Peaceful 
Elections in the DRC. 
22
 Réseau national pour l’observation et la surveillance des élections au Congo is French for 
National Election Observation and Monitoring Network in Congo. 
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did not make use of representative samples, as doing would have been highly 
costly. Notably, this study did not aim to attend to all stakeholders or to assemble 
a representative sample of election stakeholders in the DRC and therefore the 
researcher did not intend to generalize the findings.  
 
The 2011 electoral processes are still sensitive issues in the DRC. During data 
collection, people were not ready to talk or to comment openly about these 
elections: they preferred talking secretly due to security threat and post-election 
violence that occurred after the publication of the results. According to Creswell 
(2013:299), purposive sampling is the primary sampling strategy used in 
qualitative research. It means that the inquirer selects individuals and sites for 
study because they can purposively inform an understanding of the research 
problem and central phenomenon in the study. For this reason, the research made 
use of a purposive sampling technique to select twelve interviewees who 
participated in in-depth interviews.23 The maximum variation sampling approach 
was also followed in this study, because it allowed the researcher to finalize in 
advance some criteria that distinguish the sites, events or participants. The 
researcher applied this approach because it allows the maximizing of differences 
at the beginning of the study and it also increases the likelihood that the findings 
will reflect differences or different perspectives in qualitative research (Creswell 
2013:156-157). 
 
In addition, the researcher used convenience sampling to select a sample of 120 
stakeholders (domestic observers) from a population of domestic observers in 
order to measure their perceptions (quantitative data) on the management of the 
2011 electoral processes. According to Robson (2011:274), a convenience 
sample involves choosing the nearest and most convenient persons to act as 
respondents until the required size has been reached. As a non-probability 
sampling method, convenience sampling is the most used because it is simple 
and cheap. This kind of sampling method means that all respondents do not have 
                                            
23
 The researcher made used of different lists of election role players who were involved in the 
2011 electoral processes in the DRC. The 12 informants and 120 respondents were selected 
based on their availability, knowledge in terms of election processes and involvement in the entire 
electoral cycle as election experts, domestic observers as well as civil society organization leaders.  
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an equal chance of being selected to be part of the study. Thus, the sample was 
not representative of all respondents (stakeholders), while it may reflect the 
general perceptions of domestic observers on the quality of the 2011 electoral 
processes in the DRC.  
 
3.4.3 QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION  
According to Creswell and Plano (2007:6), qualitative data consists of open-ended 
information that the researcher gathers through interviews with participants. The 
general open-ended questions asked during these interviews allow participants to 
supply answers in their own words. In addition, qualitative data may be collected 
by observing participants or sites of research, gathering documents from a private 
(e.g. diary) or public (e.g. minutes of meetings) source, or collecting audio-visual 
material such as audiotapes or artefacts. Qualitative data were generated by 
means of semi-structured in-depth interviews, which are appropriate for a deeper 
exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents regarding complex and 
sometimes sensitive issues, and enable probing for more information and 
clarification of answers. The variety of professional, educational and personal 
histories of the sample group precluded the use of an interview schedule (Barriball 
and While 1994:330). The researcher (interviewer) generated qualitative data 
through in-depth interviews by means of open-ended questions (interview 
schedule see appendix b).  
 
Firstly, the interviewer sought the respondents‟ permission to use a recorder 
during the interview process. Secondly, the interviewer explained the purpose of 
the study to the interviewees as well as reminding them that they could withdraw 
their participation in the interview at any time should they decide to discontinue the 
interview. Lastly, twelve interviewees gave their consent for the interview but 
requested anonymity. Furthermore, interviews were conducted and recorded in a 
place chosen by the interviewees at their convenience. In contrast, the Carter 
Center interviewee refused to be recorded but asked the interviewer to make 
notes only. The interview was conducted in French in Kinshasa (DRC) and later 
transcribed and translated into English. In order to ensure the quality and 
authenticity related to the translation of data from interviews, the researcher was 
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assisted by two impartial and professional translators. The table below provides 
information about the interview process. 
Table 3.3 List of interviewees 
Code Gender Organizations  Date of interview Location 
Interviewee No. 1  M NSCC of the DRC 31 October 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 2 M NDI 3 November 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 3 M UNIKIN 6 November 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 4 M RENOSEC 10 November 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 5 F CC 12 November 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 6 M KONRAD 
ADENAUER 
18 November 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 7 M INEC 22 November 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 8 F CAFCO 26 November 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 9 M UPEC 2 December 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 10 M L.E 16 December 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 11 M PPRD 21 December 2013 Kinshasa 
Interviewee No. 12 M UDPS 23 December 2013 Kinshasa 
Own source: adapted by the author 2013 
 
3.4.4 QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION 
According to Creswell and Plano (2007:6), quantitative data includes closed-
ended information such as that found on attitude, behavior, or performance 
instruments. The collection of this kind of data might also involve use of closed-
ended checklists on which the researcher checks the behaviors observed. 
Sometimes, quantitative information is found in documents such as census 
records or attendance records. 
 
The quantitative data in this study was gathered by means of survey 
questionnaires. Gray (2014:352) describes questionnaires as research 
instruments by means of which people are asked to respond to the same set of 
questions in a pre-determined sequence. The questionnaire which was used to 
collect data in this study made use of dichotomous and multiple option statement 
questions (see appendix C). The former are the kind of questions that have only 
two possibilities for response, for instance: “Yes” or “No” or “Do you feel that way” 
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or “Do you not feel that way”. The latter is the type of question mostly used to get 
data that are naturally subjective, for example, data about dispositions, attitudes 
and opinions (Delport and Roestenburg 2011:198-201). Delta and Roestenburg 
also provide the ordinal scaled questions that are designed in such a way that the 
respondents are required to mark a certain point on a scale in order to obtain 
information on more subjective aspects such as the degree of satisfaction towards 
a certain service or institution. The commonly used Likert scale approach was 
applied to measure the stakeholders‟ perceptions with regard to their degree of 
satisfaction and trust in the DRC‟s 2011 electoral processes. The researcher 
developed 120 questionnaires, which were distributed to 120 selected 
respondents from a population of short-term domestic observers. The 120 
respondents were civil society members (short-term domestic observers) who 
were involved in the 2011 election processes in terms of voter education, election 
observation and human rights in the DRC. The questionnaires were designed in 
such a way that each respondent could tick or fill in the appropriate boxes. The 
Respondents(n=120) were conveniently selected and requested to complete the 
questionnaire within a two-week time frame, based on instructions given by the 
researcher to each respondent. The respondents returned 105 questionnaires 
(87.5%) of 120 questionnaires distributed. Out of 105 returned questionnaires, 
only 10 questionnaires were inadequately completed to be used, while 5 
respondents refused to complete their questionnaires alleging fear of being 
suspected as opposition supporters or people who are against the regime.24 A 
total of 90 questionnaires were analyzed.  
                                            
24
 The fear expressed by some respondents could be justified due to the fact that the outcomes of 
2011 elections in the DRC were internally contested by the opposition supporters and Congolese 
diaspora worldwide. On 6 December 2011, the Congolese diaspora protested outside the ANC‟s 
headquarters (Luthuli House) in Johannesburg against the recognition by the South Africa‟s 
government of the incumbent president Joseph Kabila as elected president following the 2011 
elections. At the same time, the Congolese Embassy in Pretoria was vandalized by some 
Congolese in reaction to the reelection of president Kabila. Since 2011 elections became a very 
sensitive issue among Congolese. This could justified the fear among respondents including the 
fact that the researcher is resident in South Africa that is perceived by certain Congolese as being 
one opposition stronghold. 
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The outcomes of the quantitative data analysis will be in the form of tables, graphs 
and bar charts showing the level of satisfaction and trust towards the INEC, as 
well as some electoral aspects and confidence in the electoral processes, as this 
reflects the ability of the INEC to run the 2011 elections in the DRC successfully.  
  
Consequently, the stakeholders‟ views were divided in ten categories:   
 Demographic background; 
 Credibility of the 2011 electoral processes; 
 Opinions on the freeness and fairness of the 2011 elections in the DRC;  
 Level of satisfaction in some election aspects: voter registration, 
information on voting procedures, adequacy of equipment in the voting 
station, competency  and impartiality of voting officers; 
 Views on the independence of the INEC; 
 Level of trust towards institutions such as Government, Parliament, 
Supreme Court, INEC, Police and the High Council of Audio-visual and 
Communication;  
 Views on vote buying; 
 Views on election-related violence; 
 Views on the secrecy of the vote; and 
 Comments on the 2011 elections in the DRC. 
 
Therefore, the data were captured in a computer file which was imported to the 
Statistical Package for Social Science Software (SPSS) for quantitative data 
analysis purposes. 
 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis involves the gathering of raw data which could be images, views, 
words, interviews, experiences, opinions, attitudes, perceptions, and numbers in 
order to measure, explain, explore, understand and interpret the meaning of their 
content. Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2003:351) highlight that “the point at which 
data analysis begins and ends depends on the type of the data collected, which in 
turn depends on the sample size, which in turn depends on the research design, 
which in turn depends on the research purpose”. If the qualitative data and the 
quantitative data for a particular piece of research are collected concurrently, then 
the analysis will be performed after all the data has been collected. However, if the 
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two kinds of data are collected sequentially, then the data analysis will begin 
before all the data has been collected. 
3.5.1 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS  
According to Patton (2002) quoted in Schurink et al. (2011:397), qualitative 
analysis transforms data into findings. This involves reducing the volume of raw 
information, sifting significance from trivia, identifying significant patterns and 
constructing a framework for communicating the essence of what the data reveal. 
The analysis of conversations with respondents concerning their experiences and 
perceptions relating to the electoral processes in the DRC was done through the 
thematic analysis process. With regard to this study, the thematic analysis was 
used to analyze the data collected from semi-structured interviews because it 
allowed the researcher to identify factors that shaped the perceptions of the 
stakeholders on the management of the 2011 elections in the DRC.  
 
Braun and Clarke (2006:79) define thematic analysis as a qualitative diagnostic 
method for identifying, analyzing and reporting on patterns or themes detected in 
data. As Elshamly (2013:194) contends, the concept of themes is central to 
thematic analysis. Essentially, it enables the researcher to limit the total amount of 
information related to the research questions. This enables the researcher to focus 
on the key aspects relevant to the research and to organize and classify data. The 
use of thematic analysis requires the process of coding as part of analysis in 
categorizing data into meaningful groups. Besides, Robson (2011:474) posits that 
coding is how one defines what the data one is analyzing are about. It involves 
identifying and recording one or more passages of text or other data items, such 
as the parts of pictures that, in some sense, exemplify the same theoretical or 
descriptive idea. In the same vein, Punch (2011:199) states that usually, several 
passages are identified and they are then linked with a name for that idea: the 
code. Coding is the specific and concrete activity which starts the analysis. Codes 
are tags, names or labels, and coding is therefore the process of putting tags, 
names or labels against pieces of data. The process of conducting thematic 
analysis as proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006:87) was applied in this study. 
 
The qualitative data recorded was transcribed from the recorder during in-depth 
interviews. Subsequently the researcher was involved in a careful reading of data 
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transcripts in order to familiarize himself with them. This process was crucial 
because it allowed the researcher to give significant attention to each item of 
qualitative data, such as activities, behaviors, meaning, actions, description, 
feelings, statements and interpretations that emerged from each segment of the 
raw data related to the electoral cycle of the 2011 elections in the DRC. After 
being familiarized with the data, the researcher was able to code each segment. 
The purpose of grouping together the coded segments of the data with a label or 
name in clusters was to pinpoint different themes related to the research 
questions. By these means, the themes were used to develop a thematic diagram 
in order to serve as cradle for data analysis and interpretation (see Chapter Four).   
 
Table 3.4 Different phases of thematic analysis process  
Phase Description of the process 
1.Familiarising oneself 
with the data 
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-
reading the data, noting down initial ideas. 
2.Generating initial 
codes  
Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic 
fashion across the entire data set, collating data 
relevant to each code. 
3.Searching for themes Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all 
data relevant to each potential theme.  
4. Reviewing themes Checking whether the themes work in relation to the 
coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set 
(Level 2); generating a thematic „map‟ of the analysis. 
5.Defining and naming 
themes 
 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each 
theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, 
generating clear definitions and names for each 
theme. 
6.Producing the report The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extracted examples, final analysis of 
selected extracts, relating back to the analysis of the 
research question and literature, producing a 
scholarly report of the analysis. 
 
Source: Braun and Clarke (2006:87) 
  
3.5.2 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS  
The quantitative data obtained by means of survey questionnaires were processed 
by using descriptive statistics. According to Babbie (2007:450), descriptive 
statistics are statistical computations describing either the characteristics of a 
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sample or the relationship among variables in a sample. The researcher used the 
SPSS version 21 and Excel 2010 to process the responses (data) from the 
questionnaires and presented them in a statistically competent manner (see 
Chapter Four). Outcomes from these statistics are bar charts, tables and pie 
charts showing the demographic background of the respondents, portraying and 
presenting levels of satisfaction and trust in the 2011 electoral processes and in 
the INEC. These results from the survey were not generalized as representing the 
perceptions of all the stakeholders of the 2011 DRC electoral processes. 
However, they showed interesting trends related to stakeholders‟ perceptions, 
which enriched the understanding of the quality of the 2011 electoral processes in 
the DRC (see chapter Four).  
 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the research design and methodology used, including 
population, sampling method and sample, ethical considerations, validity and 
reliability. It described data collection and analysis. Chapter four discusses the 
data analysis and interpretation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter analyses and presents the data in line with the purpose of this study, 
that is, the assessment of the quality of the 2011 election management processes 
according to the perceptions of selected election stakeholders in the DRC. 
According to Schurink, Fouché and De Vos (2011:397), data analysis is the 
process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data.  
 
4.2 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS  
The first phase of this chapter sheds light on the analysis of qualitative data. The 
thematic analysis of the qualitative data provided findings on factors that affected 
the quality as well as shaped stakeholders‟ perceptions on the management of the 
2011 electoral processes in the DRC. Subsequently, the themes and sub-themes 
that developed following the thematic analysis of the data as provided by 
interviewees are presented in Table 4.1 followed by a discussion below.  
 
Table 4.1 Themes and sub-themes that emerged from interviews 
Themes  Sub-themes 
Election environment 
 
- - Insecurity 
- - Mistrust 
- - Amendment of the constitution as strategy 
to favor one contender 
- - Appointment of new justices  
Delay in the establishment of 
INEC 
- - Protracted divergence in the approval of 
INEC members  
Allegations of patronage - - The use of patronage in the recruiting 
process of INEC members 
Allegations of poor performance 
of the INEC 
 
- - Lack of professionalism 
- - Lack of organizational capacity 
Electoral malpractice  
 
- - Flawed voter registration process 
- - Misuse of state resources for election 
purposes 
- - Bias in media access and coverage 
- - Bias in campaign process 
- - Inaccurate vote tabulation  
Source: interviews (2013). 
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4.2.1 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
4.2.1.1 Insecurity 
The political environment during the 2011 electoral processes was not fully 
conducive to credible elections. The eastern region of the DRC was under the 
occupation of a rebel movement popularly known as the March 23 Movement. In 
Kinshasa as well as other cities, the 2011 electoral processes were characterized 
by a growing feeling of insecurity regarding some members of the ruling party and 
opposition. This situation of insecurity was described by the following informants: 
Inf. 4: “Our country is in a post-conflict state; elections were organized in an 
environment of crisis.”  
Inf. 8: “The environment in which the 2011 elections were conducted was 
disastrous; have a look at the ongoing conflict in the eastern region of the 
country, this is horrible.”  
Inf. 2: “On the eve of election day, we witnessed a climate of insecurity and 
assassination. Marius Ngangale, an opposition Member of Parliament from 
the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo25 (MLC), was assassinated on 
22 November 2011 in Kinshasa…on 25 November 2011 another member of 
the opposition party named Union pour la Nation Congolaise26 (UNC) was 
stabbed in Kinshasa at the same time since a part of our territory is under the 
control of rebel groups like M23, Mayi-Mayi27 and FDLR who are plundering 
… raping and violating humans rights.”         
The above statements are supported by the International Crisis Group report 
(2011a:1) as follows: in 2006, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations 
(UN) were engaged in talks to secure the 2006 general elections in the DRC. Five 
years later, the Congolese authorities regained their responsibility to secure the 
2011 election processes. However, the climate of insecurity persists in the eastern 
region of the DRC due to the fragility of the state security machinery. The 
researcher from the International Crisis Group (2011b:3) stated that lack of 
                                            
25
 Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo is French for Movement for the Liberation of Congo. 
26
 Union pour la Nation Congolaise is French for Union for Congolese Nation. 
27
 Mayi Mayi is Swahili for water. In the context of armed groups in the DRC, it is most often seen 
to symbolize the magic force that makes the combatants (armed groups) become allegedly 
invincible, invisible and immune to gunfire.   
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security disrupted voter registration at every local level. In the eastern province 
particularly in Irumu territory, the INEC relocated registration centers in Bahema-
Mitego and Bahema-South after they were looted. In the territory of Djugu, a kit 
was stolen but replaced immediately. In North Kivu, in the territories of Lubero and 
Rutshuru, armed groups attacked voter registration centers. In Walikale territory, 
the clash between two armed groups (Mayi-Mayi Cheka and the Alliance des 
Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain)28 (APCLS) interrupted the voter 
registration process. In South Kivu, especially in Kabare, Kalehe and Mwenga 
territories, registration materials were stolen by armed groups such as Mayi Mayi 
(International Crisis Group 2011b:3).  
 
4.2.1.2 Mistrust 
The political climate before the 2011 elections in the DRC was not peaceful 
because the political actors suspected each other of cheating in the elections. The 
lack of trust and consensus were predictable in such an environment. This 
situation was substantiated by the following informants:  
Inf. 3: “Before the day of elections, tension was already terrible anywhere in 
the country. Also among contenders, some political actors suspected others 
of fraud.”  
Inf. 4: “I'll admit that the elections were held in an environment of agitation, 
suspicions, mistrust and doubt among election competitors. There is also the 
integration of the historic leader of opposition Mr Etienne Tshisekedi into the 
2011 electoral processes after the boycotting of the 2006 elections. Its 
political party the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progress Social29 (UDPS) 
presence was a real threat.” [sic] 
 
The final report of domestic long-term observers from the National Network for the 
Observation and Monitoring of Elections in DR Congo (RENOSEC) confirmed this 
finding. They noted that the electoral processes leading to the elections of 28 
November 2011 in the DRC were characterized by a lack of consensus that 
                                            
28
 Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain is French for Patriotic Alliance for a 
Free and Sovereign Congo. 
29
 Union pour la Démocratie et le Progres Social is French for the Union for Democracy and Social 
Progess. 
74 
 
opened up the way for contestation at each stage of the electoral processes 
(RENOSEC 2012:11).     
 
The above statements were supported by Mavungu (2013:30) who mentioned 
that, being a popular and legendary leader; Tshisekedi‟s decision to participate in 
the 2011 electoral processes was a shock and stumbling block to the ruling party, 
due to the poor record of the incumbent regime.  
 
4.2.1.3 Amendment of the Constitution of 2006 as a strategy to favor one 
contender  
The amendment of the constitution, as mentioned above, could suggest the move 
was intended to ensure that a simple majority would secure the incumbent‟s 
victory. On 20 January 2011, the parliament (senate and assembly) changed 
Article 71, which previously stipulated that a candidate who obtains 50% plus 1 of 
votes cast should be elected as president (absolute majority electoral system) into 
First-past-the-post (the simple majority electoral system). Many informants 
commented on this point as follows: 
Inf. 3: “The speed with which the ruling party and its allies revised the 
constitution suggested the picture that the incumbent candidate was not 
strong enough to win the 2011 elections. To revise the constitution in the 
middle of the electoral process requires a minimum agreement from all 
competitors…the constitution is the foundation of constitutional democracy 
therefore its amendment could need a general consensus among election 
stakeholders but this did not happen…you can understand why…”     
Inf. 1: “The ruling party and its allies changed the electoral system for 
presidential race from absolute majority electoral system to simple majority 
ten months before the run of presidential elections without serious debate 
within the parliament.” 
According to Mangu (2013:8), President Kabila‟s party and supporters anticipated 
that their candidate would hardly go through the first round and was likely to lose 
to a common opposition candidate, as had happened to President Laurent 
Gbabgo, who lost to Allasane Dramane Ouatara in the Côte d‟Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 
2010 presidential elections. He asserted that to play safe, the possibility of a 
second round had to be ruled out by an amendment to Article 71.  
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The absence of a genuine consensus with regard to the amendment of the legal 
framework created tensions that weakened the electoral process (European Union 
Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) 2011:10). Besides, Mavungu (2013:29-30) 
declared that the constitutional amendment was passed in the face of controversy 
from political parties and CSOs.  
 
4.2.1.4 Controversial appointment of new Justices of Supreme Court 
In the DRC, the constitution makes provision for the Supreme Court to be 
transformed into three courts, namely: a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the State Council. The transformation of the judiciary did not take 
place as stipulated by the constitution. For this reason, Article 223 of the 
constitution allows the Supreme Court to deal with all election litigations and 
disputes in the absence of the Constitutional Court. On 13 November 2011, 17 
new justices were appointed to the Supreme Court by President Kabila. In relation 
to this appointment in the course of the elections, one informant declared that:   
Inf. 10: “The constitution was not observed by the ruling party and its allies 
because they failed to make effective the transformation of the Supreme 
Court. The surprise was that on the eve of the elections the media 
announced the nomination of new justices; this demonstrated the intention of 
the ruling party to manipulate the outcome of the elections.”     
 
In view of this declaration, Mangu (2013:23) argues that the President appointed 
the judges of the Supreme Court from among his supporters in the judiciary 
without any consultation with the High Council of the Magistracy (Judicial 
Commission), as required by Article 82 of the constitution.30 The legality and 
relevance of the appointment of these justices so close to election day were 
contested by opposition parties, CSOs and the legal fraternity (Tshiyoyo 2012).  
 
                                            
30
 According to Article 82 of the constitution of the DRC, constitutional judges must be appointed 
and dismissed by the President on the initiative of the High Council of the Magistracy. However, 
the Supreme Court judges were shortly appointed before the polling day. The circumstantial 
evidence related to the appointment of these judges without the approval of the Congolese judicial 
commission could have led public opinion to speculate on the judges‟ loyalty to the regime as basis 
of their appointment by their incumbent President. 
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The lack of an independent judiciary could have been a stumbling block to the 
deepening of electoral democracy as well as a trigger of election conflict in the 
DRC. Elsewhere in Africa, this situation has been observed in Kenya by Shilaho 
(2013:94) who declared that the absence of a credible judiciary contributed to the 
2007 and 2008 post-election violence because the opposition had no confidence 
in it and so resorted to mass action to express anger rather than file a petition 
against the results.  
 
4.2.2 DELAY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INEC 
4.2.2.1 Protracted divergence in approving the appointment of INEC 
members  
In the DRC, the appointment of election commissioners was a central topic of 
discussion in the public discourse, especially CSOs as well as political role-
players. In ensuring the nomination of their supporters (persons close or aligned to 
their political agenda) as chairperson, deputy chairperson, chief electoral officers 
and election commissioners within the INEC; political role-players represented in 
Parliament attempted to take over the management of the INEC. This situation 
resulted in a stalemate which contributed to the delay in the establishment of the 
INEC. The appointment of election commissioners was approved by parliament in 
January 2011 and on 03 February 2011 President Kabila enacted Act No. 11/012  
on the nomination of INEC members.  
 
In this regard, one informant described this situation as follows: 
Inf. 1: “The DRC is still an immature state, how come the politicians 
approved the choice of election commissioners only 10 months just before 
the organization of elections on 28 November 2011? This meant that the 
INEC began its work late in February 2011. The Act on the organization and 
functioning of the INEC took the electoral processes hostage. The ruling 
party and opposition appointed their supporters in the leadership positions 
(chairperson, deputy chairperson and commissioners) of the INEC at the 
expense of the people. It is clear that the INEC will never act as an impartial 
body. This is a danger for our young democracy while opposition and the 
ruling party spent time discussing who should be a member of the INEC and 
who should not without including the CSO members.” [sic] 
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The delay in electoral processes was caused by the controversy around the 
composition of the INEC, when the majority rejected the nomination of Senator 
Jacques Ndjoli, a member of the opposition, as they suspected that he would be 
an obstacle to the re-election of their leader, President Kabila; while the opposition 
perceived the presence of Daniel Ngoyi Mulunda at the head of the INEC as a 
sign that the elections would be rigged in support of the ruling party.  
 
According to Mangu (2013:7), the opposition opposed the nomination of the 
INEC‟s chairperson, Ngoyi Mulunda, who was seen by the opposition as being 
likely to take the side of President Kabila since he was in the same province 
(Katanga) as the President and was one of co-founders of the ruling party. In 
addition, Tshiyoyo (2012) stated that it was only on 10 January 2011, mere 
months before the scheduled date of elections, that the seven members of the 
CENI were appointed with Ngoyi Mulunda as Chairperson.  
4.2.3 THE USE OF PATRONAGE  
4.2.3.1 Allegations on the use of patronage  in the recruitment process of 
INEC’s members  
The appointment of the INEC members was based on political and ethnic loyalty 
rather than on the basis of competency in election management. In this regard, it 
can be said that the way in which INEC members are nominated31 and behave 
once they are appointed could affect the quality of the elections as well as 
undermine voters‟ confidence in the EMB. The informants illustrated this situation 
as follows: 
Inf. 8: “The members of the INEC were selected according to the law on the 
establishment of the INEC, but they acted irresponsibly. Each member 
attempted to pay back his sponsor (political party) and this way of doing 
things seriously undermined the credibility of the elections. You know what, 
the political parties represented within the INEC appointed some of their 
political members as voting officers.”  
Inf. 1: “The nomination of election commissioners was made on basis of 
patron-client relationships and political agendas; this way could likely 
                                            
31
 The use of patronage in the recruitment process of the INEC members may undermine the 
quality of the electoral management processes. 
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undermine the impartiality of INEC to act as a referee. It seemed like the 
INEC members worked respectively to secure the victory of their political 
parties. In some constituencies, members of political parties without any 
qualifications were recruited to serve as polling staff. Instead of resolving the 
problem of electoral integrity and credibility, INEC members were busy 
answering the unemployment issues for their political members.”              
Inf. 4: “For the sake of your research you must be aware that the chairperson 
of the INEC is a Reverend; in 2006 he got involved in the campaign of 
President Joseph Kabila and also originates from the same province. During 
the process of election officers’ recruitment, the head of the INEC Reverend 
Ngoyi Mulunda and his deputy the Senator Jacques Djoli divided the country 
into two sides. The Reverend was in charge of selecting electoral agents 
from the eastern part of the country where he is a native and his colleague 
recruited election workers from the western side of DRC. The process was 
tainted by nepotism.”  
 
The preceding statements echoed the Carter Center‟s final report on the 2011 
elections in the DRC, which mentioned that the partisan nomination of the 
Commission Electorale National Indépendante32 (CENI) leaders, along with the 
absence of civil society representation, allowed a politicization of its decisions by 
the majority and opposition political party representatives. This did not permit the 
INEC to sufficiently fulfill its mandate of independence (Carter Center 2011:67). 
Besides, in its report on the 2011 presidential and legislative elections in the DRC, 
the RENOSEC (2012:12) stated that although there was a consensus, the 
appointment of INEC members did not enjoy support because of the exclusion of 
CSO members as well as power granted to political parties to nominate their 
political members as leaders of civic institutions instead of neutral and 
independent persons as recommended by the Act on the establishment of the 
INEC. Similar to a study conducted on EMBs in another country in West Africa, 
Benin, Hounkpe (2011:29) notes that the brevity of the term of the Commission 
                                            
32
 The Commission Nationale Electorale Indépendante is French for Independent National 
Electoral Commission.  
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Nationale Electorale Autonome33 (CENA) can encourage commission members to 
look for some sort of security by sacrificing independence in the defence of the 
parties that appointed them. It is a fact that candidates for appointment to CENA 
are often forced to promise fidelity to party interests before they are appointed. 
Others are promised reappointment or a share in the fruits of victory if they are 
members of the winning coalition, all of which are factors that have an influence on 
the CENA‟s independence. Subsequently, the INEC in the DRC did not clearly 
respond to allegations of political patronage in the recruitment process of election 
officers (EUEOM 2011:28). 
 
4.2.4 ALLEGATIONS OF POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE INEC 
In this study, certain informants indicated that the 2011 electoral processes in the 
DRC were characterized by concerns such as financial inadequacy, lack of 
professionalism, lack of organizational capacity and strategic electoral planning 
from the EMB side.  
 
4.2.4.1 Lack of professionalism  
According to Gildenhuys (2004:116), professionalism refers to the qualities or 
typical features of a profession or of professionals, especially qualities of 
competence, skill and ethical conduct. In addition, Meticulous and accurate 
implementation of electoral procedures and suitable skilled staff are key elements 
for the delivery of credible elections. Moreover, EMBs need to ensure that all 
election officials, whether core staff or temporary workers, are well trained and 
acquainted with the necessary skills to apply high professional standards in the 
implementation of their technical work (Wall et al. 2006:25). One can question the 
rationality of the INEC leadership decision that preferred to swiftly recruit new 
electoral and presiding officers without experience and appropriate skills as well 
as competency on the eve of the 2011 elections, instead of keeping former and 
experienced electoral officers who were involved into 2006 elections (Tuseku 
2011). Some informants articulated their opinions on INEC‟s lack of 
professionalism in this way: 
                                            
33
The Commission Nationale Electorale Autonome is French for Autonomous National Electoral 
Commission.  
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Inf. 11: “Due to the lack of professionalism, the INEC organized the 2011 
elections like we were about to take a stroll into the field. Elections require 
staff with experience. However, Election officers lacked experience in 
conducting the 2011 election… In future the INEC should train its personnel 
to become more professional in order to improve the quality of its 
performance.”  
Inf. 6: “Elections workers were under skilled and were incompetent to 
perform their duties. Some elections workers were overtaken in running their 
task; some of them did not know how to use election materials such as 
computer, camera. They were unqualified; they botched up and 
misunderstood the electoral processes. They were unable to unearth 
duplicated voters or voters who registered twice as a strategy of cheating.” 
[sic]  
Inf. 9: “Anyone with common sense should ask himself this question: why 
recruit new agents with neither competence nor experience instead of 
keeping those who worked during the 2006 electoral processes and having 
experience?” 
Inf. 7: “We did not have enough time to train election workers. However, we 
made use of cascade training methods to reach a big number of trainees. 
Good cascade training implies much time to ensure that all levels are 
covered. We as INEC, we have experienced a serious shortage of time as 
well as funding from our first funder who is the government. We did not have 
appropriate resources in respect of our missions.” 
 
In this regard, compliance with the legislative framework, including electoral 
regulations, procedures and manuals, is a prerequisite for the achievement of 
professionalism by an EMB (Wall et al. 2006:151). In contrast, it has been said 
that the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC revealed that 
some election workers lacked the ability to perform their duties and were also not 
involved in addressing the grievances raised by stakeholders. The lack of a clear 
understanding on how to apply the electoral law characterized the 2011 elections. 
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4.2.4.2 Lack of organizational and functional capacity 
Organization is the key in elections management. It allows the EMB to reach its 
objectives and at some point the needs of election stakeholders in delivering 
credible elections. However, in the DRC, the INEC was far from fulfilling its legal 
functions and obligations due to lack of organizational capacity. The following 
points on lack of organization, planning and finances were regularly raised by 
informants during interviews.  
Inf. 9: “The INEC did not have a clear strategic and operational plan related 
to the management of 2011 electoral processes. The choice of ballot papers 
and ballot boxes supplier was changed three times with financial 
consequences. We have experienced delay in dispatching of electoral 
materials (computer, ballot papers, ballot boxes, voters rolls, ink…).”  
Inf. 5: “By the lack of planning, things were done in haste. For example, the 
design of ballot boxes and ballot papers is the showcase.” 
Inf. 11: “In some constituencies there were lack of computers, and when 
electoral materials were supplied their number was insufficient to cover the 
need as expressed by electoral officers. In Kinshasa, the constituency of 
Tshangu, which is the largest constituency and the most popular country 
wide, some members of the public failed to be registered due to the shortage 
of electoral kits.”  
Inf. 10: “The INEC did not display on time the localization of registration 
centers as well as polling stations. In certain provinces especially in remote 
areas, the INEC asked the potential voters to travel more than 20 km to 
reach the registration centers. I have realized that the location and number of 
registration centers were disproportional depending on being known as 
opposition or ruling party stronghold”. 
Inf. 1: “Being in the western Kasai province to supervise election 
observations, I met this guy alone, carrying sensitive electoral materials such 
as ballot papers, voters’ roll, ballot boxes on his bicycle; who told me that he 
is a presiding officer in one voting station. He told me that elections should 
be running on the following day and, he was 80 km towards his destination 
where he is affected as a presiding officer; this means the electoral kits were 
delivered late.” [sic] 
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Inf. 12: “A general unpreparedness was invited by the INEC. Voters were 
confused by INEC who did not provide on time an electoral mapping 
containing names and localization of polling stations in some areas 
throughout the country. You will recall that not the majority of voting stations 
were visible. Although some of them were listed, it was difficult to confirm 
their physical existence on the ground. For this reason, the opposition parties 
started shouting about invisible voting stations that produced a certain 
number of votes apparently in favor to the incumbent. [sic]   
After overseeing some voting stations, I observed the shortage of electoral 
materials and this situation resulted in dispute between election officers and 
voters.”       
Inf. 7: “First of all, everything was done in a hurry and disorganized. How 
come before and after elections sensitive electoral materials such as ballot 
papers could be found on the streets? The INEC failed to coordinate its 
activities due to its administrative inability. It had no clear plan for collection 
and storage of ballot papers. In Kinshasa, there was a loss of an important 
number of ballot papers while others were abandoned under the rain without 
any attention from the INEC. This situation led the opposition parties to raise 
the question of electoral fraud.” [sic] 
Inf. 3: “I know voting officers who complained about not being paid while the 
INEC hired them during the electoral processes.” [sic]  
 
In managing the 2011 elections, the INEC failed to perform some of its legal, 
administrative and managerial tasks effectively. One can argue that the lack of 
organizational and functional expertise within the INEC adversely affected the 
transparency and the credibility of the electoral processes. The chaos that 
characterized the management of 2011 electoral processes clearly showed that 
there was a paucity of empirical electoral information from the INEC due to the 
non-existence of a research and knowledge management tool (RKM) function or 
section in this EMB. The absence of an operational RKM system resulted in bleak 
internal organization, electoral planning as well as unpreparedness. As Maphunye 
(2013:66) posits, the existence of an RKM function or unit can assist the EMB to 
pinpoint their strengths and weaknesses. Being part of the organization, the RKM 
system and process can engender innovative ideas, highlight issues for debate 
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that might not be in the EMB‟s official program or calendar of events and mandate; 
and in terms of election management, for instance, RKM could play a critical role 
in the electoral processes. Maphunye (2013:66) states that during electoral 
processes, EMBs are normally flooded with huge demands for information from 
electoral stakeholders. However, even in countries with a reputation for respecting 
timelines, planning remains an unresolved issue for many governments, which 
wait until the election year to roll out electoral operations such as voter registration 
and upgrading voters‟ rolls (Sadiki 2013:74).  
4.2.5 ELECTORAL MALPRACTICES  
The credibility of elections depends on the existence of a level playing field within 
the electoral processes and the perceptions that the public have towards the EMB 
in ensuring that the electoral outcomes reflect the will of the voters. Merloe 
(1997:4) maintains that the core of the level playing field is related to the extent to 
which political contenders benefit from political equity in terms of political freedom, 
availability of electoral materials, accessibility to voting facilities, media access and 
coverage, campaign financing and abiding by electoral law and regulations. For 
the duration of the electoral processes in the DRC, electoral contestants did not 
compete under equal conditions. The INEC barely attempted to create a level 
playing field for all electoral stakeholders. During the interview process, informants 
raised issues related to electoral malpractices as described below.  
 
4.2.5.1 Flawed voter registration process 
The registration process was subject to criticism from opposition parties. There 
was a serious lack of confidence among some stakeholders (political parties and 
CSOs) involved in the 2011 elections with regard to the accuracy of voters‟ lists. 
This situation raised the question of the credibility of the voters‟ roll that led the 
opposition political parties and CSOs to ask for access to the central database in 
order to verify the accuracy of the voters‟ roll. In this regard, the informants 
expressed their views as follows:    
Inf. 2: “The voter registration process was flawed and caused many 
problems. Voters complained about missing names or misplaced voters’ 
rolls. In certain constituencies, voters’ rolls did not correspond to specific 
voting stations.” 
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Inf. 6: “There were allegations of unlawful practices like registration of minors 
(under age of 18), security forces (the police and army) and foreigners when 
it is well known that the electoral law denies them the right to vote. As a 
consequence, the voters’ roll did not reflect the reality of Congolese 
electorate.” 
Inf. 5: “There was also the issue of people omitted from the list who were in 
possession of electoral cards while their names were not found on the voters’ 
roll, including those whose names appeared on the voters’ roll but they did 
not have their electoral cards. Now the INEC did not communicate properly 
whether this category will be voting or will not be allowed to cast the ballot 
paper as expression of right to vote.”  
Inf. 1: “In certain areas, voters were nervous because they either could not 
locate the voting stations or find their names on the voters’ roll. There were 
complaints about a shortage of ballot papers. Some voters might travel a long 
distance such as 25 km to reach the voting station and were told that they 
should wait for 2 to 3 hours to cast their ballot because either the voting stations 
opened late or the election officers were not ready.” 
 
Maladministration in the sphere of electoral registration appears to be one of the 
most common forms of electoral abuse in many jurisdictions (Birch 2011:36). In 
the DRC, the reliability of the voters‟ roll was seriously questioned by electoral 
stakeholders (La Voix de Sans Voix34 report on the 2011 elections). The VSV 
report cautioned that Act No. 11/003 of 25 June 2011, modifying Law No. 06/006 
of 9 March 2006 on the organization of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, 
municipal and local elections, was violated by the INEC. Article 5 of the electoral 
law stipulated that “no one who is under the age of 18 at the end of the voter 
registration process will be granted the right to vote”. Further, there were 
allegations regarding people under the age of 18 who voted in some 
constituencies in Bandundu, Katanga and North Kivu provinces. Besides, Article 8 
of the electoral law required the INEC to publish voters‟ lists in each province and 
constituency at least thirty days before the beginning of the campaign. In most 
cities and constituencies, voters‟ lists were published on Election Day on 28 
                                            
34
La Voix de sans Voix (VSV) is French for The Voice of Voiceless. 
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November 2011. This was the case in Demba in Kasai Occidental Province, 
Tshela in Bas Congo province and Kasongo Lunda city in Bandundu Province 
where Article 8 of the Electoral Act was not observed; some voters were allowed 
to vote using a hand-written list (The VSV report on 2011 elections). The Carter 
Center‟s report on the 2011 elections (2011:54) contends that the delay in posting 
voters‟ roll violated Congolese law and the rights of voters. In line with Article 8 of 
the electoral law, the CENI should have displayed the voters‟ roll at voting stations 
not later than 28 October 2011, that is, the starting day of campaign. In doing so, 
voters could identify their names before Election Day and have sufficient time to 
inform the INEC about errors related to the voters‟ roll or voting station locations. 
This situation denied a huge number of Congolese voters an opportunity to 
express their right to vote.  
 
4.2.5.2 Misuse of state resources 
According to the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2004:19), 
not all political parties and candidates had access to public resources; governing 
parties in SADC had an unfair advantage in this area, using the public resources 
to which they had exclusive access for campaign purposes or to further their 
political ends. This was the case in the DRC when during the campaign, premiers 
of provinces and ministers made use of state resources at their disposal to 
campaign for the incumbent President Joseph Kabila. Despite the prohibition 
against using state resources made by principles governing the electoral 
campaign (Congolese electoral law, Constitution as well as PEMMO) some 
candidates and government officials (ministers, premiers, mayors and CEOs of 
state-owned enterprises) used state resources for election purposes. This 
situation biased the playing field during the 2011 electoral processes. In relation to 
this case, the following informants added:  
Inf. 2: “No respect of electoral law, those who were in power at that moment 
used the state resources (media, finance, police service, means of transport, 
facilities). We saw them (ruling party and allies members) campaigning with 
state vehicles, even travelling, as well as obtaining housing throughout the 
country at the cost of the state.”  
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Inf. 11: “Some candidates used the public building to launch their manifesto 
as well as to expose their posters while the electoral law prohibited the use 
of any state spaces or infrastructures.”  
Inf. 6: “The ruling party and its allies took advantage of its incumbency status 
to gain protection from police service; also, the huge surprise to everyone 
was the fact that the ruling party booked itself the unique private airplane to 
travel countrywide. The opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi who hired a 
private South African aircraft; he received from the Congolese Civil Aviation 
Authority the permission for travelling over airspace to campaign nearly at 
the end of the campaign period.”  
 
There is no clear regulation or law governing election expenditure in the DRC. The 
2011 Congolese elections campaign was tainted by disproportionate campaign 
spending among contenders. The use of public finances as well as illegal sources 
of financial support affected the playing field of the elections. This situation was 
also experienced in Zimbabwe and Guyana in 1980, where the governing parties 
were financed by special public ministries and/or official state subventions to the 
exclusion of others. Incumbents also deployed the machinery of the state such as 
state edifices, vehicles and communication organizations for electoral campaign 
purpose (Levitsky and Way 2010:11). The EUEOM (2011:5) in the DRC declared 
that the electoral law was totally violated; including the prohibition of any display of 
posters for propaganda on public buildings as well as the involvement of public 
officials in election campaigns by using state resources for electioneering 
purposes. In most cases, there were premiers and mayors who were candidates 
for MPs who took advantage of their positions to campaign for the ruling party 
using public resources. The EUEOM (2011) stated that neither the INEC nor 
prosecutors had ever conducted actions to prevent such violations of the electoral 
law.        
 
4.2.5.3 Media access and coverage    
Sadiki (2013:75) emphasizes the worthy role played by the media in the political 
arena in any society. He argues that in competitive electoral processes, the media 
can serve as an extended arm of the propaganda machinery of political actors to 
maximize their chances of success. In the DRC, only the state-owned media have 
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the capacity to broadcast throughout the country. The editorial line and 
broadcasting program of the state media as well as private media linked to the 
ruling party largely changed during the 2011 electoral campaign period. Much 
airplay was dedicated to a new documentary related to President Kabila 
describing his childhood as well as his role in the presidency. This documentary 
aired by the public media as well as those who are close to the ruling party was 
shot and edited by the state media at the cost of the state. During the electoral 
process, the state media created a special television and radio production to 
support the ruling party‟s presidential candidate (Kabila) as well as the MPs. The 
substance of this new production was mostly intended to denigrate opposition 
personalities as well as distort information related to opposition parties. Despite 
the existence of institutions such as the High Council of Audio-visual and 
Communication, which is in charge of broadcasting and regulation programs in the 
Congolese media industry for either public or private radio and television stations; 
the ruling party and its coalition upheld the monopoly on the state-owned media 
and others. As the following informants explained:  
Inf. 10: “The process was not equal; the state-owned media did not cover all 
candidates and political parties in the same way. In the public media and 
others close to the incumbent regime, enough airtime and space were 
predominantly given to the ruling party and its followers rather than the 
opposition parties.”  
Inf. 3: “The DRC has more than thirty television and radio stations. We saw 
during the campaign period that television and radio stations close to the 
opposition were seriously annoyed by state services such as the Intelligence 
Service and the Department of Information and Communication. There were 
also some of the media closer to the opposition [sic] that were completely 
banned from broadcasting.”   
Inf. 7: “The public media were not balanced; certain candidates were more 
privileged and had more airtime as well as visibility on public media than 
other candidates. The gender balance was not respected; overall the debate 
was absent. The core of electoral discourse was centered on personal attack 
rather than on manifesto, state project and idea.”    
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In the process of advancing the integrity, transparency and credibility of the 
electoral process, the Southern Africa Development Community Parliament Forum 
(2001:9) underlines that the control of state-owned media by government causes 
an imbalance in the playing field between stakeholders, mainly the ruling party and 
opposition parties. This situation creates a kind of tacit personal censorship in the 
reporting process. The EUEOM (2011:47) in the DRC points out that there was a 
discrepancy of access to the state-owned radio and television stations that did not 
play their role as a public service, neglecting the principle of equity and equality in 
the matter of information distribution. In addition, the Department of Information 
and Communication took a discriminatory and arbitrary decision that led to the 
interruption of the broadcasting signal of media associated with the opposition 
such as Radio Lisanga Television (RLTV) and Canal Futur TV, without considering 
any legal repercussions. This led other journalists to practice self-censorship that 
threatened the right to information completely during the electoral campaign 
period. In addition, the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication failed to 
regulate equal access to media between opposition and ruling party candidates. 
For example, the EUEOM (2011) media monitoring statement reported that the 
state-owned National Congolese Television spent 86% of coverage on Joseph 
Kabila‟s presidential candidate while ten other presidential candidates shared 14% 
of coverage on National Congolese Television. Levitsky and Way (2010:11) assert 
that when opposition parties lack access to media that reach most of the 
population, there is no possibility of fair competition. Taking a lesson from Malawi, 
where President Bakili Muluzi defeated the former President Banda, one journalist 
criticized the incumbent control of media as follows: “Before it was Banda, Banda 
every day; now it is Muluzi, Muluzi, and Muluzi.‟‟ (Levitsky and Way 2010:11)     
 
4.2.5.4 Campaign process  
The election campaign was organized in a climate of intimidation and coercion. All 
means were justified to achieve the end of being elected. In this respect, some 
candidates donated money and gifts to voters for election purposes, while others 
made use of a youth syndicate known for their violence and harassment in order 
to terrorize their opponents. As several informants told the researcher: 
Inf. 9: “Donation and vote buying were there. Some candidates gave money, 
T-shirts, alcohol, and built bridges in same remote areas and donated 
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electrical cables in order to attract voters. These are vote determinants on 
the basis of which certain MPs and presidential candidates were appreciated 
by some voters”. [sic] 
Inf. 1: “Some contenders in the parliamentary elections were accompanied 
by the militia and youth syndicate called Kuluna35...There was a clash 
between the incumbent President Joseph Kabila and opposition leader 
Etienne Tshisekedi’s followers in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi cities. In 
Kinshasa, UDPS headquarters of Etienne Tshisekedi were attacked by 
armed persons known to be close to the ruling party. At least 8 members of 
UDPS died and 23 others were wounded. The political intolerance was very 
high among partisans who belonged to opposition parties and ruling parties.” 
[sic]   
Inf. 2: “The last day of campaigns, the presidential guards, a special unit of 
the Congolese army in charge of presidential security, opened gun fire on 
Etienne Thisekedi’s supporters gathered around the Kinshasa National 
Airport to welcome their leader who came back to Kinshasa after a long 
journey for the electoral campaign.”  
Inf. 9: “Women candidates (MPs) were threatened by men candidates (MPs). 
In some constituencies, women candidates were prohibited to campaign; and 
their posters also have been removed in certain provinces.”  
 
According to a report published by the Ligue des electeurs (2011), the electoral 
process was devoid of a specific theme or real debate and it was marked by 
human rights violations. The League of Voters reported that there were cases of 
intimidation of opposition candidates such as Roger Lumbala and Martin Fayulu, 
who were arrested in order to discourage them from campaigning. In addition, 
Etienne Tshisekedi received an approval letter to fly over Congolese airspace for 
campaigning purposes only a few days before the end of the campaign period. 
After campaigning in the province of Bas Congo, the airplane on which Etienne 
Tshisekedi was aboard was denied the right to land at the International Airport of 
Ndjili in Kinshasa on 26 November 2011. This situation led to a murderous 
repression of Tshisekedi‟s followers and supporters who came to welcome him.       
                                            
35
 Youth association known for their violence and attacks on members of the public in Kinshasa 
and other provinces. 
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4.2.5.5 Inaccurate counting and results acceptance 
Accurate and comprehensive tabulation of votes is another dimension of free and 
fair elections. Incorrect procedures for counting votes marred the outcomes of 
elections that led the opposition to allege rigging of election results. Once the 
votes are cast, they must then be counted, tabulated (aggregated) and reported 
accurately (Birch 2011:180). The counting of votes in the 2011 electoral processes 
in the DRC was largely criticized by voters for being biased by the election 
commissioners. On 20 November 2013 in Kinshasa during the course of data 
collection, one polling worker36 told the researcher that “we are the ones who 
decided who should be elected or not. Candidates who were interested to get 
power visited us and we helped them to get elected by changing the results. 
Therefore, those who paid us, we facilitated them to gain more votes than their 
opponents by creating invalid ballots in the amount of their opponents”. In relation 
to voting inaccuracy, the following informants elaborated that: 
Inf. 7: “We did our part of the job assigned to us as elections workers. If there 
was wrongdoing, this came from the politicians; which means INEC 
leadership.”  
Inf. 5:” As the majority of election workers were recruited on the basis of 
patron-client relation, some of them refused to deliver the sheet of results to 
party agents and participated in rigging the electoral results. One voter 
claimed that we made our choice for the lamb; how it came about that the 
result gave us the cat...those people robbed us.” [sic] 
Inf. 6: “We did not vote for him. How come that if people voted for you; after 
the announcement of the results, why thanks everywhere? We were 
surrounded by soldiers.” [sic] 
 
One member of the ruling party‟s electoral alliance, Jean Claude Muyambo, 
claimed that Kabila‟s powerful advisor Augustin Katumba Mwake instructed Ngoyi 
Mulunda as to which candidates should be elected and which should be excluded. 
                                            
36
 One polling worker openly admitted his participation in the electoral fraud because he felt 
betrayed by his client (MP candidate) who got elected but did not fulfill his promise to pay him after 
the elections. This situation can be illustrated by a large number (500) of electoral charges laid to 
the Supreme Court by MP candidates who alleged that the electoral results were rigged.  
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Muyambo spoke out to justify his failure to get elected (Mavungu 2013:41). The 
results of the 2011 elections were differentially appreciated depending on 
opposition or ruling party alignment. After the Supreme Court of Justice definitively 
pronounced the results, opposition parties rejected the result. The UDPS party 
claimed that its leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, won the elections. He held an 
inauguration ceremony at his house in Limete, after which he was put under house 
arrest immediately after the announcement of the election results (Mavungu 
2013:43). In a study on Electoral Malpractice, Birch (2011:180) argues that 
noteworthy violations include miscounting, inaccurate tabulation, and the 
misreporting of results; failure to report in a timely manner is also a cause for 
concern. In the same vein, the EUEOM (2011:20) report on the 2011 elections in 
the DRC illuminates that non-compilation of nearly two thousand tallies in 
Kinshasa, which had been approved by the local compilation center but 
subsequently disappeared or were destroyed, affected the results of elections and 
credibility. However, this situation did not result in criminal sanctions against those 
who were responsible for the loss and destruction of these tallies in accordance 
with Articles 82, 83 and 89 of the Electoral Act.  
 
The Carter Center (2011:69) concluded that many local compilation centers 
seemed to have delivered credible tallies to the satisfaction of political party 
witnesses and other observers. Nevertheless, certain election observation 
missions documented that other local compilation centers, especially in Kinshasa, 
North and South Kivu and Katanga provinces, were poorly planned and chaotic in 
their operations, thus compromising the integrity of the results process in those 
areas. 
 
4.3 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS   
The second phase of this chapter is about the analysis and interpretation of 
quantitative data from 90 respondents who correctly completed and returned the 
questionnaire. The data is statistically presented in relation to the questionnaire 
(see Appendix C) as pie charts and bar charts showing the demographic 
background of respondents, the views of stakeholders on attempts at vote buying, 
violence related to election as well as the level of satisfaction and trust in the INEC 
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and other institutions involved in the management of the 2011 elections in the 
DRC. 
 
4.3.1 DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
The demographic background of respondents was described in terms of: gender, 
highest level of education, membership of CSOs, training related to election 
observation and years as members of CSOs. 
4.3.1.1 Gender distribution 
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 below show that there are more males in the sample 
than females. The data indicates that the sample was not proportionally 
represented in relation to gender distribution. The sample could be described as a 
male dominant group. 
Table 4.2 Gender of respondents 
Gender Frequency Percentage 
Male 77 86 % 
Female 13 14 % 
Total 90 100 % 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Gender of respondents (source: survey) 
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4.3.1.2 Levels of education  
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2 below indicate that 11% of respondents obtained a grade 
twelve certificate and 89% of respondents had a tertiary level of education. This 
means that the majority37 of the respondents had a tertiary qualification.    
 
 
Table 4.3 Education levels of respondents 
Education Frequency Percentage 
High school 10 11% 
Tertiary 80 89% 
Total 90 100 % 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Education levels of respondents (source: survey) 
 
4.3.1.3 Membership of CSOs 
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 below show that  95% of respondents are members of 
CSOs, while the minority of the sample 5% do not have membership with any 
CSOs. The findings show that the majority of respondents are CSOs role players. 
 
Table 4.4 CSOs membership of respondents 
                                            
37
 The term majority in this study refers to the high number (percentage) out of 90 respondents who 
expressed in the same way their views about the management of the 2011 electoral processes in 
the DRC. 
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Membership with CSOs Frequency Percentage  
Yes 5 95% 
No 85 65% 
Total 90 100% 
 
 
Figure 4.3: CSOs membership of respondents (source: survey) 
4.3.1.4 Training related to election observation 
Table 4.5 Election observation training of respondents 
Training in observing 
elections 
Frequency Percentage  
Yes 71 79% 
No 19 21% 
Total 90 100% 
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Figure 4.4: Election observation training of respondents (source: survey) 
 
Table 4.5 and Figure 4.4 above indicate that 79% of respondents were trained to 
observe elections, and 21% of respondents did not receive training related to 
election observation. This means that the majority of the respondents received 
training in observing elections.  
 
4.3.1.5 Experience of being CSOs role player in the DRC 
Table 4.6 and Figure 4.5 below reveal that 30% of respondents had been CSOs 
role players for less than 5 years. The largest group of the sample, with 53% of 
respondents, fell in the category of 6-10 years‟ experience as CSOs role players, 
while 17% of respondents were in the category of 11-15 years. None of the 
respondents was in the category of 16 and more years of experience as CSOs 
role players. This could be explained by the fact that in 2005 the DRC organised 
the constitutional referendum in which CSOs role players were involved as 
domestic observers. 
Table 4.6 CSOs tenure of respondents 
Tenure as CSOs role players Frequency Percentage  
1-5 years 27 30% 
6-10 years 48 53% 
11-15 years 15 17% 
16+ years 0 0% 
Total 90 100% 
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Figure 4.5: Tenure of experience as CSO role player (source: survey) 
 
4.3.2 VIEWS ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL PROCESSES 
4.3.2.1 Views on whether the election results reflect the will of the voters 
Table 4.7 and Figure 4.6 below show that 84% of the sample responded 
negatively: the results of the 2011 elections did not reflect the will of the voters. 
The remaining 16% agreed that the results of the 2011 elections reflect the will of 
the voters. The results in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.6 indicate that the majority of 
respondents believed that the results of the 2011 elections did not reflect the way 
electors voted.  This means that the results of the 2011 elections were not 
credible.  
Table 4.7 Views on the credibility of the 2011 elections 
Respondents‟ views on the credibility of  
the 2011 election outcomes 
Frequency Percentage  
Yes, accurate reflection 14 16% 
No, inaccurate reflection 76 84% 
Total 90 100% 
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Figure 4.6: Views on the credibility of the 2011 elections (source: sourvey)    
 
4.3.2.2 Respondents’ views on the electoral legal framework to ensure the 
integrity of the 2011 electoral processes 
The results in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.7 below indicate that 51% of respondents 
said that the electoral legal framework did not ensure integrity in electoral 
processes while 49% confirmed that the election legal framework ensure the 
integrity of electoral processes. This means that the integrity of the 2011 electoral 
processes was not ensured in the DRC, according to the majority. 
 
Table 4.8 Views on electoral legal framework  
 
Respondents‟ views on 
electoral legal framework 
Frequency Percentage  
Yes 44 49% 
No 46 51% 
Total 90 100% 
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Figure 4.7: Views on electoral legal framework (source: survey) 
 
4.3.3 RESPONDENTS’ OPINIONS ON THE FREENESS AND FAIRNESS OF 
THE 2011 ELECTIONS IN THE DRC  
 
Table 4.9 Opinions on freeness and fairness of the 2011 elections 
Freeness and fairness of 2011 elections 
Respondents‟ opinions on the freeness of the 2011 elections  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
Disagre
e 
Strongly 
disagree 
Frequency 14 28 0 31 17 
Percentage 15.6% 31.1
% 
0% 34.4% 18.9% 
Respondents‟ opinions on the fairness of the 2011 elections 
Frequency 5 14 8 45 18 
Percentage 5.6% 16% 8.9% 50% 20% 
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4.3.3.1 Opinions on the freeness of the 2011 elections  
 
Figure 4.8: Freeness of the 2011 elections (source: survey) 
The results in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.8 above indicate that 18.9% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed, and 34.4% of respondents disagreed that the 
2011 elections were free. However, of the respondents, 15.6% strongly agreed, 
and 31.1% agreed that the 2011 elections were free. This means that the majority 
of respondents (53.3%) disagreed that the 2011 elections were free. The results in 
Table 4.9 and Figure 4.8 suggest that the 2011 elections were not free. 
4.3.3.2 Opinions on the fairness of the 2011 elections 
 
Figure 4.9: Fairness of the 2011 elections (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.9 above indicate that 20% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed, and 50% of respondents disagreed that the 2011 
elections were fair. However, of the respondents, 5.6% strongly agreed, and 16% 
agreed that the 2011 elections were fair. This means that the majority of 
respondents (70%) denied that the 2011 elections were fair. The results in Table 
4.9 and Figure 4.9 suggest that the 2011 elections were not fair. 
 
4.3.4 RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ON THE IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE 
OF THE INEC 
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Table 4.10 Views on the impartiality and independence of the INEC 
 
Views on the impartiality and independence of the INEC 
The INEC made decisions that favor some contenders  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Frequency 29 27 6 24 4 
Percentage 32.2% 30% 6.7% 26.7% 4.4% 
The INEC performed its duty with independence 
Frequency 3 15 9 36 27 
Percentage 3.3% 16.7% 10% 40% 30% 
 
4.3.4.1 Views on INEC’s decisions 
 
Figure 4.10: Views on INEC‟s decisions (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.10 above indicate that 32.2 % of the 
respondents strongly agreed, and 30% of respondents agreed that the INEC 
favored some contenders. However, 4.4% of the respondents strongly disagreed, 
and 26.7% disagreed that the INEC favored certain contenders. The majority 
(62.2%) of the respondents believe that the INEC made decisions that undermined 
its neutrality. This means that the INEC was not impartial in performing its duty.  
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4.3.4.2 Views on INEC’s independence 
 
Figure 4.11: Views on the independence of the INEC (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.11 above show that 30% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed and 40% of respondents disagreed that the INEC 
performed its duty autonomously. However, 16.7% of the respondents agreed, 
and 3.33% strongly agreed that the INEC was not under partisan control in 
performing its duty. The majority of respondents (70%) said that the INEC was 
dependent in performing its duty. This suggests that the INEC was not free from 
partisan interference.   
 
4.3.5 LEVEL OF SATISFACTION IN CERTAIN ELECTION ASPECTS 
 
Table 4.11 Level of satisfaction in registration, information, equipment, 
competency and impartiality of electoral officers 
 
Level of satisfaction in certain election aspects 
 
Voter registration 
 
 
 
 
Very 
satisfied 
Satisfied Neither 
satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied Very 
dissatisfied 
Frequency 10 30 2 41 7 
Percentage 11.1% 33.3% 2.2% 45.6% 7.8% 
Information on voting procedures 
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Frequency 12 20 7 37 14 
  Percentage  13.3% 22.2% 7.8% 41.1% 15.6% 
Competency of electoral officers 
Frequency 11 22 9 38 10 
Percentage 12.2% 24.4% 10% 42.3% 11.1% 
Adequacy of equipment in the voting station 
Frequency 12 31 5 31 11 
Percentage 13.3% 34.4% 5.6% 34.4% 12.2% 
Impartiality of electoral officers 
Frequency 14 27 5 40 4 
Percentage 15.6% 30% 5.6% 44.4% 4.4% 
 
4.3.5.1 Voter registration 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Level of satisfaction in voter registration (source: survey) 
 
The informations in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show that 11.1% of respondents 
were very satisfied with the process of voter registration, and 33.3% of 
respondents were somewhat satisfied with voter registration. In contrast, 45.6 % of 
respondents were somewhat dissatisfied and 7.8% were very dissatisfied with 
voter registration. Only 2.2% of respondents were undecided. The results in Table 
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4.11 and Figure 4.12 indicate that a majority of 53.4% of respondents were not 
satisfied with voter registration in the 2011 elections.  
4.3.5.2 Information on voting procedures 
 
Figure 4.13: Information on voting procedures (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.13 indicate that 13.3% of respondents were 
very satisfied and 22.2% of respondents were somewhat satisfied with the 
information given on voting procedures. Another 41.1% of respondents were 
somewhat dissatisfied and 15.6% of respondents were very dissatisfied. However, 
7.8% of respondents were uncertain. The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.13 
indicate that 56.7% of respondents were not satisfied with the information on 
voting procedures in 2011 elections. This means that the majority of respondents 
confirmed that the information on voting procedures was not well distributed and 
conveyed.  
4.3.5.3 Competency of electoral officers  
 
Figure 4.14: Competency of electoral officers (source: survey) 
The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.14 above show that 11.1% of respondents 
were very dissatisfied and 42.3% of respondents were somewhat dissatisfied with 
the competency of electoral officers. Of the respondents, 24.4% said that they 
104 
 
were somewhat satisfied and 12.2% were very satisfied with the competency of 
electoral officers. The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.14 indicated that 53.4% 
of respondents said that electoral officers were not competent. This means that 
the majority of respondents confirmed that the electoral officers were not skilled. 
 
4.3.5.4 Equipment in voting station 
 
Figure 4.15: Adequacy of equipment in voting station (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.15 above show that 12.2% of respondents 
were very dissatisfied and 34.4% of respondents were somewhat dissatisfied with 
the equipment in the voting station. Of the respondents, 34.5% were somewhat 
satisfied and 13.3% were very satisfied with the equipment in the voting station. 
The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.15 indicate that 47.8% of respondents said 
that they were satisfied with this aspect and 46.6% were not satisfied. With a 
difference of 1 % this means that the divergence of views in terms of the 
equipment in the voting station among stakeholders is slightly expressed.        
 
4.3.5.5 Impartiality of electoral officers 
 
Figure 4.16: Impartiality of electoral officers (source: survey) 
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The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.16 above show that 4.4% of respondents 
were very dissatisfied and 44.4% of respondents were somewhat dissatisfied with 
the impartiality of electoral officers. Of the respondents, 30% were somewhat 
satisfied and 15.6% were very satisfied with the impartiality of electoral officers. 
The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.16 indicate that 48.4% felt that they were 
not satisfied with the competency of electoral officers. This means that the 
electoral officers were not skilled.  
4.3.6 LEVEL OF TRUST TOWARDS INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO ELECTION 
MANAGEMENT 
Table 4.12 Level of trust towards Government, Parliament, INEC, Supreme Court, 
police, High Council of Audio-visual and Communication38 
Level of trust towards institutions 
Government 
 Very high High Neither 
high nor 
low 
Low Very low 
Frequency 3 12 29 39 7 
Percentage 3.3% 13.3% 32.2% 43.3% 7.8% 
Parliament 
Frequency 3 20 16 31 20 
Percentage 3.3% 22.2% 17.8% 34.4% 22.2% 
INEC 
Frequency 3 6 28 24 29 
                                            
38
 Although the INEC is constitutionally responsible to manage the elections processes, there are 
other institutions that play indirectly an important role in the management of elections. For example 
the Police should ensure the security of the electoral cycle; Supreme Court should deal with all 
electoral disputes, Government supplies finances, Parliament provides electoral legal framework 
and the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication should regulate the use and access to 
the media.  
106 
 
Percentage 3.3% 6.7% 31.1% 26.7% 32.2% 
Supreme Court 
Frequency 3 3 14 29 41 
Percentage 3.3% 3.3% 15.6% 32.2% 45.6% 
Police 
Frequency 6 10 28 33 13 
Percentage 6.7% 11.1% 31.1% 36.7% 14.4% 
High Council of Audio-visual and Communication 
Frequency 3 13 25 23 26 
Percentage 3.3% 14.4% 27.8% 25.6% 28.9% 
 
4.3.6.1 Trust in the Government 
 
Figure 4.17: Trust in the Government (source: survey) 
The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.17 above show that 3.3% of respondents 
asserted a very high level of trust and 13.3% had a high level of trust towards the 
Government. Of the respondents, 43.3% confessed a low level of trust and 7.8% 
had a very low level of trust in the Government. The majority of respondents 
(51.1%) indicated a low level of trust towards the Government. This means that 
they had low trust in the Government.  
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4.3.6.2 Trust in the Parliament 
 
Figure 4.18: Trust in the Parliament (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.18 above show that 3.3% of respondents 
had a very high level of trust and 22.2% had a high level of trust towards 
parliament. Of the respondents, 34.4% had a low level of trust and 22.2% had a 
very low level of trust in Parliament. Overall significant percentage of respondents 
(56.6%) did not trust the Parliament.  
4.3.6.3 Trust in the INEC 
 
Figure 4.19: Trust in the INEC (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.19 above show that 3.3% of respondents 
indicated a very high level of trust and 6.7% had a high level of trust towards the 
INEC. Of the respondents, 26.7% claimed a low level of trust and 32.2% had a 
very low level of trust in the INEC. The majority of respondents (58.9%) expressed 
a low level of trust towards the INEC. This means that many respondents did not 
have trust in the INEC. It seems that the poor quality of 2011 election 
management raised by some interviewees (see section 4.2) could have influenced 
the decline of trust in the INEC.   
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4.3.6.4 Trust in the Supreme Court 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Trust in the Supreme Court (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.20 above show that 3.3% of respondents 
had a very high level of trust and 3.3% had a high level of trust towards the 
Supreme Court. Of the respondents, 32.2% had a low level of trust and 45.6% had 
a very low level of trust in the Supreme Court. The majority of respondents 
(77.8%) had a low level of trust towards the Supreme Court. This means that 
almost all respondents believed that the Supreme Court lacked judicial 
independence and did not perform its duty, especially in resolving electoral 
disputes and complaints raised by some election contenders.  
4.3.6.5 Trust in the Police 
 
 
Figure 4.21: Trust in the Police (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.21 above show that 6.7% of respondents 
had a very high level of trust and 11.1% had a high level of trust towards the 
police. Of the respondents, 36.7% had a low level of trust and 14.4% had a very 
low level of trust in the police. More than half respondents (51.1%) expressed a 
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low level of trust towards the police. This means that the police did not sufficiently 
secure the electoral processes, especially the election campaign (see section 4.2). 
4.3.6.6 Trust in the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication  
 
Figure 4.22: Trust in the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication 
(Source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.22 above show that 3.3% of respondents 
had a very high level of trust and 14.4% had a high level of trust towards the High 
Council of Audio-visual and Communication. Of the respondents, 25.6% had a low 
level of trust and 28.9% had a very low level of trust in the High Council of Audio-
visual and Communication. Over half of respondents (54.5%) reported a low level 
of trust towards the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication. This means 
that the majority of respondents believe that the High Council of Audio-visual and 
Communication did not fairly regulate media access and coverage during the 2011 
electoral processes. The inadequate implementation of media regulations during 
the 2011 election period could have contributed to the decline of trust in the High 
Council of Audio-visual and Communication among respondents (see section 4.2). 
4.3.7 RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ON VOTE BUYING, VIOLENCE RELATED TO 
ELECTIONS AND SECRECY OF THE VOTE   
Table 4.13 Views on vote buying, violence related to elections and secrecy of the 
vote 
Occurrence of vote buying Frequency Percentage 
Yes 58 64% 
No 32 36% 
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Total 90 100% 
Occurrence of violence related 
elections  
Frequency Percentage 
Yes 54 60% 
No 36 40% 
Total 90 100% 
Secrecy of the vote  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 12 13% 
No 78 87% 
Total 90 100% 
4.3.7.1 Vote buying  
 
Figure 4.23: Views on vote buying (source: survey) 
 
The results in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.23 above indicate that 36% of respondents 
said that there was no vote buying during the 2011 elections while 64 % confirmed 
that voters were exposed to vote buying. This implies that some candidates were 
seen to be soliciting votes unfairly. 
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4.3.7.2 Violence related to elections  
 
Figure 4.24: Views on violence related to elections (source: survey)  
 
The results in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.24 above indicate that 60% of respondents 
confirmed that there was violence related to elections during the 2011 elections 
while 40% said that voters were not exposed to violence related elections. The 
majority of respondents agreed that there was violence related elections. This 
means some contenders and their supporters employed violence in some  
constituencies during the 2011 elections. 
4.3.7.3 Secrecy of the vote 
 
Figure 4.25: Views on the secrecy of the vote (source: survey) 
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The results in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.25 above indicate that 13% of respondents 
confirmed the secrecy of the vote while 87% said that there was no confidentiality. 
This means that the secrecy of the vote was compromised at voting stations 
during the 2011 elections.  
 
4.4 SUMMARY  
This chapter covered the data analysis and interpretation of both interviewees and 
respondents‟ views on the management of 2011 electoral processes in the DRC.  
Data from interviews were analyzed in order to understand factors that affected 
the quality of the 2011 electoral processes management in the DRC while data 
from questionnaires were used to explain the capacity of the INEC in performing 
its task with impartiality and autonomy. Chapter five concludes the study and 
makes recommendations based on the findings of the study.      
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concludes the study by presenting the conclusions as they pertain to 
the objectives of the study. In addition, the limitations of the study are outlined and 
recommendations for future research are made.  
 
This study analyzed the perceptions of election stakeholders on the management 
of the 2011 electoral processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The 
importance of election stakeholders and EMBs as well as their role in electoral 
democracy was underlined through the literature related to the study. As 
Maphunye (2014) cautions, “election stakeholders play a critical role to ensure 
transparent, free and fair elections”; and he states that “elections are also about 
perceptions: stakeholders‟ roles in election prove that there is nothing to hide”. 
The question addressed in this study was: what are stakeholders‟ perceptions on 
the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC? The Findings of the 
study reveal that external and internal factors related to election management may 
shape the perceptions of election stakeholders. Taking into consideration the 
specificity of this study that is informed by both qualitative and quantitative results, 
the following is the summary of the findings that reflect the perceptions of elections 
stakeholders in the DRC. 
 
The research design used in this study was the mixed methods approach: an 
application of qualitative and quantitative methods in the same study. Pragmatism 
was the philosophical assumption that underpinned the study (see Chapter three). 
The literature relevant to this study showed that a lot has been written in the field 
of election management but not focused on election stakeholders, especially 
domestic observers and their role in enhancing electoral democracy in Africa and, 
particularly in the DRC. The political support, political trust and neopatrimonial 
theories were applied by the researcher in order to understand and explain factors 
affecting the management of the 2011 electoral processes and how election 
stakeholders came to shape their perceptions of the 2011 elections. The 
researcher conducted twelve interviews with election role players in Kinshasa 
(DRC). Of informants who were interviewed 17% (n=2) were female and 83% 
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(n=10) were male. Furthermore, of the 90 respondents who correctly completed 
their questionnaires, 86% (n=77) were male and; 14 %( n=13) were female.  
 
The objectives of the study are summarized as follows:  
5.2 FACTORS SHAPING ELECTION STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS 
The findings of the study (see Chapter four) showed that the following external 
and internal factors shaped the perceptions of stakeholders on the management of 
the 2011 elections: election environment, delay in the establishment and 
nomination of INEC members (leadership), allegations of patronage in nomination 
process of INEC members (leadership), allegations of poor performance of the 
INEC, and electoral malpractices. The context in which the Congolese 2011 
elections were conducted was not conducive to ensuring integrity and credibility of 
the election outcome. 
 
5.3 FACTORS AFFECTING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL 
PROCESSES IN THE DRC  
Findings from interviews suggested that insecurity, misuse of state resources for 
election purposes, bias in media access and coverage, the use of client-patron 
relations, divergence in nomination processes of INEC members (leadership), 
mistrust among contenders due to the amendment of the constitution and the 
appointment of new justices on the eve of 2011 elections are external factors that 
affected the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. However, 
internal factors that affected the management of the 2011 electoral processes in 
the DRC are as follows: lack of skills among election officers, lack of 
organizational capacity within the INEC, flawed voter registration processes, bias 
in campaign processes and inaccurate vote tabulation.  
5.4 PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE 2011 
ELECTION OUTCOMES  
The responses from respondents indicated that the majority (84%) believed that 
the 2011 election results did not reflect the will of the people. Of respondents, 51% 
believed that the electoral legal framework did not secure the integrity of the 2011 
electoral processes. In addition, 53.3% of respondents perceived the 2011 
elections as not being free and 70% perceived them as not being fair and 70% 
indicated that the INEC lacked independence in performing its duty.   
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5.5 PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ON SOME ELECTION ASPECTS 
The majority of respondents (53.4%) were not satisfied with voter registration 
processes; 56.7% were dissatisfied regarding information on voting procedures. A 
total of 53.4% perceived electoral officers as not being competent; 46.6% 
observed that the voting stations were inadequately equipped and 48.8% 
regarded the electoral officers as being partial. 
 
5.6 PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ON ELECTION INSTITUTIONS AS 
ROLE PLAYERS 
The perceptions of respondents on some institutions that were role players 
(Government, Parliament, INEC, Police, Supreme Court and High Council of 
Audio-visual and Communication) in the running of the 2011 elections in the DRC 
are expressed by their level of trust in each of them. The findings revealed that the 
majority of respondents (51.1%) felt a low level of trust in the Government and 
56.6% did not trust the Parliament. A total of 58.9% of respondents expressed a 
low level of trust in the INEC and 77.8 % expressed a low level of trust in the 
Supreme Court. Furthermore, 51.1% of respondents recorded a low level of trust 
in the Police and 54.5% indicated a low level of trust in the High Council of Audio-
visual and Communication.   
 
5.7 PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ON VOTE BUYING, VIOLENCE 
RELATED TO ELECTIONS AND SECRECY OF THE VOTE 
A total of 36% of respondents indicated being exposed to vote buying and 60% 
confirmed the use of violence in the 2011 elections. The majority of respondents 
(87%) said that the vote was secret. 
 
5.8 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study found that integrity, credibility, impartiality, independence, professional 
performance, trust and confidence were the weak links in the management of the 
2011 electoral processes in the DRC. To improve the quality of future election 
management the following actions need to be taken:  
• The Congolese Parliament should amend the electoral law in order to enhance 
the integrity, transparency, accuracy, impartiality and credibility of the 
management of electoral processes (electoral cycle);   
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• Provide an adequate training for electoral and presiding officers in order to make 
them more skilled, competent and professional;  
• Review the current electoral law in order to guarantee an active participation of 
domestic observers (CSOs) as key watchdogs of electoral processes from pre-
election phase to post-election phase;  
• The Parliament should insert a clause in the electoral law that prevents the 
incumbent from using public resources for election purposes and propose legal 
actions against election commissioners who are found guilty of falsification of 
results; 
• The Congolese Government should apply open advertising for members of the 
INEC and inclusiveness of other institutions (parliament and Constitutional Court) 
in the recruiting process of INEC members in order to avoid the pressure from 
political role players who want to control the electoral processes;  
• The establishment of a reliable Constitutional and Electoral Court as an organ in 
charge of political and election disputes;  
• The Congolese Government should put sufficiently large budgets at the disposal 
of the INEC;  
• The CSOs should be organized and more vibrant to ensure an effective civic and 
voter education;  
• The INEC should organize and create a space for regular dialogue with election 
stakeholders in order to mitigate harmful actions (violence during elections, 
restrictions on opposition access to state-controlled media, election 
mismanagement, and suppression of certain media during the campaign period) 
that undermine electoral integrity.   
Further research on other election stakeholders such as EMBs, CSOs, SADC-
Parliamentary Forum (PF), SADC-Electoral Commission forum (ECF), 
international observers, and media, the Police, Electoral Court and AU, EU, 
ECOWAS, ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) as well as 
SADC should be conducted in order to understand their role and contribution to 
the advancing of electoral and participatory democracy in Africa. 
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5.9 LIMITATIONS 
This study was limited to election stakeholders (domestic observers and election 
experts) in Kinshasa, the Capital city of the DRC, and the sample was not fully 
representative. Thus, the results could not be generalizable to all stakeholders all 
over the country, even if some of the stakeholders who participated in the study 
had representations and were involved in observing and reporting on the 2011 
elections throughout the country. The security threat and the fragility of political 
situation in the DRC as well as lack of funding undermined the movement of the 
researcher from one place to another during data collection. Additionally, fear of 
respondents; less attention paid to the level of education and gender profile of 
respondents; less interest of female respondents to participate in this study were 
the main limitations of the study. All these limitations undermined the researcher‟s 
attempt to ensure balanced profile of respondents based on gender, and level of 
education, among other variables.     
 
5.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The involvement of domestic observers in the electoral process is crucial because 
it contributes to the enhancement and establishment of participatory democracy in 
Africa and particularly in the DRC. Despite the participation of domestic observers 
in the 2011 elections, some contenders and their supporters interfered in the 
electoral management processes of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. This 
situation seriously undermined the possibility of electoral democracy taking root in 
the DRC. In this study, the perceptions of election stakeholders were analyzed 
from the pre-election phase, through the election phase and into the post-election 
phase. In addition, the findings of the study revealed that perceptions of 
stakeholders on the management of 2011 electoral processes were influenced by 
mixed levels of trust and satisfaction regarding some election aspects and 
institutions involved in election management, as well as internal and external 
factors that affected the performance of the INEC in meeting expectations 
(integrity, credibility, professionalism and impartiality in managing the 2011 
Congolese electoral processes) of citizens and in particular domestic observers 
and election experts. The perceptions of election stakeholders as suggested in the 
study does not mean that the management of elections in the DRC is the worst; 
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but the findings suggest that there is room for improving the management of 
electoral processes in Africa and particularly in the DRC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
5.11 LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adebayo, P.F and Omotola, J. S. 2007. Public perceptions of the 2007 Nigerian 
general elections. Journal of African Elections, 5(2):165-180. 
African Union. 2007. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. 
Addis Ababa: African Union. 
African Union-Panel of the Wise. 2010. Election-Related Disputes and Political 
Violence: Strengthening the Role of the African Union in Preventing, Managing, 
and Resolving Conflict. The African Union Series. New York: International Peace 
Institute.  
Alemika, E.E.O. 2007. Quality of Elections, Satisfaction with Democracy and 
Political Trust in Africa. Afrobarometer, Working Paper, 84. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/working_papers/AfropaperNo 84.pdf 
[Accessed: 4 February 2012].   
Alvarez, R. M., Hall, T. E and Llewellyn, M. H. 2008. Are Americans Confident 
Their Ballots Are Counted? The Journal of Politics, 70:754-766. 
Amaratunga, D., Baldry, D., Sarshar, M and Newton, R. 2002. Quantitative and 
qualitative research in the built environment: application of mixed research 
approach. Work Study, 51(1):17-31. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=851373&show=abstract   
[Accessed: 3 Jul 2013].   
Arancibia, C.S. 2008. Political Trust in Latin America. Unpublished Thesis. 
University of Michigan. [Online]. Available at: 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/61668/csegovia_1.pdf?se
quence=1 [Accessed: 4 February 2012].   
120 
 
Aydin, A. and Cenker, C.I. 2012. Public confidence in government: empirical 
implications from a developing democracy. International Political Science Review, 
33(2):230-250. [Online]. Available at: http://ips.sagepub.com/content/33/2/230.refs 
[Accessed: 4 February 2012].   
Babbie, E. 2007. The Practice of Social Research. 11thed. Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Wadsworth.  
Bach, D.C. 2012. Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism: Comparative receptions 
and transcriptions. In: Bach, D.C and Gazibo, M. (eds). Neopratrimonialism in 
Africa and Beyond. London: Routledge, 25-45.  
Balule, B.T. 2008. Election Management Bodies in the SADC Region-An Appraisal 
of the Independence of Botswana‟s Independent Electoral Commission. South 
African Journal on Human Rights, 24(1):104-122. [Online]. Available at: 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/ju_sajhr/ju_sajhr_v
24_n1_a5.pdf. [Accessed: 3 September 2014].  
Barriball, L. and While, A. 1994. Collecting data using a semi-structured interview: 
a discussion paper. Journal of Advancing Nursing, 19(2):328-335. [Online]. 
Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-
2648.1994.tb01088.x/pdf [Accessed: 3 March 2012]. 
Birch, S. 2008. Electoral Institutions and Popular Confidence in Electoral 
Processes: A Cross-National Analysis. Electoral Studies, 27(2):305-320. 
Birch, S. 2011. Electoral Malpractice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. 1994. Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political 
Transitions in Africa. World Politics, 46(4):453-489. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2950715.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true 
[Accessed: 3 March 2012]. 
121 
 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3(2):77-101. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa [Accessed: 3 
March 2012]. 
Bruhns, H. 2012. Weber‟s patrimonial domination and its interpretations. In: Bach, 
D. C and Gazibo, M. (eds). Neopratrimonialism in Africa and Beyond. London: 
Routledge, 9-24.  
Bryman, A. 1984. The debate about quantitative and qualitative research: a 
question of method or epistemology? The British Journal of Sociology, 35(1):75-
92. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.academia.edu/3230862/The_debate_about_quantitative_and 
qualitative_research_a_question_of_method_or_epistemology [Accessed: 3 
March 2012]. 
Carter Center. 2011. Presidential and Legislative Elections in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 28 November 2011 Final Report. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_rep
orts/drc-112811-elections-final-rpt.pdf [Accessed: 12 March 2012].  
Citrin, J. 1974. The Political Relevance of Trust in Government. The American 
Political Science Review, 68(3):973-988.  
Concise Oxford English Dictionary. 2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.presidentrdc.cd/constitution.html [Accessed: 12 July 2011].  
Cooper, D.R. and Schindler, P.S. 2011. Business research methods. 11thed. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
122 
 
Creswell, J. W and Plano Clark, V. L. 2007. Designing and Conducting Mixed 
Methods Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Creswell, J. W. 2003. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed 
Methods Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Creswell, J. W. 2008. Qualitative and Mixed Methods Research. Paper presented 
at the University of Kwazulu Natal on 15 October 2008. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ve
d=0CBsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fedstudies.ukzn.ac.za%2FLibraries%2FDocu
ment_Library%2FSouth_Africa_-_KZN_-
_Qualitative_and_Mixed_Methods_Research_-
_doct_and_masters.sflb.ashx&ei=NoLbU8SCEeGb0QWcl4CoCQ&usg=AFQjCNG
jD_W7dETjYpmffFz6r_gWZoFSng&sig2=pAC0YAEeADSAcm0m1r_Dpg&bvm=bv
.72197243,d.bGQ [Accessed: 3 March 2012]. 
Creswell, J. W. 2013. Qualitative Inquiry Research Design: Choosing among five 
approaches. 3thed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Creswell, J. W., Klassen, A. C., Plano Clark, V. L., Smith, K. C.  2012. Best 
Practices for Mixed Methods Research in the Health Sciences. Office of 
Behavioral and Social Sciences Research (OBSSR). [Online]. Available at: 
http://obssr.od.nih.gov/mixed_methods_research/pdf/Best_Practices_for_Mixed_
Methods_Research.pdf [Accessed: 3 Jul 2013]. 
Crotty, M. 1998. The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in 
the Research Process. London: Sage. 
Dalton, R.J. 1999. Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. In: 
Norris, P.(ed). Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57-77.   
123 
 
Debrah, E., Pumpuni, A. K and Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2010. A Study of Ghana‟s 
Electoral Commission. Dakar: CODESRIA. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/Boadi_Ghana-2-2.pdf [Accessed: 16 February 
2012]. 
Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. 2002. 
Addis Ababa: African Union. 
Delport, C.S.L and Roestenburg, W.J.H. 2011. Quantitative data-collection 
methods: questionnaires, checklists, structured observation and structured 
interview schedules. In De Vos AS., Strydom, H., Fouché, C.B. and Delport, 
C.S.L. (eds). Research at grass roots: For the social sciences and human service 
professions.4thed. Pretoria: Van Schaik Pubishers, 171-205. 
Dizolele, M. P and Kambale, P. K. 2012. Crumbling the DRC‟s legitimacy. Journal 
of Democracy, 23(3):109-120. 
Easton, D. 1957. An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. World Politics, 
9 (3):383-400.  
Easton, D. 1975. A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support. British 
Journal of Political Science, 5(4):435-457.  
Eklit, J and Svenson, P. 1997. What makes Elections Free and Fair? Journal of 
Democracy, 8(3):32-46. [Online]. Available at: 
https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/journal_of_demo
cracy/v008/8.3elklit.html [Accessed: 26 October 2014].  
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. 2004. Principles for 
Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region. 
Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy Africa. 
124 
 
Elections in the DRC: November 28 Presidential and Legislative Elections for the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Frequently Asked Questions. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/White-
Papers/2011/Elections-in-the-DRC-November-28-Presidential-and-Legislative-
Elections.aspx  [Accessed: 18 June 2012]. 
Elshamly, M.A.B. 2013. Developing a Strategic Framework in Small and Medium 
sized Enterprises (SMEs). Unpublished thesis. University of Gloucestershire 
United kingdom. [Online]. Available at: 
http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/454/1/ELSHAMLY,%20Amina%20Final%20thesis%20A(P
DF)%20PhD%20in%20Jun%202013.pdf  [ Accessed: 15 May 2014] 
Erdmann, G and Engel, U. 2007. Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical 
Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept. Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics, 45(1):95-119.  
Fombad, M. C. 2003. Election Management Bodies in Africa: Cameroon‟s National 
Elections Observatory in perspective. African Human Rights Law Journal, 3(1):25-
51. [Online]. Available at: http://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/fombad-c-m [Accessed: 9 May 
2012]. 
Gamson, W. 1968. Power and Discontent. Homewood: Dorsey Press. 
Gibson, W. J and Brown, A. 2009. Working with Qualitative data. London: Sage. 
Gildenhuys, J.S.H. 2004. Ethics and Professionalism: The battle against public 
corruption. Stellenbosch: Sun Press. 
Githaiga, N. The 2011 DRC elections polls and beyond 2012. [Online]. Available 
at: http://www.issafrica.org/publications/situation-reports [Accessed: 10 June 
2013]. 
125 
 
Gordon, A. A. and Gordon, D. L. 2007. Understanding Contemporary Africa. 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner. 
Gray, D. E. 2014. Doing Research in the Real World. 4thed. London: Sage. 
Hall, T. E., Monson, J. Q and Patterson, K. D. 2009. The Human Dimension of 
Elections: How Poll Workers Shape Public Confidence. Political research 
Quarterly, 62(3):507-522. 
Harris, P. 1998. Building an Electoral Administration. In: Harris, P and Reilly, B. 
(eds). Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. Stockholm: 
International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance, 308-319. 
International Crisis Group. 2011a. Congo: The Electoral dilemma. Africa Report 
No 175, 5 May 2011. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-
congo/175%20Congo%20-- [Accessed: 22 June 2012]. 
International Crisis Group. 2011b. Congo: The Electoral Process seen from the 
East. Africa Briefing No 80, 5 September 2011. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-
congo/B80%20Congo%20-
%20The%20Electoral%20Process%20Seen%20from%20the%20East%20ENGLI
SH.pdf [Accessed: 22 June 2012]. 
Hounkpe, M and Fall, I.M. 2011. Electoral Commissions in West Africa-A 
Comparative Study. 2thed. Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
Hounkpe, M. 2012. Benin. In: Kambale, P. (ed). Election Management Bodies in 
West Africa: A comparative study of the contribution of electoral commissions to 
the strengthening of democracy. South Africa: Open Society Foundations, 12-48. 
126 
 
Ibrahim, J and Garuba, D. 2010. A study of the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) of Nigeria. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social 
Science Research in Africa. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/Jibrim_Nigeria-2.pdf [Accessed:  22 June 2012]. 
Ijim-Agbor, U. 2007. The Independent National Electoral Commission as an 
(im)partial umpire in the conduct of the 2007 elections. Journal of African 
Elections, 6(2): 79-94. 
International Crisis Group. 2011a. Congo: The Electoral dilemma. Briefing No175, 
5 May 2011. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/175-congo-the-
electoral-dilemma.aspx [Accessed:  22 June 2012]. 
International Crisis Group. 2011b. Congo: The Electoral process seen from the 
east Africa. Briefing No 80, 5 September 2011. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/B80-congo-
the-electoral-process-seen-from-the-east.aspx [Accessed: 22 June 2012]. 
Jinadu, A.L. 1997. Matters Arising: African Elections and the Problem of   Electoral 
Administration. African journal of political science, 2(1):1-11. [Online]. Available at: 
http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/political%20science/volu
me2n1/ajps002001002.pdf [Accessed: 9 May 2012]. 
Johnson, R.B and Onwuegbuzie, A.J. 2004. Mixed Methods Research: A 
Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come. Educational Researcher, 33(7):14-
26. [Online]. Available at: http://edr.sagepub.com/content/33/7/14.full.pdf+html 
[Accessed: 3 July 2013]. 
Johnson, R.B., Onwuegbuzie, A.J and Turner, L.A. 2007.Toward a Definition of 
Mixed Methods Research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(2):112-133. 
127 
 
[Online]. Available at: http://mmr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/2/112 
[Accessed: 3 July 2013]. 
Kabemba, C.K. 2011. Democratization and the Political Economy of a 
Dysfunctional State. Unpublished thesis. Johannesburg: University of 
Witwatersrand. 
Kadima, D. 2009. An overview. In: Kadima, D and Booysen, S. (eds). 
Compendium Elections in Southern African 1989-2009: 20 years of Multiparty 
Democracy. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for Sustainability of Democracy in 
Africa, 1-20. 
Kadima, D. and Tshiyoyo, D. 2009. Democratic Republic of Congo. In: Kadima, D 
and Booysen, S. (eds). Compendium Elections in Southern African 1989-2009: 20 
years of Multiparty Democracy. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for Sustainability 
of Democracy in Africa, 91-145. 
Kambale, P.K. 2012. Overview: The contribution of electoral management bodies 
to credible elections in West Africa. In: Kambale, P. (ed). Election Management 
Bodies in West Africa: A comparative study of the contribution of electoral 
commissions to the strengthening of democracy. South Africa: Open Society 
Foundations, 1-11. 
Kerr, N.N. 2009. Electoral Governance in sub-Saharan Africa: Assessing the 
Impact of Electoral Management Bodies’ Autonomy and Capacity on Citizens’ 
Perceptions of Election Quality.  Washington DC: International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems.  [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2009/1674/
Manatt_Research_NKERR_12March2010.pdf [Accessed: 17 May 2013].  
128 
 
Klassen, A.C., Creswell, J. W., Clark, V.L.P., Smith, K.C and Meissner, H.I. 2012. 
Best practices in mixed methods for quality of life research. Quality of life 
Research, 21:377-380. [Online]. Available at: 
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/440/art%253A10.1007%252Fs11136-012-
0122-x.pdf?auth66=1411662986_40a14fc3ed77d3bfb00d2526e8babbe8&ext=.pdf 
[Accessed: 3 April 2013].  
Klingemann, H-D. 1999. Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global 
Analysis. In: Norris, P. (ed). Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic 
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 31-56. 
La Voix des sans Voix pour les droits de l‟homme. 2012. Rapport final sur 
l’observation des élections présidentielle et législatives du 28 novembre 2011 en 
République Démocratique du Congo. [Online]. Available at: http://www.vsv-
rdc.org/pdf/rapport_elections.pdf [Accessed: 22 June 2012].  
Law No. 04/002 of 15 March 2004, on political parties. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.content.eisa.org.za/old-page/drc-party-registration [Accessed: 22 June 
2012]. 
Law No. 04/028 of 12 November 2004, regulating the DRC citizenship. [Online]. 
Available at: http://eisa.org.za/PDF/drc_elect_law_en.pdf [Accessed: 22 June 
2012]. 
Law No. 10/13 of 28 July 2010 governing the establishment and function of the 
CENI. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/Divers/Loi.28.07.2010.pdf 
[Accessed: 13 February 2013]. 
Law No. 11/001 of 10 January 2011 on the composition and functioning of the 
Conseil Supérieur de l‟Audiovisuel et de la Communication (CSAC). [Online]. 
129 
 
Available at: 
http://www.ambardc.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=233%3Al
oi-sur-le-csac&catid=50&Itemid=37 [Accessed: 13 February 2013]. 
Law No. 11/002 of 20 January 2011, revising the Constitution of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (introducing a one-round presidential election system). 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2011/JOS.01.02.2011.pdf [Accessed:13 
February 2013]. 
Law No. 11/003 of 25 June 2011, modifying Law No. 06/006 of March 9, 2006 on 
the organization of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, municipal and local 
elections. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/Divers/loi.11.003.25.06.2011.ht
m [Accessed: 13 February 2013].  
Law No. 11/014 of 17 August 2011, on the allocation of legislative and provincial 
seats according to registered voters. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.presidentrdc.cd/doc/circonscriptionselectorales.doc [Accessed: 13 
February 2013]. 
Lekorwe, M.H. 2006. The role and status of the independent electoral commission.  
Journal of African Elections, 5(2):62-80.  
Levi, M and Stoker, L. 2000. Political Trust and Trustworthiness. Annual Review of 
Political Science, (3):475–507. 
Levitsky, S and Way, L.A. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism Hybrid Regimes 
After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lieberman, E.S. 2005. Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for 
Comparative Research. The American Political Science Review, 99(3):435-452. 
130 
 
[Online]. Available at: http://socsci.colorado.edu/~bairdv/Lieberman_2005.pdf   
[Accessed on 22 July 2014]. 
Ligue des Electeurs. 2012. Elections tronquées en République démocratique du 
Congo: Rapport final sur l’observation des élections présidentielles et législatives 
du 28 novembre 2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://documentation.codap.org/ONG/fidh/RDCElectionLE_5_.pdf [Accessed on 22 
June 2012]. 
Likoti, F.J. 2008. How parties fared in the 2007 election: A theoretical exploration 
of the outcome. Journal of African elections, 7(1):75-94.  
Lyons, T. 2004. Post-conflict Elections and the Process of Demilitarizing Politics: 
The Role of the Electoral Administration. Democratization, 11(3):36–62  
Makara, S., Rakner, L., and Rwengabo, S. 2008. Administrating the 2006 
Multiparty Elections: The role of the Electoral Commission. In: Kiiza, J., Makara, S 
and Rakner, L. (eds). Electoral Democracy in Uganda: Understanding the 
Institutional of 2006 Multiparty Elections. Kampala: Fountain Publishers: 90-118.  
Makulilo, A.B. 2009. Independent Electoral Commission in Tanzania: a false 
debate? Representation, 45(4): 435-453. 
Mangu, A.M. 2013. Democracy and states‟ compliance with regional and sub-
regional election benchmarks in Africa: the 28 November 2011 in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in retrospect. Journal of African Elections, 12(1):1-33. 
Maphunye, K.J. 2009 Evaluating Election Management in South Africa‟s 2009 
Elections. Journal of African Elections, 9(2): 56-78. 
Maphunye, K.J. 2013. Research and Knowledge Management gaps in African 
Election Management Bodies: a Dilemma for Governance and electoral 
democracy? Journal of Public Administration, 48(1):63-74. 
131 
 
Maphunye, K.J. 2013. Colloquium on Electoral Democracy in Africa organized by 
WIPHOLD-BRIGALIA BAM Research Chair in Electoral Democracy in Africa and 
the University of South Africa: Pretoria. 
Maphunye,K.J. 2014. Management of Democratic Elections in Africa. Pretoria: 
University of South Africa. Unpublished document. 
Mathagu, S.F. 2010. An analysis and appraisal of the Imbizo as an instrument of 
democracy in South Africa. Unpublished dissertation, department of Political 
Sciences, University of South Africa. [Online]. Available at:  
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/4031 [Accessed: 5 April 2011].  
Matlosa, K. 2004. Managing Democracy: A Review of SADC Principles and 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for 
Sustainable Democracy in Africa. [Online]. Available at: 
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30272/1/DSS_matlosa20
04.pdf?1 [Accessed: 4 March 2012]. 
Mavungu, M.E. 2013. Stay in power whatever it takes: Fraud and repression in the 
2011 elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Journal of African Elections, 
12(3):34-64. 
Menang, T. 2006. Election management in Cameroon: Progress, problems and 
prospects. Journal of African Elections, 5(1):60-73. 
Merloe, P. 1997. Electoral Campaigns and Pre-Election Issues: The Level Playing 
Field and Democratic Elections. [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.ndi.org/files/005_ww_demelections.pdf [Accessed: 6 July 2013]. 
Miller, A.H. 1974a. Political Issues and Trust in government. The American 
Political Review Science, 68(3):951-972. [Online] Available at: 
132 
 
http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci92n/readings/oct30.1.miller.jstor.pdf 
[Accessed: 3 July 2013].   
Miller, A.H. 1974b. Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or 
Ritualism? The American Political Science Review, 68(3):989-1001. [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci92n/readings/oct30.3.miller.jstor.pdf 
[Accessed: 3 July 2013].   
Mishler, W and Rose, R. 2001. What Are the Origins of Political Trust? : Testing 
Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies. Comparative 
Political Studies, 34(1):30-62. [Online]. Available at: 
http://cps.sagepub.com/content/34/1/30.full.pdf+html [Accessed: 3 July 2013].   
Mission d‟observation électorale de l‟union Européenne. République 
Démocratique Du Congo : Rapport final élections présidentielle et législatives 28 
Novembre 2011. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/moeue-rdc2011-rapport-
final_fr.pdf [Accessed: 22 June 2012].  
Mozaffar, S. 2002. Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa‟s Emerging 
Democracies. International Political Science Review, 23(1):85–101. 
Mpabanga, D and Rakner, L. 2007. The Evolution of International Norms and 
Standards of Electoral. In: Kaunda, J.M.(ed).  Proceedings of the 2006 Foprisa 
Annual Conference. Botswana: Botswana Institute for Development Policy 
Analysis. [Online]. Available at: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2837-macro-
economic-convergence-policy-in-the-southern.pdf [Accessed: 12 February 2013].   
Muboko, N. 2011. Conflict and Sustainable Development: the case of the Great 
Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP); Southern Africa. Unpublished thesis, faculty 
133 
 
of Arts at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. [Online]. Available at: 
http://dspace.nmmu.ac.za:8080/jspui/bitstream/10948/1357/1/Never%20Muboko.p
df [Accessed: 3 March 2012].  
Norman, A.S. 2010. Assessment of Elections Stakeholders in Elections 
Management. Educational Research, 1(9):319-326. 
Norris, P. 1999a. Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens? In: Norris .P. (ed). 
Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1-28.  
Norris, P. 1999b. Institutional Explanation for Political Support. In: Norris .P. (ed). 
Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 217-235. 
Norris, P. 2013. Does the world agree about standards of electoral integrity? 
Evidence for the diffusion of global norms. Electoral Studies, 32(4):576–588. 
[Online].  Available at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379413001169#.  
[Accessed: 14 May 2014]  
Ogoude, H. 2012. Appraisal of election monitoring and observation in Africa the 
case of the Democratic Republic of Congo‟s 2011presidential elections. [Online]. 
Available at:  http://www.consultancyafrica.com/an [Accessed: 10June 2013].  
Ordinance No. 11/012 of 3 February 2011 formally installing the members of the 
CENI. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2011/JO%2015%2002%202011.Sommaire.p
[Accessed: 10 June 2013].  
Onwuegbuzie, A. J., and Teddlie, C. 2003. A Framework for Analyzing Data in 
Mixed Methods Research. In: Tashakkori, A and. Teddlie, C. (eds).Handbook of 
134 
 
Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
351-383. 
Parry, S and Kupiec-Teahan, B. 2010. Exploring marketing and relationship 
software SMEs: a mixed methods approach. Bangor Business School Working 
Paper. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.bangor.ac.uk/business/docs/BBSWP10015.pdf [Accessed: 3 July 
2014]. 
Pastor, R. A. 1999. The role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions: 
Implication for Policy and Research. Democratization, 6(4):1-27. 
Pintor-Lopez, R. 2000. Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of 
Governance. New York: United Nations Development Programme. [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://www.albacharia.ma/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/30506/0247Electoral
%20management%20bodies%20as%20Institutions%20of%20Governance.pdf?se
quence=1  [Accessed: on 22 June 2012]. 
Pitcher, A., Moran, M.H and Johnston, M. 2009. Rethinking Patrimonialism and 
Neopatrimonialism in Africa. African Studies Review, 52(1):125-156. 
Punch, K.F. 2011. Introduction to Social Research: quantitative and qualitative 
approaches .2thed. New Delhi: Sage. 
Rakner, L and Svåsand, L. 2005. May be free but not fair: Electoral administration 
in Malawi 1994-2004. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. [Online] Available at:  
http://bora.cmi.no/dspace/bitstream/10202/97/1/Working%20paper%20WP%2020
05-5.pdf [Accessed: 22 June 2012]. 
Report of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security. 2012. 
Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections 
135 
 
Worldwide. [Online]. Available at: http://www.idea.int/publications/deepening-
democracy/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=54594 [Accessed: 
10June 2013]. 
Réseau National pour Observation et Surveillance des Elections au Congo. 2012. 
Mission Nationale D’observation Electorale: Rapport final de l’observation des 
elections presidentielles et legislatives nationales du 28 Novembre 2011 en 
République Démocratique du Congo. Kinshasa: RENOSEC. 
Roberts, M. D.R.C Elections 2011: Lessons Learned for a Faltering Democracy, 
10 August 2011. [Online]. Available at: http://m.polity.org.za/article/drc-elections-
2011-lessons-learned-for-a-faltering-democracy-2011-08-11 [Accessed: 10 June 
2013].  
Robson, C. 2011. Real world research: a resource for users of social research 
methods in applied settings.3thed. Sussex: John Wiley and Sons. 
Rudolph, T.J. and Evans, J. 2005. Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for 
Government Spending. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3):660-671. 
Rukambe, J. 2008. EMBs, Strategic Planning and Professional Development: 
International IDEA joint Training on Effective Electoral Assistance working paper 
presented in Maputo. [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.google.co.za/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=ol7bU7OCBqLd8gfP8oCYDg&gws_rd=s
sl#q=Rukambe%2C+Joram.+2008.+EMBs%2C+Strategic+Planning+ [Accessed: 
22 January 2013].  
Sadiki, K. 2013. Understanding election-related violence in Africa: Patterns, 
consequences and a framework for prevention action. Journal of African Elections, 
12(3):51-88.  
136 
 
Schram, S.F. 2007. Taking Political Science Seriously: Mixing Methods Makes for 
a More Contingent but Self-Reflective Discipline. [Online]. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10746-007-9056-7# [Accessed: 22 
July 2014].  
Schurink, W., Fouché, C. and De Vos, A.S. 2011. Qualitative data analysis and 
interpretation. In: De Vos, A.S., Strydom, H., Fouché, C.B. and Delport, C.S.L. 
(eds). Research at grass roots: For the social sciences and human service 
professions. 4thed. Pretoria: Van Schaik,397-423. 
Sebudubudu, D and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. 2010. The Management of Elections: The 
case of Botswana. Politeia, 29(1) 65-77.  
Sebudubudu, D. 2006. Election observation and monitoring in Botswana. Journal 
of African Elections, 5 (2):165-180. 
Shilaho, W. K. 2013. Old wine in the new skins: Kenya‟s 2013 Elections and the 
triumph of the régime. Journal of African Elections, 12(3):89-119. 
Sonubi, O.A. 2010. Managing problems and pressures facing single mothers in 
management and professional occupations in South African organizations.   
Unpublished thesis, faculty of Economic and Management sciences, University of 
Pretoria. 
Southern Africa Development Community-Parliamentary Forum. 2001. Norms and 
standards for elections in the SADC region. Windhoek. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/167_SADCPF%20Norm
s%20and%20Standard%20for%20Elections.pdf [Accessed: 25 September 2014].  
Struwing, J., Roberts, B and Vivier, E. 2011. A vote of confidence: Election 
management and public perceptions of electoral processes in South Africa. 
Journal of Public Administration, 46(3):1117-1138. [Online]. Available at: 
137 
 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/jpad/jpad_v46_n3_
si1_a3.pdf [Accessed: 27 May 2012]. 
Teddlie, C and Tashakkori, A. 2009. Foundations of Mixed Methods Research: 
Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in the Social and Behavioral 
Sciences.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Tlakula, P. 2011. Promoting free and fair elections. Presented paper at the launch 
day of the National Results Operation Centre. [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.google.co.za/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=sbwyVNOoDYup8weNhoHIBQ&gws_rd=
ssl#q=Tlakula%2C+p.+2011.+Promoting+free+and+fair+elections.+Presented+pa
per+at+the+launch+day+of+the+National+Results+Operation+Centre 
[Accessed:16 June 2013].  
Tötemeyer, G. 2010. Namibia‟s constitution, democracy and the electoral process. 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.kas.de/namibia/en/publications/21153 
[Accessed: 15 May 2013]. 
Tshiyoyo, D.2006. The Constitutional Referendum in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Conflict Trends, 2:24-28.  
Tshiyoyo, D. 2012. The 2011 Elections in the DR Congo: Assessing the electoral 
legal framework and CENI‟s preparedness to organize the 2011 elections. 
Unpublished paper presented at the workshop organized by African Institute of 
South Africa in Pretoria. 
Tuseku, T.D. 2011. The 2011 elections and the democratization process in the 
DRC. Unpublished paper presented at the postgraduate annual conference held at 
the University of South Africa.  
Ugues, A. 2010. Citizens‟ view on Electoral Governance in Mexico. Journal of 
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 20(4):495-597. 
138 
 
Van der Meer, T. 2010. In what we trust? A multi-level study into trust in 
parliament as an evaluation of state characteristics. International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, 76(3):517-536. 
Wall, A., Ellis, A., Ayoub, A., Dundas, C. W., Rukambe, J and Staino, S. 2006. 
Electoral Management Design: The International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance Handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA.  
Willame, J.C.1972. Patrimonialism and Political change in the Congo. California: 
Stanford University press.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
Appendix A                           DRC geographical and administrative map 
 
Source: Online available at: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/d-r-of-congo-
maps.html. [Accessed: 4 October 2014].   
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Appendix B 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
My name is Tumba Tuseku Dieudonné, currently studying for a Master‟s degree in 
Politics at the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa 
(UNISA). In fulfilment of the requirements of the Master‟s degree, each student is 
required to carry out a research study in any approved topic relating to Political 
Sciences. Hence, I am undertaking this research as part of these requirements. 
My research topic focuses on “STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THE 
MANAGEMENT OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO”. The information you provide is 
requested for educational purposes only, will not be used against you in anyway 
and will be treated confidentially. Therefore, you do not have to give your name or 
other details that might identify you, should you prefer to remain anonymous. 
 
Statement of consent 
I have read the above information. I consent voluntarily to participate in the study. 
Participant‟s Name:……………………………………………………………………… 
Participant‟s Signature………………………………………………………………….. 
Date……………………………………………………………………………………….                               
 
I THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO BE INTERVIEWED. 
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Appendix C 
Schedule interview for key informants 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed for this research study. The study which 
is part of my Master‟ s dissertation research at the University of South Africa 
(Pretoria), Department of Political Sciences, explores the perceptions of election 
stakeholders on the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. You may choose not to 
answer a particular question if you feel uncomfortable, or you may withdraw your 
consent to participate in this interview at any time, should you prefer to do so. 
 
Section 1: Informants Information 
1. Gender: 
2. Organizational Affiliation: 
Section 2: Perceptions on the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the 
DRC 
1) What can you tell me about the management of the 2011 elections the 
DRC?  
………………………………………………………………..................................
........................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................
....................................... 
2) What factors affected the management of the 2011 electoral processes in 
the DRC? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………….. 
3) How would describe the capacity (performance) of the INEC in managing 
the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC? 
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………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
4) How did you perceive the following aspects related to the 2011 elections 
management in the DRC? 
- Political context in which the 2011 elections were organized 
- Nomination process of INEC members 
- Recruitment of election officers 
- Competence of presiding and election officers 
- Election logistic related to the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC 
- Voter registration process 
- Civic and voter education 
- Election campaign 
- Counting and tabulation of the vote 
- Election dispute resolution 
- Credibility of the 2011 election outcome 
5) Is there anything else you would like to say with regard to the management 
of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC?  
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
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Appendix D 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDENTS 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed for this research study. The study which 
is part of my Master‟ s dissertation research at the University of South Africa 
(Pretoria), Department of Political Sciences, explores the perceptions of election 
stakeholders on the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. You may choose not to 
answer a particular question if you feel uncomfortable, or you may withdraw your 
consent to participate in this interview at any time, should you prefer to do so. 
Section I: Demographic background of respondents 
a) Gender 
          Male                      Female 
 
 
b) Level of Education 
         
 Secondary school                    Tertiary                          Other 
                                       
 
c) Membership with Civil Society Organizations   
    Yes                            No                         
   
 
d) Have you been trained in order to become skilled and knowledgeable in 
election observation and monitoring? 
           Yes                               No            
 
 
e) How many years of experience do you have as Civil Society Organizations role 
player in the DRC? Please tick the appropriate box 
1-5 years  
6-10 years  
11-15 years  
16-20 years  
21- above  
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Section II: Credibility of the 2011electoral processes in the DRC 
              
1) Thinking only about the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC, 
do you believe that the election results accurately reflected the way people voted? 
                      Yes                               No        
   
 
If no, could you explain your answer? 
...................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................... 
 
2) In your view, did the electoral legal framework ensure the integrity of the 2011 
electoral processes? 
                     Yes                                No        
   
 
If no, could you explain your answer? 
...................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................... 
 
3)  Please rate the degree to which you agree with each statement below by 
ticking the appropriate box     
Statement Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
The Congolese 2011 
presidential and parliamentary 
elections were free 
     
The Congolese  2011 
presidential and parliamentary 
elections were fair 
     
The INEC made decisions that 
favor some contenders 
     
The INEC performed its duty 
with independence 
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Section III: Level of satisfaction in certain election aspects 
4) Please rate the degree to which you are satisfied with certain election aspects 
below by ticking the appropriate box 
Level of 
satisfaction in 
election aspects 
Very 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied   
Neither 
satisfied 
nor 
dissatisfied  
Somewhat 
dissatisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied  
Voter registration 
 
     
Information on 
voting               
procedures                     
     
Competency of 
electoral officers 
                 
     
Adequacy of 
equipment in voting 
station 
 
     
Impartiality of 
electoral officers 
 
     
 
Section IV: Level of trust towards institutions related to election 
management in the DRC 
5) Please rate the extent to which you trust the institutions below by ticking the 
appropriate box 
      
Level of trust towards 
institutions 
Very high Average  Neither high 
nor low  
Low Very low 
Government      
Parliament      
INEC               
   
     
Supreme Court 
 
     
Police      
High Council of Audio-visual 
and Communication 
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Section V: Respondents’ views on vote buying, violence related to elections 
and secrecy of the vote   
 
6) During the 2011 elections did anyone try to buy votes for a certain candidate? 
                       Yes                                                No     
                                       
 
7) During the 2011 electoral processes did you hear about any violence related to 
elections? 
                         Yes                                                 No     
                                       
   
8) How likely do you believe that someone could find out how you voted, given the 
fact that there is supposed to be a secrecy of the vote this country?   
                        Yes                                                  No     
                                       
 
I appreciate the time you took for this interview. Is there anything else you think 
would be helpful for me to know which might be of importance to my research 
study?  
...................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................  
 
Thank you again for giving me this opportunity to interview you. 
 
THANK YOU FOR TIME 
 
 
